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ABSTRACT 




The autodidact has a curious structural relationship to knowledge, education, and 
that assumed distillation of institutional learning, the academy.  Because of its 
subjectivity-producing function, knowledge represents a site of tremendous cultural 
investment, and one that is challenged, if not even undermined, by the renegade ethos and 
idiosyncratic approach of the autodidact.  Nineteenth century self-taught scholar and 
Renaissance man, Constantine Rafinesque, serves as a vivid exemplar, or even theoretical 
matrix, for demonstrating certain problems that the autodidact raises for post-
Enlightenment knowledge as it assumes the various institutional states, metaphysical 
postures, and ideological closures necessary for its culturally privileged function.  As the 
work of Michel Foucault has demonstrated, in its capacity as a crucial component in the 
makeup of the modern individual, knowledge is a cultural good of unequaled value; but 
its horizon is often one of force, regulatory and normative.  This dissertation posits the 
autodidact Rafinesque as a path for illustrating and exploring these various implicit, but 
nonetheless binding, regulations, limits and boundaries.    
Although a prolific contributor to fields such as taxonomy, botany, economics, 
linguistics, philosophy, and ethnography, Rafinesque continues to stir debate and generate
vi
perplexity among scholars.  This is due, in no small part, to his unusual status as both
social and intellectual outsider, one who in more ways than one challenges the coherence 
of disciplinary knowledge.  Eccentric, unorthodox, self-taught, and with few friends, 
Rafinesque came to symbolize knowledge in its most unregulated state, and to a large 
degree this status persists.  Each chapter of this dissertation departs from an episode in 
Rafinesque’s intellectual career.  Using Rafinesque’s writings and correspondence with 
intellectuals of the time, it joins these to a contemporary post-structural theoretical 
discussion involving the relationship between subjectivity and knowledge, knowledge 
and cultural value, and the role of the academy in the modern world.  By uniting these 
theoretical and research trajectories this work posits the autodidact as a type of post-
structural subjectivity, one whose very existence offers unique possibilities for the 
critique of contemporary knowledge as both the engine of apparent self-creation, and of 
the subject’s cultural/intellectual domestication.
vii
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Constantine Samuel Rafinesque, son of a wealthy French merchant and a Greek 
mother of German descent, was born in a suburb of Constantinople on October 22, 1783.  
Rafinesque spent the early part of his youth in Marseille, but as a result of the French 
Revolution the family fled to Leghorn, Italy in 1792.  These circumstances had a 
determinate effect on his upbringing such that from early youth Rafinesque was polyglot, 
cosmopolitan, and almost wholly self-taught.  In addition to his passion for languages and 
literature, Rafinesque showed early interest in the natural sciences, in particular botany, 
ichthyology, conchology, and the day’s unifying science, taxonomy.  He studied these and 
many other subjects relentlessly and largely in isolation.   
In 1793, Rafinesque’s father, while on business in Philadelphia, died when an 
epidemic of Yellow Fever swept the city.  Less than a decade later the young Rafinesque 
made his own trip to Philadelphia where he botanized and established contacts before 
returning to Italy to follow in his late father’s footsteps as a businessman.  Having 
amassed a significant fortune, Rafinesque left behind his money as well as his young 
wife, Josephine, and their daughter in order to embark on a scientific career in the New 
World.  He would never see his family again.    
An extensive collector, Rafinesque was obsessive in his fieldwork, hunting the 
unexplored forests for plant specimens and undiscovered animal species.  Not only did 
this process lead to thousands of new discoveries, it also drew Rafinesque into a variety 
of collateral pursuits such as ethnology and linguistic studies, the cataloging of Native
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 American earthworks, topography, viticulture, oenology, pharmacology, meteorology and 
countless others.  In 1819 Rafinesque took up residence in Kentucky to continue his 
discoveries on the frontier of the New World and teach at Lexington’s Transylvania 
University.  By 1826 Rafinesque was terminated from his professorship and shortly 
thereafter returned to Philadelphia where he continued to research and self-publish on 
diverse topics such as economics, education, linguistics, astronomy, metaphysics, and an 
array of scientific topics.  Money was an increasing concern for the chronically 
unemployed Rafinesque, and by the time of his death from gastric carcinoma in 1840, he 
was not only penniless, but deeply in debt.  As his biographer Leonard Warren 
summarizes the final scenario: “his papers, books, and plant collections, many junked, 
sell for less than the cost of burial” (xii).  He was interred without ceremony in a mass 
grave on Philadelphia’s south side.  
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INTRODUCTION: INSIDE AND OUTSIDE MYTHOLOGIES OF THE 
AUTODIDACT
Constantine Rafinesque is in some ways the exemplar of the Enlightenment’s 
rationalist promise, but at the same time he is the unwitting embodiment of what 
orthodoxy—here in the form of modern institutional knowledge—strives to repress, and, 
in his case, to a large extent did successfully repress.  Two analytic frames relevant to 
Rafinesque dominate the present study, and they are inextricably bound up in one 
another.  The first concerns the autodidact as a subjectivity peculiar to a cultural structure 
and historical epoch founded on knowledge as the primary engine for constituting useful, 
productive subjects (commonly and ideologically termed “individuals”) even while 
touting reason and knowledge as ends in and of themselves.  The second is the dynamic 
that emerges when this enshrined reason/knowledge takes institutional form, defining its 
systems, its orthodoxies and heresies, and delimiting those boundaries that will mark its 
inclusions and exclusions.  Rafinesque’s story is that of the autodidact, and the 
autodidact’s story concerns the inside and outside of institutional knowledge: what is 
deemed to fall within the realm of acceptable knowing versus what is judged hopelessly 
beyond the protective grasp of canonical validation.  This distinction between the inside 
and outside of the orthodox is unreflectively conceptualized as the simple difference 
between knowledge and non-knowledge, and in terms of agents of learning it separates 
the expert or cognoscente from the crank, crackpot or dilettante.  According to this frame 
of understanding the autodidact cannot appear other than as Reason’s chronic outsider.
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Of course, the binary conceptual structure of inside/outside, knowledge/non-
knowledge, rational/irrational, and so on, is and has been prey to a host of 
poststructuralist critiques concerning the cognitive parsing of post-Enlightenment 
Reason.  Inasmuch as Descartes’ Cogito is reckoned (accurately or not) as one dominant 
philosophical birthing ground for such regulative dichotomies, Derrida, via his critique of 
Foucault’s History of Madness, has demonstrated that, “the choice and division between 
the two ways … the way of logos and the non-way, the labyrinth, the palintrope in which 
logos is lost; the way of meaning and the way of non-meaning,” is a “crisis” that Reason 
contains within itself (Writing 62).  Similarly, Giorgio Agamben’s analysis of the logic 
governing systematic inclusion and exclusion has shown the institutional figuration of an 
inside and outside to be more legally binding than logically consistent (Homo 15-29).  
This leads Agamben to the juridical paradox that, “the law is outside itself” (15).  Here I 
would like to argue for a similar confusion with respect to what functions as the inside 
and outside of knowledge-as-orthodoxy, but I would maintain that it is in this case even 
more self-evident, the two realms existing in a visible relation of intimacy to one another. 
As a subjectivity, the autodidact illustrates this relation of intimacy.  The 
autodidact is by definition alienated from the inner sanctum of orthodox knowledge, but 
at the same time receives her/his mandate from the very principles that ostensibly 
determine the conditions of that knowledge.  Orthodoxy, whatever its form, is by nature 
conservative.  Yet, philosophically, the practice of modern knowledge is founded largely 
upon the potentially destabilizing twin imperatives of open critique and unregulated 
inquiry.  The autodidact is especially driven by the latter.  But as Rafinesque shows, the 
autodidact’s engagement with mainstream scholarship can have critical potential by
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revealing the limits, overt and otherwise, placed upon knowledge and its practitioners in
order to secure stability.  Post-Enlightenment knowledge, with its pretensions to universal 
scope, may not readily admit to having an “outside,” but orthodoxy must.  And the extent 
to which orthodoxy as a regulatory structure—whether in the form of the academy, 
inherited cultural practice, or some other received and binding “common sense”—seeks 
to safeguard itself against unsanctioned critique or limit acceptable modes of inquiry is 
one way it defines its own renegades and their practices, i.e. its “outside.”  The autodidact 
is at once a confirmation of, and a challenge to, the avowed rules of modern knowledge, 
knowledge being poised as it is somewhere between the exhilaration of discovery and the 
strictures of convention.  In this sense, Rafinesque’s adventures as an autodidactic 
knower speak both of the subjectivity itself and of the inherent potentialities and 
prohibitions that make such a subjectivity possible—even inevitable, but at the same time 
largely unviable as a recognized agent and producer of valid knowledge.  This 
dissertation looks at Rafinesque, and the autodidact, from both vantage points.
The effort to quarantine certain inferior or archaic modes of knowing or methods 
of inquiry to the margin, or even banish them to the outside, has not prevented the 
incursion of mythology into modern Reason.  Like the paradigms and epistemes of earlier 
cultural belief systems, modern Reason has its share of fables, origin stories and primal 
scenes.  One significant myth of Reason concerns Ur-philosopher and proto-cultural critic 
Socrates being brought before the Athenian jurors and forced to answer for his 
transgressions against the polis.  The “history” of this episode is uncertain, the only 
primary written accounts being Plato’s Apology, and Xenophon’s lesser known, slightly 
differing version, Socrates’ Apology to the Jury.  Nonetheless, the episode is substantial
5
enough to form the basis of an enduring account of origin, an account that seems to exert 
widespread appeal across disciplinary lines.  Philosopher C.D.C. Reeve has observed of 
Plato’s canonic version: “like the Gospels, it is an interdisciplinary text studied, 
sometimes in proprietary fashion, by classicists, philosophers, historians, literary 
scholars, and students of law, politics and religion” (ix).  The editors of the recent 
Northwestern UP anthology, Reexamining Socrates in the Apology, put this in even more 
dramatic terms: “we would have no tradition of philosophy without Socrates—but we 
would have no Socrates without the text. Socrates is a singular figure, font of our 
tradition” (xiii).  Philosopher and theorist, Simon Critchley, has commented on this story 
specifically in its mythogenic capacity, focusing particularly upon the climax of Socrates’ 
death and its continued resonance: “Philosophy loves to tell itself stories … and there is 
one story in particular that philosophy likes to tell … which, it seems, must be retold in 
order for philosophy to be capable of inheritance” (17).  Critchley defines this legacy as 
the tradition of “radical de-traditionalization,” or in other words, the commitment to 
critique that Socrates seems to embody and that the western impulse to logos will 
enshrine as it marches ever forward in pursuit of its rationalist promise.  In the modern 
context this critical impulse seems to inform everything from the Kantian Enlightenment 
injunction to “dare to know,” to the German Idealist notion of transformational Bildung, 
the scientific principles of fallibilism and falsifiability, and even the critical/theoretical 
practices of late modern interpretation which informs this dissertation1.
Perhaps one reason the episode of Socrates’ martyrdom has remained (or perhaps 
more accurately reemerged) evergreen into modernity is the simple fact that prior to the 
1Both Kant’s Enlightenment essay and the principles of scientific fallibilism are treated in this dissertation.  
As to the notion of Bildung see Thomas Mann’s 1923 lecture on the Weimar Republic, reprinted in part in 
Walter Horace Bruford’s 1975 German Tradition of Self-Cultivation: Bildung from Humboldt to Thomas 
Mann, Cambridge UP, page vii.
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19th century, philosophy was still the catch-all conceptual category for nearly any 
systematic scholarly inquiry, including science.  During Rafinesque’s day, scientists were 
still summoned under the moniker “natural philosopher,” and the so-called “liberal 
arts”—humanities in combination with natural sciences—were similarly glossed such 
that “philosophy” comes to signify them collectively throughout Kant’s seminal 1794 
critique of the university, Conflict of the Faculties.  But the story of Socrates’ demise also 
has internal qualities that give it mythic endurance, that make it succeed, in the words of 
Roland Barthes, at “ultra-signification, at the amplification of a first system,” which is to 
say, a system capable of giving underlying structure through symbolic coherence to a 
matrix of cultural values  (Mythologies 133).  Schelling and Hegel wrote in 1797 that in 
order to give rational thought life and meaning it must be made “sensual,” thus it was 
necessary to, “make ideas aesthetic, i.e., mythological” (Philosophy of German Idealism 
162).  It seems that philosophers (and critical thinkers generally) are themselves hungry 
for this same mythologizing process, for as Critchley observes, the story of Socrates’ 
apologia, “allows philosophers to reanimate, theatrically and sometimes in front of their 
students, the passion that founds their profession,” transforming what otherwise might 
seem a dry, drama-free exercise of thought into the climactic result of monumental 
struggle and sacrifice (17).  In this way, logos receives the benefit of pathos, in its dual 
senses of deep feeling and suffering unto death, and the critical imperative that founds so 
much rationalist inquiry is given a mythic paradigm for knowledge to be conceptualized 
as a stance of heroic resistance.  Seen from this angle, the contours of the story are 
familiar enough: Socrates is brought before the tradition-bound Athenian jurors on 
trumped up charges of corrupting the youth, denying the gods, making the lesser
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argument seem the greater, and so on; ever-defiant, he is found guilty and sentenced to
death; stoically content with his fate, Socrates drinks the poison potion and assumes his 
status as rationalism’s first and most significant martyr.
Against this canonical version of Socrates’ demise, I would like to suggest a 
different reading, if not even a parallel alternate myth.  In contrast to the picture of the 
one wise man pitted against ignorant superstition, we could understand the parable as 
being a myth of origin about the inside and outside of knowledge: knowledge as 
orthodoxy, and following this line of reason, Socrates as the archetype of the autodidact, 
the one who by definition must personify unorthodox knowing.  By this reckoning, the 
tale is about the collision of two differing approaches to knowledge, and the Athenian 
jurors are not merely benighted hoards in thrall to blind tradition, but custodians of an 
established archive, acting as its gatekeepers and appointed assessors.  Through their 
authoritarian roles these knowers function in the manner described by Francois Lyotard in 
The Postmodern Condition, by deciding “what knowledge is” and “what needs to be 
decided,” and by their evaluation Socratic knowledge does not fare well (9).  
Under this scheme of interpretation one of the central charges leveled against 
Socrates’ takes on a different mytho-theoretical aspect.  Accused of “corrupting the 
young,” the crucial Greek verb, consistent in both the accounts of Plato (24b) and 
Xenophon (19) (again, the only two significant sources), is diaptheirein, one which 
escapes precise translation into English on account of its distinctive polysemy.  Usually 
rendered “corrupt,” the word doubly signifies “to destroy,” and “to seduce.”  Liddel and 
Scott’s lexicon emphasize that the word has psychological dimensions as well as moral, 
by observing that in the perfect it can indicate “to be deranged, mad” (168).  Through its 
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effects, this knowledge pursued without cultural approval bears traces of risk, disruptive 
desire, even madness; and it is this transgressive knowledge that Socrates is accused of 
cultivating.  It is also in light of this accusation that Socrates begins to look most like the 
modern autodidact, that agent of knowledge who circumvents—or even defies—orthodox 
channels in pursuit of knowledge as an object of desire, or even as its own metaphysical 
end.  Socrates argues for a definition of knowledge as intrinsically worthy, and the 
Socratic passion for knowledge reflects this in being self-propulsive, self-justifying, 
autodidactic—even autoerotic.  Through Plato, his most famous student, Socrates gives a 
picture of what it looks like to sublimate the carnal to the intellectual and along the way 
offers recipes for cathectic conceits such as “Platonic love,” and “children of the mind.”  
Socrates has been seduced (diaphtheirein) by knowledge to the extent of his own 
destruction (diaphtheirein).  But the risk is not confined to Socrates’ ruin, nor to the ruin 
of those youths whom he has figuratively seduced.  Inasmuch as the archive is 
synonymous with the orthodox, to the extent that it constitutes the “inside,” it too is 
threatened by this alien knowledge; and it is this risk that it seeks to curb through 
Socrates’ trial and execution in a hygienic act of self-preservation.
By recounting Socrates’ story I am making no historical claims.  Rather, I am 
arguing that even as modern Reason must mythologize its own heroic origins and critical 
mission, the autodidact already haunts the scene as its repressed remainder.  The self-
same account that gives Reason mythic shape and purpose by depicting its hero, its 
enemies, and their struggle, can be alternately read as a parable of knowledge as an 
uncertain value in an ever-contested ground.  Under the twin aspects of diaphtheirein, 
destruction/seduction, knowledge exerts its risky allure.  Allure because knowledge, with
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its own internal economy of desire, entices, even seduces.  Risk because though 
knowledge sometimes does empower, it always changes—or even corrupts, and often in 
radical and unpredictable ways; it can change both the subjects who give themselves over 
to it (those impressionable Athenian young, and Socrates himself) and it can change the 
archive (the humiliated Athenian citizens, the polis, even the Western tradition as founded 
upon this myth).  It is this dynamic, too complex to be characterized simply as heroic, 
that informs the adventure of the autodidact as s/he clashes with orthodoxy and its many 
forms of hemlock. 
Given his particular time, place and character, Rafinesque is a striking avatar of 
this alternate Socratic archetype, offering both a vivid model for autodidactic subjectivity 
as well as an example of the problems such a figure poses for institutional knowledge.  
During his productive years in the early 19th century, the orthodoxies that characterize 
post-Enlightenment knowledge were in a formative stage.2  The sciences were just 
beginning to delimit their horizons of inquiry and in this way separate themselves from 
each other as well as certain studies—some of which will come to be called the 
humanities—that had hitherto been included as part of their make up.  This process 
involves the establishment of internal criteria: repeatable discursive conditions 
encompassing system or procedure—what collectively comes to be called method—in 
addition to closed intra-disciplinary networks of authority that will vouchsafe a given 
practitioner’s credibility and output.  Combined, these reductive and constructive 
processes of disciplinary self-definition give each branch of inquiry, scientific or 
otherwise, an identity and a sense of coherent continuity, but also go far in establishing 
2For a revealing but concise overview of this process of development see the David Cahan edited volume, 
From Natural Philosophy to the Sciences: Writing the History of Nineteenth Century Science, University of 
Chicago Press, 2003. 
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exclusions and creating institutional boundaries, thus demarking both the inside and 
outside of the field.  A revealing aspect of Rafinesque’s story involves his inability to 
observe and obey discursive rules that were emerging as the regulative norms within the 
sciences, his well as an inability to secure crucial endorsements from those who had 
come to represent the faces of orthodoxy.  These failures not only marked him as 
unorthodox, autodidactic, they represent transgressions against the rules that the sciences 
were just beginning to posit in order to define themselves.    
This essentially regulatory self-definition at the institutional level to some degree 
clashes with the exhilaration of Enlightenment faith in knowledge as its own 
metaphysical end, a trait which characterizes Rafinesque’s will to know, and to a great 
extent that of the autodidact, generally.  The postures of self-legitimation and protective 
closure that Rafinesque’s work so often encountered—even if for apparently valid 
reasons—cannot help but reveal some of the willful blind spots and repressions that were 
helping to shape once heterodox studies into an emerging governing orthodoxy called the 
sciences.  The determinations of these disciplines have consequently informed our 
inherited conceptual structure for what constitutes knowledge, per se, as well as its means 
of circulation, production and management.  Through Rafinesque’s autodidactic 
adventures we see not merely the foundational gestures of the emerging sciences, but also 
the outlines—both positive and negative—that will come to be reckoned as governing 
attributes of knowledge itself: its reliance upon various types of system as well as 
credentialing and corroboration.  In this way, the authority structures that are an 
inescapable corollary to institutional orthodoxy, those social dynamics that always attend 
validation and certification, the particular discursive and rhetorical forms meant to ensure
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coherence and communicability, are not merely mythologized, but even naturalized as 
knowledge’s essential elements.
The dissonance between the power structures endemic to institutional knowledge, 
and the promise of the Enlightenment, vis-à-vis, learning and education, are a key issue in 
The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Jacques Ranciere’s study of Rafinesque contemporary, 
Joseph Jacotot.  “Universal teaching,” Jacotot’s autodidactic pedagogy, is a radical self-
conscious reorientation of educational theory around the individual, a figure strictly 
conceived according to principles of the Enlightenment will to knowledge (52-4).  In this 
respect, Jacotot’s theory of “intellectual emancipation” wears its ideological 
presuppositions like a badge of honor, but does so for the purpose of preserving the 
integrity of what Kant and other Enlightenment luminaries saw as the fundamental unit of 
knowledge: the solitary researcher/learner.  The academy is also ostensibly organized in 
service to the same, but Jacotot recognized an inherent conflict between the ideals of 
Enlightenment inquiry and the drive toward institutionalization and standardization 
represented by the university and other educational bodies.  These collectives only 
engender intellectual conformity and groupthink, a “stultification” that mirrors the 
capricious authority wrought of general social imbalance.  Using Jacotot’s Enlightenment 
diction, Ranciere sums up: “it is obvious that from the moment men form a society for 
the purpose of protecting themselves against each other, this reciprocal need announces 
an alienation of reason that promises no reasonable result … thus the social world is not 
simply the world of non-reason it is that of irrationality” (81, 82).  Following Jacotot, 
who in turn was pursuing what he perceived to be the inescapable logic of modernity, 
Ranciere inverts the norm such that the isolated learner, the autodidact, is rendered the
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ideal, and the institution (in whatever form) becomes an egregious anomaly.  However, 
neither his rigorous theorizing nor his educational successes were enough to prevent 
Jacotot—like his historical fellow Rafinesque—from ultimately lapsing into intellectual 
obscurity, successfully repressed by the machinations of intellectual authority he opposed 
and denounced.     
Jacotot’s hostility to capriciously regulated knowledge is reflected within 
orthodoxy itself as anxiety concerning authenticity.  Jacotot recognized that one of the 
key pressure points of institutional modern knowledge was its reliance upon specific 
rhetorical forms and discursive strategies.  Ultimately inescapable, since these parameters 
give knowledge its concrete, communicable shape, orthodoxy additionally relies upon 
standardized forms and ritualized gestures to function as legible guarantors of authority.  
One fundamental exercise of Jacotot’s universal teaching involved students delivering 
spontaneous, structured lectures on topics completely unknown to them (Ranciere 42).  
This lesson, which empowers the learner by urging spontaneous sustained intellectual 
action and immediate direct engagement with rhetorical process, becomes an almost 
parodic critique of an institutional knowledge system wherein apparent credentials or 
seemingly authoritative verbal packaging may traffic in place of actual content.  
Knowledge’s reliance upon authority—or its semblance— invites exploitation and this 
takes urgent shape in modernity as the hoax.  Rafinesque was implicated in such hoaxing. 
In a notable example, while Rafinesque was a guest of John Audubon during an early 
sojourn into the Western frontier of Kentucky, the host convinced him that a huge log 
floating on the surface of the Ohio was an uncataloged species, the “Devil-Jack 
Diamond-Fish,” armored with bulletproof scales capable of emitting enough spark to start
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a bonfire.  Upon the authority of his guide, sight unseen, Rafinesque gave the creature a 
scientific name, Litholepsis adamantinus, and published on it, only to be later mercilessly 
ridiculed for the mistake (Warren 74).  But Audubon’s antic says less as evidence of 
Rafinesque’s credulity than as a demonstration of the binding force of testimony—those 
networks of authoritative witness and corroboration—that necessarily attends evolving 
intellectual inquiry of drive and sweep.  Quite simply, complex systems of knowledge 
demand a more complex division of intellectual labor, and thus a high degree of reliance 
upon facts, but also upon representations of facts.  This not only allows for the hijack of 
said representation—the essence of the hoax, but also raises serious questions about the 
stability of representation, not least of all the challenge of fitting new and exploratory 
knowledge into well-worn discursive and rhetorical forms.  Uncertain speculation 
disguised by misleadingly authoritative delivery is just the most obvious example of the 
potential tensions between supposedly unbounded inquiry and rigorously standardized 
form.  One of the most infamous episodes of Rafinesque’s career, his “translation” and 
publication of the spurious Native American epic, Walam Olum, straddles this hazy 
territory wherein the deceptive merges into that which is merely discursively indefinite.  
Whatever its “actual” status, the Walam Olum, even more than modernity’s other many 
literary hoaxes, underscores the profound interdependence between authority and 
representation that goes into constituting what we understand as “facts.” 
In theory, knowledge does not tolerate a status quo (what Kant, in his 
Enlightenment essay, called our “self-imposed tutelage”) to the extent that it seems to 
welcome, even demand, critical input—voices from the outside, as it were.  In practice, 
however, knowledge is expressed in paradigms that are both normatively binding and
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reluctant to change, as Thomas Kuhn argued in his well known analysis of the sciences 
(52).  In this respect, knowledge as it is instantiated by governing processes and 
standardizing forms—the way that most of us access it—is always to some extent absent 
from itself, its promise seeming to lie somewhat less in the rules than in what will bring 
their eventual disruption; we endure strict forms and prescriptive structures, regarding 
them not as the source of knowledge, but only as its necessary police force, and always 
with the expectation that they will be eventually emended or rewritten according to the 
dictates of new knowledge.  Perhaps this fundamentally conflicted nature is what 
accounts for the ubiquity of the intellectual outsider, Ranciere’s Jacotot being yet another 
modern figure potentially understood as an embodiment of the Socratic/autodidactic 
protagonist.  “Eccentric” - literally “out of the center” - is the word that seems most often 
to be invoked in descriptions of Rafinesque.  This association is inaugurated by John 
Audubon, who penned the essay “The Eccentric Naturalist,” years after putting up, and 
putting up with, the wanderer on one of his earliest research sojourns into Western 
Kentucky.  But in spite of this persistent characterization, even minimal research into 
Rafinesque reveals him to be a ghostly presence in countless areas of intellectual 
endeavor.  Though largely ostracized, he was nonetheless productive in such fields as 
botany, ichthyology, taxonomy, ethnology, linguistics, to name but a few.  In these fields 
he contributed vast amounts of vocabulary and his work often anticipated or coincided 
with major scientific breakthroughs of others, including an early primitive theory of 
evolution, an anticipation of Georges Cuvier’s work on classification, a novel approach to 
comparative linguistic analysis, and significant pioneering ethnological research on 
Native American tribes.3  Rafinesque was even among the first to identify and define an 
3For a concise overview of Rafinesque’s many accomplishments—and shortcomings—see Charles 
Boewe’s introduction to Profiles of Rafinesque, University of Tennessee Press, 2003.
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emergent scientific discipline of his day, though his proposed name, “somiology,” arrived 
a few years later than Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s now familiar “biology,” and was 
forgotten.  In addition, Rafinesque was acquainted with an astounding number of 
significant historical and scientific figures, a fact all the more striking given his overall 
isolation from any particular community.
Apart from the footnotes, the scientific names, the copious correspondence and 
the equally vast catalog of public criticism he endured, Rafinesque persists in more 
sublimated ways.  It is impossible to theorize the autodidact without also theorizing 
knowledge and to some extent that common metonymic signifier of knowledge, and its 
rigorous institutional embodiment, the academy.  Rafinesque had a momentary affiliation 
with the academy, teaching for a short time at Kentucky’s Transylvania University, 
perhaps even mentoring the young Jefferson Davis in botany (Warren 81).  But this brief 
appointment cannot account for the spectral connections that Rafinesque has to the 
academy and to institutional knowledge in general.  For example, one of his fiercest and 
most vocal champions was David Starr Jordan (1851-1931), crusading president for both 
Indiana and Stanford Universities and the man whom Gerald Graff credits as instrumental 
in finding the modern American academy’s metaphysical center with the creation of the 
first department of English (67).  Jordan, an ichthyologist, early proponent of evolution, 
and eugenicist, wrote extensively and passionately on Rafinesque, helping to rehabilitate 
him from the scornful public dismissal that followed the autodidact’s death.  More 
circuitously, in a recent work on taxonomy, Rafinesque’s primary scientific field, Carol 
Yoon ties the impulse toward classification to the notion of Umwelt (15-17).  This 
theoretical term, first posited by German biologist, Jakob von Uexkull, and meaning
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“environmental perspective/worldview,” fascinated Heidegger (Fundamental Concepts of  
Metaphysics 261-67), and more recently Giorgio Agamben (Open: Man and Animal, 
chapter 10), and was one of the chief elements of Thomas Sebeok’s biosemiotics.  Sebeok 
had developed the field while professor at Indiana University where he had come to assist 
celebrated anthropologist Carl Vogelin, chief translator and overseer of Eli Lily’s 
“scholarly” edition of the Walam Olum (subject of chapter 4 of this dissertation).  These 
connections are anecdotal, tangential, even rather nebulous, but in being so they are 
appropriate to Rafinesque, the autodidact, and the university.  Since Kant, theorists of the 
academy have struggled to identify its stable ground, articulate its logical center.  
Naturally, this uncertainty carries over to the figure that—on account of being its outsider
—is differentially defined by the academy: the autodidact.  Ultimately it is my contention 
that the autodidact and the modern academy interpenetrate one another, both being 
products of the post-Enlightenment episteme and its specific definition of, and orientation 
to, knowledge; and yet upon analysis both are—like knowledge itself—curiously protean, 
even somewhat nebulous, except in their negative or exclusionary attributes.  Through the 
contrast of this solitary learner with this reverend institution, knowledge may be no easier 
to define, and yet it appears to assume a definite inside and outside.  Rafinesque is a 
fitting tour guide to connect both of these regions.        
This study argues that within the landscape of possible post-Enlightenment 
subjectivities there exists a covert hero—or perhaps antihero—in the figure of the 
autodidact.  A subject both transgressive and necessary, the autodidact is at once 
embedded in the logic of modernity and alienated by it.  She/he is the epitome of the self-
made individual, a human identity founded in, and by, knowledge, but to an unacceptable
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degree.  One could say that the autodidact is a “post-structural” subject-position, one 
which by its very terms of existence speaks to the paradoxical character of knowledge as 
a modern value and pushes at the acceptable boundaries of the ideologically constructed 
notion of the individual as an autonomous entity largely founded in knowledge.  
Literalizing certain post-Enlightenment dictates, the autodidact idealizes knowledge as 
the primary mechanism for creating individuals over and against the institutional 
structures that have come to govern and even metonymically identify modern learning.  
This especially applies to the academy, knowledge’s terrestrial epitome, and the structure 
against which the autodidact is always differentially defined.  I use this subject-position, 
and more specifically, the autodidact as embodied by Rafinesque, as a point of focus for 
joining several research trajectories encompassing the contemporary critique of the 
Enlightenment conception of knowledge as well as the institution of the academy.
Michel Foucault’s Order of Things began an extensive archeology of knowledge 
and subjectivity centered upon the fundamental insight that a unique characteristic of the 
late modern period is that, “man appears in his ambiguous position as an object of 
knowledge and as a subject that knows” (312).  Foucault later sharpened his focus to the 
actual production of subjectivity through the operation of what he calls power-knowledge, 
the index of discursive possibilities and prohibitions that determine the defining horizons 
of individual subjects and which exert themselves locally through what individuals know 
and how they in turn can be known.  From this vantage point knowledge ceases to be an 
inert amalgam of facts to be gathered, shared out and acted upon, and instead becomes an 
extensive series of regulatory processes of control and definition (arguably the same 
thing) essential to structuring reality and the self.  In Discipline and Punish, Foucault
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observes the polyvalent nature of these systematized processes of control, so-called 
knowledge regimes, as they are institutionally exercised: “the individual is no doubt the 
fictitious atom of an ‘ideological’ representation of society; but he is also a reality 
fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called ‘discipline’ … The 
individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (194). 
The Enlightenment dream of knowledge as pure discovery in the aid of unlimited 
personal agency, summed up by the apocryphal Francis Bacon motto, scientia potentia 
est (“knowledge is power”), gives way to Foucault’s more complex picture wherein 
knowledge is the discursive boundary circumscribing all human potential, personal or 
otherwise.  This becomes the analytic horizon for mapping the cultural histories of 
countless institutions, since everything from the penal system to human sexuality to 
education, per se, is enclosed and governed by such discursive mechanisms. 
The cultural institutions which treat knowledge directly also respond to the same 
analysis, and this is of marked importance with respect to the autodidact, a subjectivity 
defined by learning and the various forces that structure it.  Perhaps not ironically, one 
important articulation of the Enlightenment euphoria in knowing is also taken as the 
clarion call for its self-directed critique.  Kant’s influential essay, “Was Ist Aufklarung” 
(“What Is Enlightenment”) with its imperative sapere aude (“dare to know”), becomes 
for Foucault not merely a case of, “philosophical thought … reflect[ing] on its own 
present,” but is also an instance of doing so negatively, which is to say critically (Reader 
33-34).  Thus begins the meta-critique in which inquiry becomes its own object of 
analysis, one salient feature susceptible to this operation being the various hierarchical 
formations which knowledge assumes as it attains its status as premium cultural good. 
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The formation of institutional orthodoxy engenders a host of cultural judgments and 
valuations, sometimes to the detriment of the individual knower/inquirer, the very agent 
whom Kant saw as the protagonist of Enlightenment strategy—the darer, so to speak.  
Barbara Benedict observes in her extensive cultural history of curiosity in modernity that, 
“the individual, empirical pursuit of information was seen to challenge the social use or 
organization of knowledge,” (4).  The narrowing of knowledge into what fits acceptable 
“social use or organization,” i.e. into various disciplinary lenses, resonates beyond the 
individual in that it also leaves behind a trail of invalidated, marginalized, repressed or 
ignored knowledges and knowledge-strategies, as Siegfried Zielinski’s “variantology,” or 
archeology of orphaned media, has vividly shown.4
At the level of pedagogy the repression of knowledge-strategies encompasses the 
aforementioned Joseph Jacotot, and Ranciere’s study of this autodidactic educator, The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster, is an important antecedent to my dissertation.  Not only is 
Ranciere’s text the only contemporary critical-theoretical work to deal directly with 
autodidaxy,5 it also opens a window into some of the Enlightenment presuppositions that 
structure our contemporary understanding of how knowledge functions both culturally 
and individually.  While Ranciere gives concentrated attention to general social forces 
and their (largely negative) effect on learning, relatively little is said about the academy 
specifically.  Rafinesque had a much more complex relationship to the university than 
Jacotot; and in the time since both men were active the academy has come to dominate 
our understanding of what knowledge is and how it functions, a situation which has 
ramifications for our continued evolving understanding of autodidaxy.  Thus another 
4Of particular relevance to this dissertation is Zielinski’s treatment of Rafinesque contemporary, Johann 
Wilhelm Ritter, 159-205. 
5Ranciere’s own coinage based on Greek roots, 126.
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crucial facet of this dissertation involves the rich critique of the academy itself, a move 
again inaugurated by Kant with his 1798 analysis, Conflict of the Faculties.  Recent 
critical theory has seen a resurrection of this line of inquiry with Bill Reading’s cultural 
analysis of the “post-historical” academy, University in Ruins, a conversation taken up by 
Gregg Lambert’s Report to the Academy and Jacques Derrida’s Eyes of the University.  It 
is perhaps no wonder that the autodidact is a subject position at once untenable and 
inevitable, for its contrastive term, the academy, has been revealed as equally 
paradoxical.  In many respects this dissertation is an attempt to join into this exchange 
concerning the institutional status of contemporary knowledge, though it does so through 
an admittedly—and maybe fittingly—oblique direction.
Rafinesque certainly qualifies as a marginalized agent of knowledge, an 
irremediable outsider, and continuing uncertainty about the exact nature of his vast—but 
extremely controversial—input into the emerging modern knowledge carries over into 
scholarship about the man.  The fact that he made significant contributions to both the 
sciences and the humanities has meant that most treatments of Rafinesque have chosen 
one disciplinary path into his work over the other, and for a multitude of reasons, many of 
them relevant to this dissertation, the sciences have generally prevailed.  Several brief 
biographical sketches of Rafinesque have been made, but only recently has a significant 
biography by Leonard Warren appeared, a text which tries to situate him as a crucial 
contributor to the emerging scientific understanding of the New World, in spite of 
Warren’s repeated insistence that his autodidactic status marks him as little more than an 
inspired amateur and a loose cannon at that.  The foremost contemporary scholar on the 
topic is Charles Boewe, a former academic and now retired independent researcher who
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specializes in history and philosophy of science.  Boewe has edited a collection of 
Rafinesque’s writing as well as a collection of writings about Rafinesque that spans over 
a century.  In addition, Rafinesque occasionally appears as a topic in scientific journals 
wherein specialized issues related to ichthyology, botany, or malacology (study of 
mollusks) are dealt with and his work still has some relevance.  Generally, Rafinesque’s 
extremely problematic work in the humanities or sciences has received little attention 
from the perspective of contemporary humanities theory, though the “scientific” merit of 
his work in comparative linguistics is still the topic of some debate.6 
Bypassing the more usual form of biography or linear narrative, this text clusters 
issues around key themes, images and moments of significance to Rafinesque’s story, 
using these as a way of ordering both the theoretical materials as well as the writings by 
and on Rafinesque.  In this respect, Rafinesque functions less as a protagonist, per se, 
than as a kind of literary trope giving structure to a series of vignettes each of which 
offers a critique of knowledge as it assumes the institutional states necessary for its 
continuing, recognizable status as a value of cultural significance.  The first chapter, 
“Peculiarly My Own: The Autodidact’s Conditions of Being,” traces a general theory of 
the autodidact, historicizing this subjectivity, while drawing upon select episodes from 
Rafinesque’s life for illustration.  In particular the chapter is concerned with explaining 
the engine of desire that drives autodidactic learning, and the ways that this desire and its 
expression fundamentally conflict with modernity’s emerging dominant discursive modes 
for handling knowledge, especially as knowledge is more and more modeled using the 
sciences as its highest exemplar.  To again stress, it is impossible to adequately theorize 
6For example, see Vilen V Belyi’s, “Rafinesque’s Linguistic Activity,” Anthropological Linguistics. Vol 39, 
No. 1 (Spring 1997), p 60-73.  
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the autodidact without looking toward knowledge and how it is ideologically and 
institutionally constituted and this too is a facet of the chapter.  One of the primary points 
of contention vis-a-vis the autodidact concerns the status of the archive and the extent to 
which it is a public good, accessible to all and open for unlimited input and withdrawal.  
This question encompasses the priesthood that is the university and their privileged role 
in defining and maintaining knowledge orthodoxy.  If the autodidact is chiefly defined in 
contrastive relation to the academy, then how do we define the academy?  Here I argue 
that the autodidact is a subjectivity that emerges as logically from the dictates of 
Enlightenment values as does the university, but which struggles against the same 
contradictions that have haunted the modern university since its appearance.  
In chapter two, “Rafinesque’s Herbarium: The Individual as Knowledge, 
Knowledge as Collection,” I examine the commonsense metaphor of knowledge as a type 
of personal property.  The evolving concept of ownership is essential to the rise of the 
bourgeois individual, the two joining to form an index of mutual definition.  While 
Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke used the concept of property to explain 
inborn rights and labor production, this notion, perhaps naturally, also came to seem 
applicable to acquired knowledge.  But rather than as a type of exchangeable property, or 
currency, I suggest knowledge should be understood similarly to a collection—even a 
systematic (scientific) collection—with its more nebulous sense of worth and its 
contested status as property, existing somewhere between the public and private.  To 
illustrate this conundrum I examine Rafinesque’s prized herbarium, a collection that he 
fetishized, theorized, and even attempted to use as leverage to persuade Thomas Jefferson 
to grant him an appointment at the University of Virginia.  Through Rafinesque’s
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herbarium I posit the notion of autodidactic knowledge as a kind of spurned collection on 
account of its fundamentally uncertain and idiosyncratic value.
Though Rafinesque was known primarily as a botanist, much of his work and 
thought was devoted to the evolving discipline of taxonomy, and his naming of creatures 
and species has been one of the most enduring aspects of his legacy (as well as one of the 
most problematic).  Chapter three, “Arthrology: Taxonomy, Category, Validity and the 
Archive,” examines this facet of his career and the ways that it testifies to his intellectual 
isolation.  Just as Wittgenstein questioned the coherence of a radically private language, 
the autodidact urges us to ask if it is possible to have a private science (in whatever way 
one wishes to define the notion of science).  To what degree is all systematic knowledge 
fundamentally social or at least dependent upon collective forces for validation?  Here I 
use the example of Rafinesque’s correspondence with Cuvier as a model to discuss his 
standing within, and alienation from, the intellectual culture of his time as well as 
problems inherent to taxonomy itself.  To what extent is taxonomy a linguistic activity, 
and vice versa?  To what extent does it capture nature’s own divisions?  Although much 
of science (early taxonomy included) is predicated on capturing the inherent qualities of 
material and its behaviors, like all human activities, in addition to its overt aims, it cannot 
help but form an intersection between thought, language and culture.  This point of 
intersection forms a gravitational center that must be obeyed, and that the autodidact (like 
Rafinesque) defies at his/her peril.
One of the most infamous episodes of Rafinesque’s career is his “translation” of 
the forged Native American epic poem, Walam Olum.  This text became the centerpiece 
of a great deal of ethnological and linguistic research.  Perhaps even more
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problematically, the faux epic was unwittingly embraced as part of the Delaware Indian 
identity reclamation movement during the latter part of the 20th century, and in the 
manner of creating an artificial “continuity with the past” described by Eric Hobsbawm 
in The Invention of Tradition, has stubbornly persisted as such even long after its 
debunking (Invention 1).  Nearly the entire body of scholarly work since David 
Oestreicher’s initial demonstration of the text’s dubious nature has been preoccupied with 
arguing the degree of Rafinesque’s culpability, and determining the reasons for the so-
called hoax.  In “Instabilities: Walam Olum, Knowledge Creation and Discursive Forms,” 
I argue that this bizarre text sheds light on the formal necessities inherent to knowledge in 
the modern age.  Though the label “hoax” may apply, examination of the way the Walam 
Olum has functioned through time invites its comparison to “legitimate” knowledge-texts 
as they assumes the various provisional forms necessary for circulation.  In addition I 
compare the Walam Olum to other spurious identity-texts, such as the Ossian poems, and 
the Yasusada notebooks, to demonstrate the problems inherent in gauging the authenticity 
of certain types of texts.  In this respect the hoax-text reveals the degree to which all 
discursive forms (including those overtly devoted to knowledge) are to some extent 
subject to the capricious interplay of authority, authenticity and expediency.
The final chapter, “The Bones of Rafinesque: Virtuality and Knowledge’s 
Deferred Promise,” represents—as the title hints—something of a departure from the 
historical Rafinesque and even the autodidact, in order to look more directly at the 
character of knowledge, generally.  Here I use the controversy surrounding Rafinesque’s 
remains as a starting point to discuss his theories of knowledge as well as his vision for a 
utopian culture based on a metaphysics of knowledge, which is to say, knowledge
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conceived as both arche and telos, the ultimate end in and of itself.  These narrative 
elements serve to illustrate the developing thesis that knowledge is always to some extent 
in deferral, a promise never realized and essentially unrealizable.  This is not to say that 
knowledge is ineffectual or illusory, but rather that it functions as much in the realm of 
the virtual as that of the actual, its sense of perpetual absence forming a vital part of its 
character.  Though any study of knowledge in the post-Foucault age cannot risk lapsing 
into the purely idealistic, the final chapter attempts to preserve some of the benefits of 
idealism with respect to knowledge, its function and its meaning, while not sacrificing 
analytic honesty.  This aspiration seems true to the spirit of Rafinesque, such that in spite 
of the broader sweep of the chapter, the dissertation’s protagonist—like the section title 
suggests—persists as its ghostly remnant.    
David Starr Jordan, in one of his many pathos-driven accounts of the autodidact, 
approvingly cites ornithologist Elliot Coues that on analogy with words like “grotesque” 
and “picturesque,” our language is in need of the adjective “rafinesque” (Science 
Sketches 156 footnote).  The always slightly disapproving Warren picks up this idea and 
even offers his own gloss: 
The word rafinesque would be distinct from the harsh and derogatory 
raffish which according to Webster’s Dictionary (2nd edition) means (1) 
disreputable; disgraceful, and (2) tawdry; flash; cheap.  These words do 
not really apply to Rafinesque, who was an honorable, idealistic victim of 
his imagination, enthusiastic, grandiose in his visions, part charlatan, and 
forever bringing calamity down upon himself. (230 footnote)  
In the obscure lexicon of the autodidact, this word describing one’s combined seduction
and destruction by knowledge will be found after diaphtheirein.    
26
PECULIARLY MY OWN: THE AUTODIDACT’S CONDITIONS OF BEING
The autodidact arouses suspicion.  With no recognizable qualifications, no 
testimonial of academic affiliations, with no obvious motivation apart from the lure of 
knowledge-for-its-own-sake (itself a somewhat suspicious thing), this singular subject of 
solitary learning occupies a decidedly uncertain place in modernity’s reckoning.  In 1819, 
the roving naturalist and autodidact Constantine Samuel Rafinesque seemingly overcame 
these suspicions by being appointed professor of botany, natural history and modern 
languages, at Transylvania University in Lexington, Kentucky.
The bare outline of this event suggests a familiar narrative of restoration, 
reconciliation, a return to the whole: the renegade is at last brought into the fold; the 
loose end is recuperated back into the otherwise tightly woven fabric from which it has 
frayed.  This prodigal son motif in which fractious difference is resolved and inevitable 
order restored speaks to both the autodidact’s status and the institution against which s/he 
is defined.  The autodidact arouses suspicion.  To make this statement blithely passes over 
the underlying question central to said suspicion: exactly what is an autodidact?  In 
response to the question, the most obvious contemporary autodidactic tool yields this 
terse answer courtesy of merriam-webster.com: “a self-taught person.”  Apart from the 
thin meta-joke that whoever happens upon this particular webpage should look no further 
than oneself for an answer, the gloss is only really helpful in unearthing more questions.  
Self-taught in what?  Self-taught how?  And self-taught by whose standards of
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measurement?  What kind of knowledge, if any, is actually amenable to self-directed 
learning?  What kind is excluded from this approach?  If knowledge must be produced by 
someone before it can be learned by another can it ever accurately be described as self-
taught?  If all knowledge acquisition is dependent upon a personal will to know and the 
individual transformation of that will into action isn’t all knowledge in some essential 
ways self-taught?  To what extent is knowledge, its production, and its acquisition, a 
fundamentally interpersonal process and to what extent does it escape (or to put it more 
ideologically “transcend”) cultural and/or political vagaries?  Is the notion of private 
knowledge, or even privately acquired knowledge, even logically coherent?
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the web dictionary definition is what its 
brevity implies.  Why should the solitary in teaching/learning be the marked monad with 
respect to normativity, and how can its mere definition as such be sufficient for us to 
comprehend it?  What fundamental assumptions are concealed by this facile definition?  
The “problem” is that to a large degree the concept of the autodidact, and to 
borrow Jacques Ranciere’s term for the non-agentive form, autodidaxy,7 subconsciously 
marshals a host of other equally hazy, contingent and ideologically laden ideas for its 
formation.  The purpose of the forgoing is to untangle some of these notions using the 
autodidact—and specifically Rafinesque’s vivid embodiment of this figure—as a primary 
frame and theoretical trope.  One could describe the autodidact as a kind of post-
structural subjectivity of modernity, a figure whose impossibility is scarcely mitigated by 
the very logic that necessitates its appearance.  On one hand, the autodidact is the heroic 
crystallization of the post-Enlightenment credo concerning the liberatory/instrumental 
value of knowledge placed at the service of the individual.  But as Foucault has shown, 
7Ignorant Schoolmaster, page 126.
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knowledge—which he explicitly posits in identity with discursive power—is never so 
simple as to be purely salvific.8  Thus in the autodidact we see the cultural collision 
between metaphysical euphoria and ideological foreclosure.  Power-knowledge forms the 
subject (ideologically termed the “individual”) and thereby simultaneously enables and 
limits her/him within the regulating horizon of cultural legibility: “one of the main moral 
obligations for any subject is to know oneself ... and to constitute oneself as an object of 
knowledge both for other people and for oneself” (Foucault 2007, 151).  We must be, first 
and foremost, subjects of learning, and recognizably so.  Culturally regarded, we are what 
we know, and what we know must be open not only to self-reflection, but also to public 
review.  Private knowledge will not—cannot—be tolerated.  In this way knowledge 
always straddles the line between the individual’s volition and subjection, the personal 
and the institutional, the private and the public, as it forms the primary criterion and 
fundamental mechanism for both the creation of “self” and the cultural 
validation/invalidation of subjects.  
Given the profound importance placed on knowledge for creating subjects and 
also guaranteeing the legitimacy of those subjects, it is no surprise that one of the 
centerpieces of our culture would be the vast institutional apparatus overtly devoted to 
the task of overseeing said legitimacy, with all that this oversight entails; here I refer to 
primary schools, but especially to the university as the presumed apex of knowledge, its 
validation, conservation and dissemination.  What perhaps is surprising is that anyone—
especially one whose personality is self-consciously and overtly predicated upon 
knowledge—would choose to pursue this vocation outside of those channels of cultural 
8For discussion of the mechanics and scope of discursive power-knowledge, see Archeology of Knowledge,  
181-186; for a discussion of its localized effects on the formation of human subjects, see History of 
Sexuality, Volume One, 92-102. 
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legitimacy.  What is the value of knowledge when it has not been culturally certified?  
What kind of economy of desire drives someone to pursue knowledge irrespective of 
credentials?  These issues form the background of the autodidact’s identity, and of 
Rafinesque’s story. 
In one of his last and most original works, 1838’s Genius and Spirit of the 
Hebrew Bible¸ Rafinesque says of his project to re/discover (capitalized and emboldened) 
“Truth”: “many eminent men (nicknamed Rationalists) are doing so in Europe; I have 
seen but few of their works and my researches are therefore peculiarly my own” (14).  
There is perhaps no more apt summation of Rafinesque as agent of the modern will to 
know, the pioneer taxonomist, renegade scientist, autodidact.  At the time of his 
appointment, the thirty-six year old had already been prolific as an independent 
researcher.  Whether a true Renaissance man or just a thinker with a profound lack of 
focus (as some of his detractors maintain), Rafinesque had shown remarkable breadth in 
his intellectual pursuits and accomplishments.  Between time spent in the United States 
and Europe, he had amassed (lost, and amassed again) an extensive and costly collection 
of books and a wide variety of natural specimens, these being the day’s paraphernalia of 
the learned.  He had spent countless hours in the field observing natural phenomena, and 
had published a handful of works on biology and taxonomy.  Arguably, Rafinesque had 
made some notable contributions to the emerging body of knowledge within the natural 
sciences (especially if one trusts some of the claims made amidst the pages of his own 
publications).  And yet, he had also already come to be suspiciously regarded as 
something of an outsider within key parts of the American scientific community.
The status of social and intellectual outsider—someone between communities
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(and oftentimes uncomfortably so) rather than within them, someone dangerously out of 
step with the prevailing order—is one that more or less characterized Rafinesque from 
birth to death.  Confusion over how to understand Rafinesque had a determinate influence 
on his personal and professional life (thus the apparent triumph of his appointment at 
Transylvania), and—as if it were some kind of lingering curse—has continued to exercise 
its effect on his reputation since.  The man whom in 1944 Edwin Betts mourned as 
“America’s most versatile and most tragic naturalist” (368) was in the same year damned 
by the faint praise of his chronicler Huntley Dupre as a “famous botanist, versatile and 
prolific writer, near-genius, and wholly eccentric” (1).  Ironically, for one so singularly 
driven by the hunger for knowledge, alienation was especially acute for Rafinesque when 
it came to those communities concerned with cultivating, conserving, and disseminating 
learning.  Perhaps appropriately, Rafinesque’s apartness from institutional learning begins 
with his own education.  
“I never was in regular College, nor lost my time on dead languages; but I spent it 
on learning alone and by mere reading ten times more than is taught in Schools” (Life 8-
9).  Born in 1782 in a suburb of Constantinople, his father a French merchant, his mother 
a Greek of German descent, Rafinesque’s youth seems to have been marked by too much 
instability—some political, some due to the pressures of his father’s international 
business—to afford a long term, permanent home, let alone an extended connection to 
any terrestrial institution of learning.  Apart from a bit of early schooling in his youth, and 
subsequent private instruction by a handful of tutors, his education appears to have been 
largely determined by his own drive and interests, which by all accounts were, 
respectively, indomitable and extensive.  Though Rafinesque had little need to exaggerate
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his intellectual aptitude, a familiar hyperbolic grandiosity colors his description: “before 
twelve years of age, I had read the great Universal history, and 1000 volumes of books on 
many pleasing or interesting subjects” (8).  The exact nature of this “great Universal 
history” to which he refers is now something of a mystery, remnants of a time when such 
thinkers as Hegel and Schiller conceived of all human knowledge as one vast process of 
teleological unfolding.9  But whatever the content of those many books he internalized, 
Rafinesque portrays his as a definite “program” of study, one essentially equivalent to a 
college curriculum; this is evident in the language as he recalls the single moment at 
which he was poised to undertake a traditional institutional education, a transition 
presented merely as the continuation of the learning he had already begun acquiring on 
his own: “I was to go to Switzerland, into a College to finish my education” (Life 8 
emphasis added).  Unforeseen circumstance intervened, and as Rafinesque reports he was 
left the task of finishing what he had already started, “…this project was not fulfilled.  I 
was taken to Genoa by a trusty man, but sent from thence soon after to Marseille by sea.  
There I remained till 1800 with my grand mother, and completed my education by 
myself” (Life 8-9).  Rafinesque’s course of study—taking him at his word—was the 
entire body of Western learning theretofore amassed.  And in terms of his method, one 
cannot help recall that reviled autodidactic character of Sartre’s Nausea, the so-called 
“Self-Taught Man,” whose pedagogy consists of reading every book of the local library 
in alphabetical order (Sartre 30).  As Rafinesque admits, “I read every kind of books, 
good or bad.”  Fortunately for him, his process involved more discernment than Sartre’s 
9For an in-depth analysis and critique of this metaphysical approach to historiography, see Hayden White’s 
Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. Baltimore: John Hopkins UP: 
1973.
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intellectual antagonist, even if his “system” did not, for he adds, “but happily I knew how 
to distinguish them” (Life 9).
The value of the conventional modern education is naturally not confined to 
imparting content, nor to training students in coherent methods of inquiry.  One of the 
chief functions of a modern institutional education lies in its testimonial value.  “Proper” 
channels of transmission confer readily visible qualifications upon the educated; within 
the so-called “marketplace of ideas,” the institutionally educated circulate as 
commodities of legible and interpretable value.  As a byproduct, institutional education 
provides a link between the social and the intellectual by establishing a structure for 
differential status between members of a realm that often likes to fancy itself a domain of 
the mind, pure in motive, idealist in orientation, and thus above such pettiness.  In other 
words, it creates prestige among the educated irrespective of what they actually know.  
Rafinesque was obviously keenly aware of the credentialing function of education, as 
well as its reputation-boosting effects.  His biographer Leonard Warren describes, “as an 
autodidact without wealth or tangible credentials who had attended no schools, he saw 
value in collecting memberships in scientific societies and being awarded diplomas and 
degrees, and each was carefully added to a growing list that was printed on the title page 
of his books and pamphlets” (96).  Warren characterizes Rafinesque’s drive for these 
honorary degrees, memberships, and other tokens of intellectual recognition as a manic 
hunger, one which prompted him “to nag his peers in other lands” for more of these types 
of endorsements (46).  The attraction to these honors and certificates of institutional 
validation was likely a canny compensation for what others might have perceived as 
lacking.  Still, Rafinesque was keenly aware of the disjuncture between knowledge and
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accreditation and he writes of these awards with an air of ambivalence in his 
autobiography, mocking the disparity between conferred status and actual expertise: “I 
was refused for awhile in Lexington the Diploma of M.A. because I had not studied 
Greek in a College! altho’ I knew more Languages than all the American Colleges 
united” (Life 71).  Though one cannot help but discern traces of exaggeration in his 
complaint, it contains a kernel of truth and eventually the degree was granted, but an 
M.D. withheld on account of Rafinesque’s admitted aversion to dissecting corpses. 
Rafinesque’s suspicions concerning the potential emptiness of college credentials 
is an inversion of those often cast upon the autodidact concerning his/her knowledge—
and as an autodidact, upon Rafinesque himself.  But it also hints at an commensurate 
anxiety that the autodidact can instill in the academy and among its denizens: the fear that 
traditional education is at best a kind of cultural domestication, at worst little more than 
tokens of prestige, empty titles, embossed personalized certificates and alumni clubs.  
This represents one localized facet of the perceived tension that persistently surrounds 
knowledge, the tension between truth and falsity, actual content and the mere appearance 
thereof.  Though cunning with respect to the sign-value of degrees and endorsements, 
Rafinesque was naive in his belief that knowledge simply and justly trumps credentials.  
This unwavering faith in the unimpeachable authority of knowledge as content (rather 
than process) is a sometime trait of the autodidact, lending the role an evangelical quality 
and engendering a generalized hostility.10  Nonetheless, Rafinesque was confident in how 
he stacked up against those ensconced in the ivory tower, and this confidence powered 
his undying assumption of a place within the university, some position waiting for him 
10Consider this casual dismissal in a recent description of Newt Gingrich: “he has the cocksureness, the 
insularity, and the continuous need of an audience of the born autodidact.” David Bromwhich, “The 
Republican Nightmare,” New York Review of Books, Feb 9, 2012, Vol 59, No. 2.
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despite the fact that he had no academic training to speak of.  According to Rafinesque’s 
suspect account, long before his appointment at Transylvania, while still living in Sicily, 
he was in the running for two professorships until those fell through for various reasons 
(Life 42-3).  Once at Transylvania, he renewed a correspondence with Thomas Jefferson 
in hopes of securing a better position at the soon-to-be University of Virginia.  
Rafinesque’s confidence is in part predicated upon a modern ideology of self-
creation through learning.  Idealized faith in knowledge and its determinate value for 
shaping the fate and character of the individual—irrespective of any institution or its 
endorsement—is repeatedly expressed by Rafinesque in Life of Travels, for instance, 
when he concludes the long list of subjects in his intensive self-education with the 
optimistic declaration, “I could have thus embraced any profession I chose” (10).  
Countering this ideological belief is the cultural fear that knowledge, on account of its 
powers of transformation, requires special handling, that it is a potentially dangerous or 
unstable element that threatens to corrupt the untrained and unsupervised (putting the 
academy in a protective regulatory role).  This “Pandora’s box”-type narrative of 
destructive curiosity makes for a commonsense critique of the autodidact and is often 
leveled against Rafinesque, even becoming one of the central bases of Warren’s 
oftentimes mystified biography: “unfortunately, in his formative years there were no 
restraining, calming, and guiding influences.”  One of the symptoms of this lack of 
supervision, according to Warren, is Rafinesque’s lifelong inflated sense of possibility 
with respect to knowing and learning: “by the time he reached adulthood he was a 
fearsome autodidact who lacked a critical sense of the limits of human capability—he 
was a loose cannon” (10).  But in failing to theorize autodidaxy, Warren fails to account
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satisfactorily for Rafinesque’s peculiarity, his desire for learning, his irremediable 
singularity as a lone agent laboring in a collective economy of knowledge.  Toward such 
a theory I would like to look at the various problems and possibilities of modern 
knowledge posited as a self-justifying end both individually and institutionally. 
In order to posit a theory of method for Rafinesque as a thinker and autodidact, I 
propose looking—somewhat anachronistically—toward the notion of theory itself—
theory in its historical and even etymological relation to knowledge and sense-perception. 
Aristotle begins his own theoretical excursion into metaphysics and knowledge with a 
famous observation on epistemology: “all men by nature desire to know.  An indication 
of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are 
loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight” (980a).  According to 
Aristotle’s account, knowing is a pleasurable and organic function of our basic 
engagement with reality.  Primary delight in the senses, in our raw experience of the 
world, forms the basis and necessary conduit for higher realms of knowledge: “…science 
and art come to men through experience” (981a).  Aristotle assumes a direct line of 
connection between sensuous pleasure and the loftiest theory, and Metaphysics not only 
argues but also strives to illustrate this connection.  In this way we are being urged 
toward a kind of proto-phenomenological approach to the circuit between sense and 
knowledge, one which, in spite of its intuitive commonsense appeal, is actually far too 
nuanced to adequately account for here.11  Nonetheless, there is a telling confidence in the 
unquestioning assumption that such a circuit is not only possible, but given; knowledge is 
11For an account of the connection between Aristotle’s thought and phenomenology, see the text of 
Heidegger’s 1927 lecture, “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,” Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
Indiana University Press, 1975, pages 1-23.  For a more thorough account of Aristotle’s approach to 
knowledge see, Groarke, Louis. An Aristotelian Account of Induction: Creating Something from Nothing. 
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2009. 
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natural and the proof of this begins with an attentive look at how perception joins up to 
thought, and vice versa.
The strict correlation between knowledge and nature, and the notion of the human 
appetite to know giving, and in turn being given, access to all that is worth knowing 
suggests a state of equivalence essential to Aristotelian metaphysics: the equivalence 
between thinker and knowledge.  It is possible that Aristotle’s theory of knowledge in 
some ways better explains the impulse of autodidaxy (even in modernity), and perhaps 
tellingly, two early literary accounts of the self-taught derive from his philosophy.  Ibn al-
Nafis’ thirteenth century novel, Theologus Autodidactus, was inspired by the 
philosophical fiction of ibn Tufayl from a century before, which in turn was derived from 
the philosophy of one of the middle ages’ foremost commentators on Aristotle, Avicenna.  
Whereas Tufayl’s earlier self-taught protagonist was a feral child in communion with 
nature, al-Nafis’ later novelistic autodidact is nature itself: the accidental mixing of 
organic materials and elements results in the gestation and emergence of a man. 
… deep within the earth, there was a great mass of clay that had been in a state of 
ferment over the course of many years.  Hot vapours mixed with cold and moist 
vapours fused with dry to produce a homogenous balance of forces ... The most 
perfect balance was in the centre, where the vapours most fully resemble the 
humours of man … At that point, the spirit that proceeds from the command of 
the Lord attached itself and so firmly did it bind, it would have been hard for 
either sense or reason to separate the two. (al-Nafis 13)
In this account, “sense or reason” functions not to further separate elements, but to unite 
them.  And this product of natural ferment combined with divine imperative is a being
that will eventually learn all of the secrets of the universe—up to an including the 
revelations of the prophet Mohammed—through engaged inquiry into his surroundings 
(al-Nafis 39-44).  Thus, al-Nafis’ autodidact is engaged in a natural process that
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precipitates his birth and eventually results in the highest knowledge, a cyclical process in 
which nature leads to birth, which leads to learning, which leads to knowledge, which 
leads back again to nature.  His learning is as organic as his spontaneous generation, the 
assumed result of the intersection between inquiring mind and legible world.  Like the 
Platonic/Socratic notion of evil as a species of error,12 there is the implicit argument in 
this text that to remain in ignorance is simply to fall out of step with nature and her goals.
Rafinesque’s most important expressions of a theory of learning come not in some 
unified treatise of Aristotelian rigor, nor in a fantastic allegory about creation, nor even in 
an epic poem, but rather in his scattered observations about his own autodidactic 
education; nonetheless, among these passages there is a similar assumed equivalence 
between natural human development and knowledge—at least with respect to Rafinesque 
himself.  Throughout his autobiography, A Life in Travels, Rafinesque voices an 
idealizing faith in knowledge and the determinate value knowledge has for shaping the 
individual and his/her fate.  Rafinesque’s early exposure to the written word was matched 
by an insatiable curiosity, for he did—just as Aristotle asserts—by nature desire to know.  
His autobiography concludes with a powerful expression of the effects of this desire, in a 
passage that gives voice to Rafinesque’s unwavering confidence in knowledge, education, 
personal ability and self-fashioning, “it is a positive fact that in knowledge I have been a 
Botanist, Naturalist, Geologist, Geographer, Historian, Poet, Philosopher, Philologist, 
Economist, Philanthropist ... By profession a Traveller, Merchant, Manufacturer, 
Collector, Improver, Professor, Teacher, Surveyor, Draftsman, Architect, Engineer, 
12An idea expressed in the dialog Protagoras: “for you have admitted that it is from defect of knowledge 
that men err, when they do err, in their choice of pleasures and pains—that is, in the choice of good and 
evil” (357d) 
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Pulmist13, Author, Editor, Book-seller, Librarian, Secretary ... and I hardly know myself 
what I may not become as yet” (148)   
Books do not constitute the only—or even the main—channel for acquiring viable 
knowledge for Rafinesque.  Like al-Nafis’ knowledge-driven golem, and Tufayl’s feral-
boy autodidact before that, Rafinesque believed in direct communion with nature.  
Returning to the very significant title of his autobiography, A Life of Travels, we find that 
rather than cold archival researches, the domain of experience constitutes for Rafinesque 
the richest program for learning; throughout the work, he details at length his many 
experiences traveling and doing fieldwork in the natural sciences, observing and 
discovering.14  In this respect, Life of Travels, unapologetically assumes that the 
adventure of knowledge is indeed an adventure, and one that implies a journey, the taking 
in of sensory experience—especially visual, and finally the processing of that experience 
into knowledge; the effective sequence of these elements amounts to learning, and ideally 
culminates in a report on what has been learned (Rafinesque was a prolific writer and 
sharer of his ideas and discoveries).  Explaining the choice of title, Rafinesque plainly 
states the equivalence in his mind between journeying and self-education, when he says 
that in spite of his ravenous youthful hunger for books of all kinds, “my favorite studies 
were still travels and natural sciences” (10).  At the book’s conclusion, Rafinesque even 
asks that his readers accept, “the fruits of my travels and researches, which I desire to 
leave as monuments of my life and exertions” (115).
13Someone who cures tuberculosis; a word derived from another of Rafinesque’s coinages, Pulmel, which 
was the name of the botanical treatment Rafinesque developed for the disease.
14For an interesting theoretical account of how the sciences came ultimately to disavow this approach, see 
the second section of Giorgio Agamben’s “Essay on the Destruction of Experience,” in Infancy and History. 
Trans Liz Heron. London: Verso, 2007 Page 19-34.
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Returning to Aristotle by way of Rafinesque, this circuit between sense-
perception—particularly sight—and knowledge inheres at the level of common 
vocabulary and is apparent in such expressions as “I see,” when deployed to mean “I 
understand.”  In this respect, the correlation perhaps betrays a more ancient Indo-
European commonsense empiricism.  In Greek the verbal root eido equally signifies both 
“to see” and “to know.”  It is also the basis of the noun to eidos (“that which is seen”), a 
word common in Platonic thought and one which is often rendered into that pluralized 
English term so familiar to philosophy, “the forms.”  Perhaps then, given the immediacy 
of this linguistic/epistemological sensorium, it is no wonder that this would become the 
basis for some degree of Greek self-analysis, analysis which then persists into English in 
the form of the word “theory.”  Theory is based on the Greek word for contemplation, 
theoria, a word related to the verb theaomai: to view, gaze at, behold.  Not only does 
theoria indicate systematic contemplation and reflection, or theorizing, it also 
encompasses, “a looking at, viewing, beholding, observing”—and as such is 
etymologically related to the English “theater,” as well as the Greek word for the same, 
theatron.15  
Theoria’s Greek root, theoros, signifies not an abstract verbal notion, but a 
concrete subject, an intellectual agent embarked on a veritable adventure of knowing 
enabled through seeing: “a spectator, observer, one who travels to see men and things.”  
Like that mythic knower of nearly divine intellectual prowess, Odysseus, who through his 
wanderings is said to have “seen the cities of many men and learned their minds” (Homer 
1.1), theoros evinces belief in a fundamental interconnectedness between journeying, 
15For etymology, see Liddell and Scott’s  Lexicon: Abridged from Liddel and Scott’s Greek-English 
Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994. 
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seeing, experiencing, knowing and reporting.  By the logic of the theoros, travel has yet 
to be reduced to mere personal amusement in its devolution toward the leisure activity of 
common tourism, and instead retains a sense as viable basis for pedagogy.  This function 
of the journey and its travelogue as the reliable sense data and point of departure for 
deeper reflection and broader knowledge informs an entire body of classical literature, 
from the works of Herodotus, to Xenophon, to Pausanias, and others.  The same 
assumption is to some extent mirrored linguistically when theoros is extended into its 
derivative, theoria, for then this root passes beyond mere reportage of the seen and 
experienced, and enters into the realm of the reflected-upon, the contemplated, the 
processed—in a word, the theorized.  In serving this function, the theoros also becomes 
the object of such theorizing, as both Aristotle and Plato devote considerable attention to 
the role of this subject as an acquirer of knowledge and agent of its further dissemination; 
in fact, one of philosophy’s most well-known exercises in thought, Plato’s allegory of the 
cave, can be read as a meditation on the proper behavior of the theoros as traveler, 
discoverer, and finally instructor.16
In much the same way that the autodidact-as-subject seems curiously Aristotelian, 
so Rafinesque’s fervor for knowledge, as something to desire, to seek out, to acquire, and 
then to share, is perhaps better served by the model of the theoros than that of the 
scientist as s/he appears within the contemporary landscape of subjectivity.   In her book 
on the subject, Andrea Wilson Nightingale has observed, “in Plato’s conception of 
theoria,17 theoretical knowledge is a sort of ‘hot cognition’ … in which eros and the effect 
16For examples of this reading, in addition to Andrea Wilson Nightingale which I discuss further, see also 
Robert Burch’s essay in, Wurzer, Wilhelm S. Panorama: Philosophies of the Visible. London: Continuum, 
2002. Page 76.  
17By this she means the knowledge production of the theoros, per se.
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of wonder play a key role in the activity of contemplation” (8).  The distance between the 
spectatorial subject and object may be total, for this is the essence of observation; as 
philosopher Hans Jonas has noted, the separation between observer and observed is, “... 
the concept of objectivity, of the thing as it is in itself as distinct from the thing as it 
effects me, and from this distinction arises the whole idea of theoria and theoretical truth” 
(2001 147).  Still, this objectifying gaze is a notorious vehicle for sublimating or even 
facilitating that play of eros and wonder which Nightingale identifies as characteristic of 
the platonic theoria; and while perhaps ensuring a sense of distance between spectator 
and spectacle, it nonetheless allows for the aestheticization or even fetishization of the 
object of contemplation.
Aristotle’s treatment of the theoros does not involve the direct discussion of erotic 
sublimation that sometimes marks Plato’s discussion of the same, but it does encompass 
the inescapably aesthetic dimension that attends the work of the theoros.  In the section of 
his Rhetoric devoted to epidictic—which is to say, non-argumentative oratory, or as 
Aristotle calls it, “the ceremonial oratory of display”—the theoros is central; it is the 
theoroi who will judge the epidictic spectacle, and who will then in turn report it in like 
manner.  That this type of rhetoric has an aesthetic component, or even is itself a kind of 
aesthetic exercise, goes without saying, and in fact is the basis of Aristotle’s assessment 
of it.  What is perhaps more controversial is its exact function and proper domain.  As 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue in The New Rhetoric, “in spite of a lack of 
understanding toward it,” the epidictic mode, “forms a central part of the art of 
persuasion” (49).  Freed from any overt obligation to competitive argument, epidictic is a 
capacious category, one that encompasses eulogy, panegyric, propaganda, and even
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displays of “academic eloquence” (47).   This rhetoric of spectacle, “which immediately 
evokes literature,” one “more reminiscent of a procession than of a struggle,” lends itself 
to the forceful and seductive expression of apparent fact, and thus is the ideal rhetorical 
mode of the theoros.  To again quote Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, “In epidictic 
oratory, the speaker turns educator” (51).
Rafinesque was keenly aware of the attractions of rhetoric, being himself prone to 
epidictic excesses.  Throughout his “scholarly” self-publication on astronomy, taxonomy, 
linguistics, economics, botany, and countless other topics (much of which is already 
written in a rather theatrical tone), there are diversions into poems, forays into the nature 
of wit and the purpose of literature.  His short-lived journal Western Minerva contains 
puzzles suggestive of later concrete poetry: blocks of letters with stray words and 
messages running up one side and down the other, hidden amidst seemingly random 
sequences.  Rafinesque even attempts the creation of new forms, such as the so-called 
“polygryph,” a compound word coined from Greek roots meaning, “interwoven enigma,” 
and indicating a kind of didactic riddle-in-verse, each of which Rafinesque addresses to a 
different woman (67).  While Rafinesque is not always at a total loss to differentiate 
scientific discourse from more overtly aestheticized sorts—such as in the case of the 
World or Instability, his well-known exposition of proto-evolutionary natural theory in 
the form of an epic poem—he does consistently fail to quarantine the discourse of science 
from forms that by his day were reckoned unwelcome, or even impure, on account of 
their color and affect.  
Historians of science Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer have analyzed the 
necessary shift in rhetoric that has attended the rise of modern scientific discourse in their
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work Leviathan and the Air Pump, a shift well underway by the time of Rafinesque, but 
not yet universal enough to have attained complete dominance over Europe, let alone 
penetrated into the wild frontiers of the New World where Rafinesque was laboring.18  
While the mission of this newer discourse remained essentially the same—transmitting 
the rarified experience of a mere few to a general audience by way of print—the 
rhetorical approach was nearly opposite, characterized not by its flourish, but rather by its 
restraint.  One facet of this newer discourse was its vigorous insistence that it presented 
unalloyed “fact”: theory—not to say, theoria—implies human agency in the form of 
speculation, contemplative intervention, cognitive modeling, all of which implies 
rhetoric; by this measure rhetoric is the opposite of “fact,” which is to say, data gleaned 
straight from nature.  To create the appearance of a discourse of pure fact, that is, some 
transparent window through which a reader supposedly gets direct access to nature and 
her laws, the intermediary of that discourse—i.e. the scientist—has to disappear.  Thus 
within this new discourse there was no room for a self-aggrandizing master of 
ceremonies; the theoros who witnesses the spectacle and then in turn must create one for 
the educational benefit of the community was not welcome here.  As Shapin and Schaffer 
show, since the writer of this new discourse could not vanish altogether, he instead had to 
appear consistently “sober and modest,” an intellectual “under-builder,” who willingly 
hides within his own text, for his sole role is to provide the merest platform for Nature to 
speak in her own voice (65-6).  To accomplish this, there emerged the now-familiar 
discursive style of science, “plain, ascetic, unadorned … functional,” and freed from the 
corrupting influence of its messenger (66).  Ironically, the new spectacle was just this 
18Presumably, however, the cosmopolitan polyglot Rafinesque would have been well-acquainted with the 
scientific rhetoric of Europe that was gradually achieving dominance in that day.  Warren even goes so far 
as to assert, “extraordinarily well-read, he must have been aware of virtually everything that was going on 
at the time in science and natural history” (156). 
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apparent vanishing act on the part of the reporting scientist, for as Shapin and Schaffer 
observe, “the public display of this modesty was an exhibition that concern for individual 
celebrity did not cloud judgment and distort the integrity of one’s reports” (65).
In a recent essay, science writer Jim Endersby has argued that Rafinesque is 
perhaps better understood as a literary figure rather than as a strictly scientific one (168-
78).  While this idea has a certain appeal, my own argument to some extent seeks to 
complicate it in a rather roundabout way.  By positing Rafinesque as a kind of version of 
the theoros, I am in no way suggesting that Rafinesque self-consciously modeled himself 
upon Greek sources, nor that this Greek institution, as such, has somehow persisted into 
modernity.  Rather, what I am arguing is that the theoretical notion of the theoros seems 
to be the most mindful and self-conscious articulation of a longstanding commonsense 
pedagogy in which one knowledge-seeking individual’s eye-opening experience must be 
vividly communicable to a broader community not privy to said experience; in this 
respect, the theoros is an agent, driven by desire and wonder, and laboring in an 
atmosphere in which the discourses of science and literature are not, and should not, be 
separate.  This notion of the theoros seems closest to Rafinesque, and it is also the 
discursive mode that the relatively new discourse of science was intent on displacing.  
The “heroic” agent of knowledge which the theoros and the autodidact seeks to be is 
dependent upon a charged personal investment in intellectual inquiry.  Friedrich 
Nietzsche, repentant academic and autodidactic philosopher, forcefully lamented the 
displacement of this engaged stance of learning:
Let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as “pure reason” … 
“knowledge in itself”: these always demand that we should think of an eye that is 
completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the 
active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing
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something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an 
absurdity and a nonsense.  There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective 
“knowing” … But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every 
affect supposing we were capable of this—what would that mean but to castrate 
the intellect?   (119)
The problem is that the very move to conceal perspective knowing, to render it invisible, 
also conceals the complex cultural foundation upon which all knowledge inevitably rests.
As Gregg Lambert has observed, knowledge is not self-organizing (76), from 
which we can deduce that it is particularly susceptible to symptoms from the various 
forces, models and metaphors which come to structure it.  To speak of the autodidact is to 
speak of something imprecise, uncertain, something almost bordering on the fictitious.  In 
being so, it is perhaps to some extent a telling reflection of that space which is assumed to 
differentially define the autodidact: the university.  Derrida begins a meditation on the 
contemporary academy with the question, “how not to speak, today, of the university?” 
(Eyes129).  This question, posed as it is in the negative, is a commentary on “the strange 
destiny of the university,” an institution whose ubiquity has remained undiminished—
perhaps in fact increased—even as its specific reason for being, its ground or goal, has 
become ever more obscure(Eyes 155).  Any simple appeal to a fundamental principle of 
Reason, or an organic impulse to knowledge, ignores the complex historical conditions of
the university, as argued by other contemporary theorists of the institution, such as Bill 
Readings and Gregg Lambert.  It also ignores the complex historical transformation that 
modernity forces upon knowledge itself, a transformation which changes our 
understanding of what knowledge is, and one which effectively displaces those prior 
accounts of learning, rendering them unconvincing, improbable, even fabular.  Such is the
fate of the theoros.  The new understanding of knowledge—arguably yet another handful 
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of metaphors and fables—must account for the bourgeois democratization of knowledge, 
and particularly that common organ of distribution and production with which knowledge 
is now metonymically identified: the academy. 
Walter Benjamin, failed academic—and a thinker with profound autodidactic 
tendencies, states quite simply one metaphor of modern knowledge: “collecting is a 
primal phenomenon of study: the student collects knowledge” (Arcades 210).  The model 
of knowledge as a kind of vast archive, that is, a collection, from which each independent 
scholar assembles a sub-collection, is the engine of what Gregg Lambert calls, “the 
encyclopedic impulse, which is the condition of the existence of a University” (76).  By 
this he means the modern university, the one which Kant first theorized, the one whose 
status seems to Derrida and others beyond simple explanation.  It is within the logic of 
the modern university—that place which Rafinesque, rather erroneously, assumed to be 
his natural home, and that place which has come metonymically to emblematize 
knowledge in the modern age—that we encounter many of the problematic parameters of 
contemporary knowledge: the public versus the private, the hidden versus the open, the 
collective versus the individual.  One crisis-producing effect of the Enlightenment model 
of knowledge has to do with what Lambert calls “the public character of reason” (77). 
Knowledge must be reckoned as a kind of common property, although as we shall see this 
conflicts somewhat with the ideal Kantian agent of knowledge.  Bill Readings alludes to 
this tension between public knowledge and private thought when he observes, “the 
Kantian University of Reason is modeled upon the individual researcher, perhaps despite 
Kant’s wishes” (Readings 55, my emphasis).
Kant’s account of the university, Conflict of the Faculties, early though it is, is
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already riddled with anxieties concerning the relationship between knowledge, and the 
dynamics of the private and public.  As Derrida observes in his essay on Kant’s text, it is 
the character of discourse, the “publicness” of the archive (that same “publicness” 
discussed above by Lambert), that “designates the unavoidable locus of equivocation that 
Kant would like to reduce” (Derrida, Eyes 98-9).  In this respect, we could say that 
Conflict, that first foray into theorizing the modern university—a place, to reiterate, 
which represents knowledge generally—is also an announcement of the university’s 
crises, and thus an announcement of a certain crisis of knowledge.  In fact, to some extent 
that is exactly what Kant intended for his text: to showcase what he perceived as an 
impending threat to knowledge.  Kant maintains that “a university must have a faculty of 
philosophy,” a conviction which stems from his discomfort over the powers wielded by 
the so-called “higher” faculties of law, medicine and theology (Conflict 45).19  Kant 
argues that only philosophy is endowed with the necessary critical skills to govern the 
other faculties, an arrangement which he is proposing and which he proposes from a state 
of fear: the fear that those other departments are dangerously close to enjoying control 
over philosophy, to being able to influence its operation or silence its voice (Conflict 27-
9).  Although Kant acknowledges that the higher faculties offer a certain utility, 
philosophy is solely concerned with the truth, and for this reason it should enjoy privilege 
as the governing center for the academy (Conflict 45). 
   Here it is important to remember that Kant also theorizes the solitary 
Enlightenment subject of knowledge and in this sense Conflict has a companion piece 
from within his oeuvre.  When Conflict is read together with the essay “What is 
19The designations “higher” (medicine, law and theology) and “lower” (philosophy) are in reference to the 
status of these departments with respect to their political standing and are, of course, in no way indicative 
of Kant’s esteem for the disciplines.
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Enlightenment,” a text that debuted fourteen years earlier, when Rafinesque was still an 
infant, we get a fuller picture of the modern adventure of knowledge acquisition, as well 
as a more vivid sense of the problems that that adventure engenders.  In fact, the tension 
between public and private use of reason is foregrounded in this essay (though Kant’s use 
of the terms are inverted such that public equals private, and vice versa), foregrounded to 
the degree that they become the central parameters of regulation with respect to the 
thinking individual—which is to say, the individual as individual, as thinker, as scholar, 
and not necessarily as a member of the academy.  Enlightenment, as Kant defines it, is 
animated by the intellectual imperative sapere aude, “dare to know/think,” and its force 
should remain intact in all cases of what we would understand as private uses of reason.  
Whenever one is acting apart from her/his capacity as a functioning element of civil 
society, whenever one is freed from the duties and demands of the realm, there should be 
unfettered ability to exercise thought in whatever way one chooses.  The ideal conditions 
envisioned by Kant are summed up in a slogan obviously intended to appease the 
monarchic powers looking over the philosopher’s shoulder, “argue as much as you want, 
and about whatever you want, but obey!” (Basic 141).
Michel Foucault has observed Kant’s distinctive diction in the Enlightenment
essay.  Specifically, he notes that “the German word used here is rasonieren; this word, 
which is also used in the Critiques, does not refer to just any use of reason, but to a use of 
reason in which reason has no other end but itself; rasonieren is to reason for reasoning’s 
sake” (Foucault, Reader 36).  The issue of language is a potentially important one with 
respect to Kant’s essay, a text which—not unlike Aristotle’s metaphysics—is as much a 
kind of fable of knowledge as it is a rigorous philosophical tract.  Unlike the later
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Conflict, a document which, given its interventionist purpose, given its attempt to 
influence policy, should be regarded as political, as being about the political, and thus 
essentially about the public, the Enlightenment essay tells the tale of an imagined 
protagonist: an agent driven by a will to know and who, in pursuit of this will, shall 
remain in necessary isolation, apart from those duties that engender social responsibility.  
Ostensibly, this is for the protection of those duties themselves, for the protection of a 
fragile social order, one that could easily be disturbed and disrupted by the incursion of 
sudden radical critique.  But when read against its companion text, which is to say against 
the situation described in Conflict, a situation where the pursuit of knowledge and the 
exercise of reason is inhibited or even threatened by various corporate bodies and 
affiliations, indeed, threatened by the educational apparatus itself, this injunction to 
remain apart from the workings of society takes on another sense.  Kant’s framing of the 
public and private in the Enlightenment essay is, on the surface, just right to appease the 
suspicions of a wary monarch, but there seems also to be a barely repressed anxiety 
lurking here, and a veiled—if not even unconscious—concomitant warning to the modern 
adventurer of reason, that ideal agent of the Enlightenment: keep reason free from outside 
social control or responsibility, and (taking seriously Foucault’s observation on Kant’s
language) keep it free from obvious utility.  Thus a kind of schizophrenic no-man’s-land 
emerges between the individual thinker and the institutional body believed necessary to 
cultivate, conserve, and even represent, knowledge: knowledge and reason must remain 
public and collective, but its crucial exercise is conducted by the solitary thinker.   
Of course, there was a contemporary of Kant (and Rafinesque) who joined in 
commenting on this very issue, and in a way much more strident and immediately
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relevant to the autodidact, even if perhaps less theoretically rigorous in some ways.  
Joseph Jacotot (1770-1840), itinerant scholar and developer of “Universal Education”—
essentially a systematized program for autodidactic learning—was convinced of the 
fundamentally dangerous effect of the collective public with respect to acquiring 
learning.  Jacques Ranciere, Jacotot’s modern-day theorist, has summed up the position 
of this early modern proselyte of knowledge and its transmission, “intelligence is only in 
individuals … not in their union” (Ranciere 76).  Jacotot characterizes the public as a 
kind of gravitational force that pressures its individual members into a state of enforced 
stultification (Ranciere 76-7).  It is this effect that accounts for the continued ignorance of 
the public at large, as well as that dynamic within the university that was such a concern 
for Kant, a dynamic which marks the academy as a place obsessed as much with the 
exercise of power as with that of thought.
Rafinesque was tormented by the uncomfortable intersection of the public and 
private with respect to knowledge, perhaps even to the point of delusion.  His seemingly 
genuine commitment to the belief that knowledge should be available to the public is 
consistent with his tendencies toward socialist thought (Rafinesque even at times dabbled 
with the idea of joining various communal societies of his day such as New Harmony and
the Friendly Society of Mutual Interests).  This egalitarian approach to knowledge comes 
across in a couple of journals he attempted to establish, publications whose expressed 
purpose was summed up in the explanatory introduction of his Atlantic Journal and 
Friend of Knowledge, “… to improve and instruct, to scatter the seeds of learning, and 
become eminently useful by rendering all kinds of knowledge and improvements popular 
…” that otherwise might be, “beyond the means of those whom they are most likely to
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benefit” (1).  The project is introduced from the beginning as one designed to facilitate 
autonomous learning, a project for the needy but autodidactically inclined.  In spite of 
this generous intent, Rafinesque perceived his journals to be the subjects of conspiracies 
to repress; in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Rafinesque apologizes for not forwarding a 
copy of his forthcoming journal, Western Minerva, because, “it has been condamned [sic] 
before its appearance … by a new kind of Western Literary Inquisition and Censorship” 
(Betts 372).  This is not the only claim of its kind amongst Rafinesque’s writings, and 
therefore is quite possibly evidence of a delusive (though telling) paranoia; and yet, 
whether for reasons good or bad, by 1819, according to Warren, Rafinesque had indeed 
been barred from publishing in the primary American scientific journals, thus banishing 
him from the general scientific community and relegating him to the reduced orbit of 
self-published scholarship (30).  
Amidst the numerous pages of his Atlantic Journal and Western Minerva are 
pieces (all written by Rafinesque but often under various pseudonyms such as “Mentor,” 
“Captain Forman,” or “Archimedes”) speculating on humanity’s latent or lost knowledge, 
pleading for free public education, even “reconstructing” the egalitarian governmental 
and educational theories of the Pythagoreans.  In one of these articles, Rafinesque, under 
the nom de plume “Benj. Franklin Junr.,” surveys the pedagogical approach of his elder 
contemporary, Joseph Jacotot (Atlantic 123-4).  Despite the fact that Rafinesque is 
virtually the ideal embodiment of Jacotot’s educational philosophy, the review skewers 
the “Natural Method of Universal Instruction and Intellectual Emancipation,” on a point 
by point basis according to the system’s chief principles.  The only principle to secure 
agreement from Rafinesque is the first: “God has endowed the human mind with the
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power of self-instruction” (123).  As to that other cherished principle in Jacotot’s struggle 
for intellectual emancipation against stultifying dogma and the parade of empty 
credentials, “intelligence is the same in all beings, and therefore the aptitude to learn,” 
Rafinesque facilely dismisses the notion with the two condemning words, “Quite false” 
(123).  This principle, which Jacotot-interpreter Ranciere perceives as the only protection 
against the stultifying collective (the public), is an “elevation” of the Kantian-style 
Enlightenment individual through a radical leveling of ability; arguably this move 
threatens to efface the very notion of the “individual” as it is understood in modernity, 
given that one of the chief parameters by which the individual is assessed is by his/her 
specific store of acquired knowledge and “unique” aptitude.  But it is precisely this 
difference of ability—of aptitude and knowledge—that Rafinesque believes to be his 
trump over the mindless mandarins of the institution and their meaningless credentials.  
And, of course, in this, Rafinesque is right: ironically, until the entire world is 
intellectually emancipated and running smoothly according to Jacotot’s system of 
liberating self-instruction the only possible means for validation an autodidact like 
Rafinesque has is in appearing to possess superior knowledge and ability.    
In the case of Rafinesque, even the appeal to a superior knowledge and ability—
something Rafinesque seems to have believed he possessed, whether rightly or wrongly
—was not enough.  One way to account for this is by recognizing that the same collective 
that Rafinesque was trying constantly to best and humble in its knowledge and aptitude 
was the very public solely licensed to validate or invalidate him as a scholar, thinker, and 
knower.  Shapin and Schaffer, in Leviathan and the Air Pump, describe the necessary and 
inescapably social aspect that enters into modern science as it moves from a model of
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observation to one of experimental method: “the foundational item of experimental 
knowledge, and of what counted as properly grounded knowledge generally, was an 
artifact of communication and whatever social forms were deemed necessary to sustain 
and enhance communication” (25).  To one without community to speak of, one always at 
odds with his validating public, such foundation would naturally be difficult to come by, 
if not outright denied.  In this respect, Rafinesque’s resemblance to the Greek theoros, 
resemblance born of being a traveling-scholar, Nietzsche-esque perspectival seer, and 
reporter of experience-as-learning, becomes completely untenable as a model for 
acquiring valuable, or even viable, knowledge.  What seemed so natural and valid to 
Rafinesque (and the ancient Greeks) as a facet of self-directed study fails in modernity on 
account of its radical privateness in an order that cannot tolerate the private.  As Shapin 
and Schaffer state, “the problem with eye witnessing as a criterion for assurance was one 
of discipline.  How did one police the reports of witnesses so as to avoid radical 
individualism? … In natural philosophy, as in criminal law, the reliability of testimony 
depended upon its multiplicity …” (56).  And so, in a realm wherein the rules are dictated 
by the collective social body—a body perhaps given to silencing and overpowering, as 
argued by Kant, or even stultification, as argued by Jacotot and Ranciere—autodidactic
and self-validated knowledge comes to seem more fetish than fact, a radically isolated 
collection, private, perverse, autistic.    
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RAFINESQUE’S HERBARIUM: THE INDIVIDUAL AS KNOWLEDGE, 
KNOWLEDGE AS COLLECTION
In 1819, the year of his appointment at Transylvania, Rafinesque wrote a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson that reads, “some untoward Circumstances in this University, might 
induce me to prefer a more eligible situation elsewhere,” and thus the purpose of the note 
at hand: to inquire about the possibility of a professorship at the nascent University of 
Virginia (Betts 371). 
At the time of Rafinesque’s 1819 letter, he and Jefferson were already mildly 
acquainted, having met once in person in 1804 during Jefferson’s first term as president 
and Rafinesque’s first stay of residence in the United States; coincidentally, Alexander 
von Humboldt paid a visit to Jefferson the very same summer.  In spite of accounts that 
Rafinesque, with his customary zeal for knowledge and accuracy, repeatedly interrupted 
the president during this initial meeting—even daring to correct him, Jefferson seems to 
have been impressed by the young naturalist and the two thereafter shared a very brief 
correspondence cemented largely in their mutual interests in botany and the discovery 
and cataloging of the rich and diverse plant and animal organisms of the New World 
(Warren 17).  On November 27, 1804, Rafinesque concluded this first series of letters to 
Jefferson with a note inquiring leadingly as to whether, “the American Govert have not 
sent some Botanist there along with Messr. Lewis & Hunter”20 (Betts 369).  Almost 
20Rafinesque is referring to the expeditions to explore the Louisiana Purchase, one of which was that of 
Lewis and Clark, another being the lesser-known Hunter-Dunbar Expedition.  By the time of Rafinesque’s 
letter, both expeditions had already departed.  
55
immediately after posting this inquiry a deflated Rafinesque left the U.S. for Europe on a 
hiatus lasting over a decade; but many years later he would ruefully reminisce, “I was 
told that I might be admitted as Botanist in the expedition which Lewis and Clark were 
then preparing to survey the Missouri and cross the Oregon mountains” (Rafinesque, Life  
24).  Whatever source Rafinesque was relying on for this claim is never identified in his 
account.  Having seen the respected ornithologist Alexander Wilson passed over, 
Rafinesque had not even actually applied for the position of botanist to Lewis and Clark, 
so perhaps such a suggestion had been leaked from behind closed doors, but this memory 
may also have simply been the product of a sense of entitlement mixed with nostalgic 
overblown imagination.  For in response to Rafinesque’s early searching letter concerning 
the expeditions, Jefferson had given this cursory, garbled, and ambiguously dissuasive, 
reply: “certainly I should be happy to add your botanical talents to the party but that is 
not in my power to propose any berth worthy your acceptance expenses only with little 
other compensation are expected by the members of the party, who are chiefly induced to 
undertake the journey for the gratification only of their curiosity” (Betts 370).  By the 
time this response arrived, Rafinesque had already departed for Europe and so he likely 
never saw it. 
Now in 1819, all of these many years later, writing from his new American home 
at Transylvania University in Lexington Kentucky, Rafinesque was again seeking a 
position from his acquaintance.  And so began a five year long lopsided exchange of 
letters between the ex-president and the autodidact.  Again Rafinesque would ultimately 
be frustrated.
Within just a few short years of working at Transylvania, Rafinesque’s energy for
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teaching had cooled in comparison to his enthusiasm for field work, and his many 
eccentricities had caused relationships with administrators and colleagues to grow 
strained.  This to some extent may account for the increasingly pleading tone of the 
letters to the former statesman, whose responses generally avoid dealing with 
Rafinesque’s questions directly, instead blaming unforeseen delays and vague obstacles.  
From the very first letter of inquiry, a metonymic association is established between 
Rafinesque and his collections, an equivalence that will endure until the end of the 
correspondence.  This parallel is formed by his attempt to entice (not to say, bribe) 
Jefferson into giving him the position: should the scholar be hired, along with him will 
come his collection of books, his “museum,” “specimens” of an unspecified sort, 
monetary donations to help build the university’s library, and the treasure so often 
mentioned throughout the correspondence, a wonder of plant taxa incarnate, Rafinesque’s 
beloved, “extensive and rich herbarium” (Betts 371).
The valuation Rafinesque placed upon this assortment of plant specimens, his 
herbarium, is well-documented, and exceeds simple scientific interest, so it is perhaps 
appropriate that the assemblage should be appointed as the material stand-in for the man 
and his otherwise immeasurable capabilities.  Here Rafinesque is participating in a 
cultural shift.  The term economy is often loosely deployed to describe all manner of 
circulation, including the circulation of knowledge.  And this is somewhat appropriate 
given the simultaneous (and symbiotic) rise of private property with its reliance upon 
modern systems of exchange, and that of bourgeois individualism with its reliance upon 
power-knowledge for the formation of viable cultural subjects.  One effect of this 
systemic interdependence is the pressure to make personal knowledge which might
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otherwise be idiosyncratic and nebulously-valued assume not merely literal form, but 
even fungible form.  Like other entities of exchange, our conceptualization of modern 
knowledge tends toward standardization as well as literal objectification—a quality 
exemplified by the ubiquitous ceremonial diploma—so that knowledge may circulate, 
recognizable and amenable to evaluation.  Max Horkheimer gives a trenchant critique of 
this shift in Eclipse of Reason when he discusses the evanescence of knowledge once 
understood ideally as “stationary contemplation” (disinterested thought for its own sake), 
against the rise of the “instrumentalization of reason” (31-2).  The redefinition of 
“knowing” under the influence of capitalist logic, materialist scientism and competitive 
technocracy parallels a reification of modern knowledge as it comes to be understood, 
like so many things, as a species of private property: knowing is owning, and knowledge 
is capital.
Problems emerge, however, when analytic pressure is put upon the model of 
knowledge-as-capital, since knowledge forms a somewhat uncomfortable border between 
subjective identity and cultural valuation.  In the marketplace capital is impersonal.  In 
the “marketplace of ideas” knowledge is oftentimes made out to be also.  But as anyone 
who has spent time in the academy well knows, attachment to knowledge tends to be 
very personal: people often find it difficult to renounce their ideas even in the face of 
compelling evidence, and an attack on one’s thought can feel much like an attack on 
one’s person (and is oftentimes treated as such).  Given this lopsided engagement, 
knowledge does not have the fluid qualities of exchange characteristic of other forms of 
capital, and the result is an unwieldy commodity that must function simultaneously as a 
site of personal investment and cultural assessment.  For this reason knowledge is more
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aptly compared to a private collection on display with its complex dynamic of personal 
and public worth.  The collection is a token of individual interest and values, but it must 
submit to a broader cultural logic if it is to be reckoned valid.  In this respect the 
herbarium of Rafinesque-the-autodidact (that is, the solitary-thinker) is especially 
appropriate for metaphorizing him into the legible commodity that the modern agent of 
knowledge must be in order to be viable.  Rafinesque seems to have been at least 
intuitively aware of this dynamic, and yet—just as he so often demonstrated in other 
cases—that knowledge in and of itself was not sufficient to guarantee a positive outcome. 
Jefferson was in some respects more socially imbedded in the scientific culture of 
the era—particularly the international scientific culture—than was Rafinesque, and the 
president was a keen scientist in his own right.  Conversant in many of the European 
intellectual trends of the day, Jefferson was a commentator on Cuvier and a friend and 
correspondent to Alexander von Humboldt.  Near the end of the eighteenth century, 
Jefferson had had a famous intercontinental feud with Rafinesque’s idol Buffon, based 
upon the latter’s so-called theory of “American degeneracy,” as articulated in volume V 
of his Histoire naturelle.  Here Buffon rashly proposed that the fauna of the New World 
was stunted in relation to that of Europe and the other continents on account of 
malnutrition and poor climate, an idea that quickly took root in European intellectual 
society.  The sting of this affront prompted the patriotic Jefferson to ceremoniously 
present the French naturalist with the pelt of a wild panther and a full-sized stuffed bull 
moose, a gesture that quelled the controversy once and for all.21
This episode in which global political rivalry is acted out under the cover of 
“disinterested science” is but one example of the figurative/symbolic reach of the new 
21This episode is recounted in detail in, Dugatkin, Lee Alan. Mr. Jefferson and the Giant Moose: Natural 
History in Early America. University of Chicago Press, 2009.
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mode of inquiry.  Arguably, the scientific impulse has never been as pure as we 
sometimes like to believe and early modern science could often be suprisingly overt in its 
mixture of agendas.  The undeniably regulatory character of taxonomy and classification, 
especially, suited the colonial urge toward appropriation and control, and it is under this 
banner that some of science’s most stark expressions of imperial impulse appear.  
“Captain Cook’s Kangaroo,” killed, collected, and shipped back to England, was the first 
discovery claimed and labeled by Joseph Banks and James Cook as their British ship 
Endeavor lay anchored off the coast of Australia in the summer of 1770 (Ritvo 2-3).  The 
platypus, echidna and a whole continent would soon follow.  A strikingly bare articulation 
of the equation between conquering and classifying is the petulant preface to Thomas 
Pennant’s 1784 contribution to biological taxonomy, Arctic Zoology (Class I. 
Quadrupeds), in which he laments, 
… this work was designed as a sketch of the Zoology of North America.  I 
thought I had a right to the attempt, at a time I had the honor of calling myself a 
fellow-subject with that respectable part of our former great empire; but when the 
fatal and humiliating hour arrived, which deprived Britain of power, strength and 
glory, I felt the mortification which must strike every individual in losing his little 
share in his boast of ruling over half of the New World (3-4)
Pennant’s maudlin politico-scientific dejection is humorous by contemporary 
standards.  But its flip side is the brutal eroticized control of colonial exploration, a force 
which gets sublimated and intellectualized into a metaphoric realm in the early natural 
sciences—though even this could sometimes find comically literal expression.  For 
instance, one striking example of the early life science’s “appetite” to subjugate the
organic world through understanding is the preponderance of descriptions of newly 
discovered creatures climaxing with the specimen being killed, dissected, eaten, and its 
flavor analyzed.  Ritvo has argued that in these earlier stages neither taxonomy nor
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 science more generally was sufficiently distanced from competing systems of 
classification—those of butchers and farmers for instance (xii).  It is therefore perhaps 
too much to expect that scientists would be entirely free from this partisan influence 
when evaluating animals.  No wonder then that in the most thorough accounts the subject 
of analysis would have to be “put into the pot” for final assessment (Knight 54).  In 
keeping with this distinctive degree of curiosity, Banks offers the final word on that 
mystery-being that would come to be called Cook’s Kangaroo when, before shipping it to 
the motherland he pronounces it, “excellent food” (Ritvo 1).  This physio-gustatory drive-
to-know could also extend beyond the realm of specimens strictly defined as organisms.  
In traveler Zacharias Conrad von Uffenback’s catalog of the holdings of Hans Sloane (the 
collection that would eventually form the basis of the British Museum) one finds the 
jarring analysis of some showcased birds’ nests: “it is said that the material is formed in 
the sea like succino and used by the birds to build their nests.  But, judging from its taste, 
appearance and feeling, I took it for a gum or resin …” (Pearce, Voice 112).  Even 
Rafinesque engages in this sensory immersion with certain subjects of his analysis, for in 
Good Book’s section on the newly classified cephalopod, Ocythoe, he wraps up with the 
casual mention of dispatching and eating the creature and assures his reader that it was 
“as good as usual with the octopus” (64).
In the case of the herbarium the issue was not one of world-domination, but rather 
self-expression.  Between the beginning of 1832 and the end of 1833, Rafinesque
published a serial in eight installments called Atlantic Journal and Friend of Knowledge.  
The journal’s format—ranging in topic from botany, zoology, philology, architecture, 
agriculture, economics, education, even poetry, to name but a few, and stretched out over
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the course of months—was ideally suited to showcase the breadth of his mercurial mind, 
especially given that he was the sole contributor of its more than 150 pieces.  But it 
demanded the support of a paying readership, something Rafinesque’s contemporaries 
were unwilling to give.  Shortly before the Atlantic lapsed into oblivion like similar 
projects before it, Rafinesque produced an extra of the sixth number just as he had also 
done with the third.  But the eighty-page extra of the sixth stands out from the rest of the 
journal, to the point of being an autonomous work.  Not only is this supposed addendum 
paginated separately (unlike that of three), its masthead deemphasizes the mother 
publication, replacing it with the large print title, Herbarium Rafinesquianum, the 
moniker by which it is generally referred within modern scholarship.     
At the level of its written content, this Herbarium of Rafinesque is a compendium 
of ranging data, loosely unified under the concept of botany.  It promises to be 
“Prodromus—pars prima”: “a forerunner, first part,” presumably of a series, a curious 
designation given that it is already positioned as one degree in the middle of a series (this 
sequence-within-a-sequence status has a mise-en-abyme quality not unfamiliar to readers 
of Rafinesque); however this work stands apart, bearing as little, if not less, relation to 
Rafinesque’s later publications as it does to its parent text. 
As a testament to Rafinesque in his capacity as historical scientist, the text 
becomes much more.  Most obviously, it contains excerpts from a letter from Rafinesque 
to pioneering American botanist John Torrey, followed by a list of “Some Principles of
Natural Classification” (11-12, 13-15).  Both of these passages involve the mutability of 
species, which is to say, the conjecture that all living entities are potentially in a slow 
process of natural change into other types of entities, a theory eventually refined by
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Charles Darwin and unified under the blanket term “evolution.”  Though already briefly 
alluded to in prior work, the idea that, “Species and perhaps Genera also, are forming 
into organized beings by gradual deviations of shapes … taking place in the lapse of 
time,” was becoming a more central preoccupation for Rafinesque (11, emphasis and 
capitalization in original).  And it was growing in importance to him such that the letter to 
Torrey closes with the injunction that should Rafinesque die before the theory can be 
fully articulated, “give me credit for it, and do it yourself upon the plan that I trace” (12).
The significance of Rafinesque’s theory as it is limned in this letter and then later 
works has been the subject of much debate within the sciences.  Does it constitute an 
early articulation of the theory of evolution, or is it merely another general observation 
concerning the protean nature of life and its forms such as those that stretch back to 
Aristotle?  Darwin himself, in the essay, “An Historical Sketch of the Progress of Opinion 
on the Origin of Species” (an essay added as a preface to later editions of Origin 
following the hostility of its initial reception), cites Rafinesque as a precursor (13).  
However, Rafinesque’s own current biographer and most studied champion, Charles 
Boewe, disagrees, pointing out that in his desperation to situate evolution within a 
recognizable intellectual continuum Darwin cites other thinkers in the same essay whom 
no modern scholar would hold up as true antecedents to his thought.  Instead, Boewe 
believes Rafinesque to be ensconced in a growing and (true to form) evolving strand of 
thought that was well-anticipated by Erasmus Darwin (and others) but which would not
 reach maturity until Charles (Profiles 118).  And yet, most of the positive recognition 
afforded Rafinesque in the modern day rests upon his supposed anticipation of that 
Copernican revolution in our understanding of species.
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Whether or not Rafinesque consciously deployed the herbarium as a metaphorical 
conceit with theoretical implications, Herbarium Rafinesquianum is just that.  For under 
this central image the text becomes a vehicle to catalog his collection (especially its many 
“rare” holdings) complete with prices, to detail the aforementioned theory of species 
mutability, chronicle what he sees as critical developments in the science of 
classification, list his own “Principle Botanical Works and Discoveries” (including, in 
recursive-loop style, the very text at hand), reprint letters to other scientists, list the many 
people and places that are represented by his specimens, and advertise his other works, 
already written or soon to be so.  Herbarium Rafinesquianum also establishes a 
significant equivalence when Rafinesque announces that in accepting new plant 
specimens, the contributions, “will be duly valued, and the equivalent paid in plants 
asked, or books, or money” (10).  This is a literal marketplace of knowledge, an economy 
in which articles and artifacts, the production and paraphernalia of learning (specimens, 
books), circulate and function undifferentiated from capital-proper such that they are 
essentially interchangeable.  
The Herbarium Rafinesquianum could be seen as the textual complement to the 
concrete collection that is Rafinesque’s herbarium, and both contribute to a figurative 
composite of Rafinesque the person—or more accurately the subject.  In the case of the 
text this includes a window into Rafinesque’s most pressing thoughts in the form of his 
evolutionary theory and his urgent pleas to Torrey to bring these to maturity.  The many
mentions of contributors and correspondents gives some sense of the social/professional 
milieu to which the autodidact felt, accurately or not, he belonged (the longest continuous 
list appearing on pages 4-5).  The pamphlet also gestures toward the system of values that
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Rafinesque held, about which more will be said in later chapters, one wherein knowledge 
is not merely conceptualized as capital, but may even function as a form thereof, thereby 
equalizing the influence of economy-proper and knowledge-economy in the continued 
life of the subject.  On the first page, just below the title and above the Herbarium’s 
publishing information, Rafinesque announces, “THE LABOR OF A WHOLE LIFE!” 
and this could serve as a declaration of the broad existential implications of both the 
textual and the concrete herbarium.  
Some of this significance may have dawned on Jefferson when the two had 
exchanged letters those many years before.  Both Rafinesque and Jefferson were 
enthusiastic collectors.  Jefferson had a fervent passion for books, at one time possessing 
the largest private library in the U.S. (what would eventually become the basis for the 
restored Library of Congress after the original collection was burned by the British in the 
War of 1812), and Rafinesque many times throughout the years of their correspondence 
sent Jefferson clippings and seeds to increase the president’s botanical collection.  The 
drive to curate was a common one between these men (indeed, it was a common one to 
the day’s educated generally), as was the obsessive valuation placed upon systematic 
aggregations of objects, particular those deemed of scientific worth.  And the monetary 
value of such collections was often significant.  It is certainly no surprise that libraries 
could fetch vast sums (Congress had paid Jefferson nearly $25,000 for his collection of 
6,487 books in 1815), but even herbaria, such as the one Rafinesque was dangling as
enticement, could command high prices.  In 1816 the American Philosophical Society 
paid $504 for just a portion of Henry Muhlenberg’s herbarium (Mears 156).  Muhlenberg 
was a sometime contributor of plants to Rafinesque—as well as a critic of his botanical 
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taxonomy.  An 1842 auction at Sotheby’s featured portions of the celebrated herbarium of 
Aylmer Bourke Lambert broken into smaller lots, a collection that contained a number of 
prized American plants that had been gathered on the Lewis and Clark expedition; though 
the individual lots went for seemingly little (5-25 British pounds apiece), one of the 
purchasers, Edward Tuckerman of Massachusetts, later claimed to have made the 
purchase as “a venture,” implying that he expected significant future returns on his 
investment (Teece 17).
The monetary value of herbaria obviously varies based on issues such as 
condition and/or rarity of specimens, but this is only one facet of its assessment.  Like 
other entities wherein knowledge-value and commodity-value overlap or even intersect, 
the herbarium occupies a strange status as bearer of economic worth because to a great 
extent its worth is judged otherwise.  Although there is a history of herbaria being bought 
and sold on the open market, there is also a tradition of botanists and collectors 
bequeathing them to others still at work in the field or donating them to institutions such 
as schools or museums to be the basis of ongoing public collections.  This has been the 
case with many notable herbaria, such as the one that pioneering American botanist (as 
well as bitter critic—and even personal enemy—of Rafinesque) Asa Gray inherited then 
donated to become the nucleus of Harvard’s collection.  Like with nearly any collection 
that is intended to edify or participate in an ongoing archive or field of study, as many 
herbaria were, there is always some inherent illogic in terms of ownership: though the
specimens themselves can perhaps be understood as personal possessions of a sort, and 
possessions with a monetary worth, as articles of actionable knowledge they are ever-
accountable to the relevant scholarly community who will be implicitly charged with
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assessing their ongoing value as knowledge.  A 1952 Science article on institutional 
herbaria admits, “… when an herbarium ceases to be a private one and when it becomes 
‘public’ or ‘institutional’ is not always easily decided” (Gordon 218).  Though this refers 
to historical determination, the article already (well in advance of any guiding principle 
of postmodern undecidability) hints at the conceptual ambiguity between the two senses.  
For the purpose of sorting and studying the complex floral taxa an herbarium functions 
not unlike a library, and for any particular herbarium to be botanically valuable in this 
capacity it must be attested so by a community qualified to judge, thus its status as a 
strictly private collection is always to some degree mitigated.  Furthermore, in terms of 
worth, there has been at least some debate about the value and validity of the institution 
of herbaria to the field of botany when viewed from a wider perspective.  Humboldt, in 
keeping with the broad aims of Naturphilosphie, was the pioneer of a much more holistic 
approach for apprehending flora, urging that plants ideally be studied in their native 
contexts and alongside their natural neighbors, “in contrast to the artificial isolates on 
which herbarium practice was based” (Cunningham 181).  In this respect, even the 
logical basis for the private herbarium belongs to an ongoing public discussion: as a 
coherent and valuable collection it is a cultural—as much as an individual—product, 
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding.
When Benjamin calls collecting the “primal phenomenon of study,” he is not 
merely being figurative, but rather is identifying a historical correlation that was firmly
established by Rafinesque’s day (Arcades 210).  As John Elsner and Roger Cardinal 
observe in the introduction to Cultures of Collecting, the physical collection becomes a 
focal point toward which the taxonomic impulses of science and language are extended
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into space: “if classification is the mirror of collective humanity’s thoughts and 
perceptions, then collecting is its material embodiment.  Collecting is thus the narrative 
of how human beings have striven to accommodate, to appropriate and to extend the 
taxonomies and systems of knowledge they have inherited” (2).  Every taxonomic 
ordering posits a theory of perception concerning the experiential realm and its structure, 
and every collection is a physical demonstration of just such a theory.  Thus collection is 
theory made matter, the universal expressed in the individual and its aggregates.  And just 
as science is ideology, and ideology is both super-structural as well as personal, the 
collection marks one point at which the theoretical edifice and the individual merge.
Foucault, throughout his writings, has stressed the importance of the various 
analogies, metaphors and other discursive mechanisms that determine the ways, “in 
which the individual appears and acts as subject of learning” (Reader 335).  Inasmuch as 
knowledge is a collection, and the individual understood as such—which is to say, the 
individual as a modern subject comprised of various particular ideological investments—
is a kind of collector, determined largely by/in his or her store of knowledge, there is 
already a profound conceptual link between the mind and the cabinet.  This link is also a 
concrete one, as knowledge more and more comes to be equated with the acquisitive 
impulses of the ideal individual as imagined by the emerging bourgeois culture.  As Carol 
Yoon, in her recent book on taxonomy, Naming Nature, asserts of the culture that grew up 
around early modern science, “natural history collections eventually became so
commonplace that any respectable family home could be expected to boast its own 
display of nature’s wonders” (34-5).  Susan Pearce, professor of museum studies and 
theorist of collecting, observes of that moment midway between the births of Kant,
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Jacotot, and Rafinesque, “by the middle of the [eighteenth] century, it is tempting to think 
that almost every self-respecting nobleman or woman, doctor, merchant, or indeed 
anyone with a sufficient urge to better themselves and the wherewithal to do so, had 
equipped their home with some sort of gallery or cabinet of curiosities” (Voice 110).   
The telling language used here—Yoon’s “respectable family,” and Pearce: 
“anyone with a sufficient urge to better themselves”—hints at a function of the collection 
that exceeds the mere demonstration of scientific principles and instead points toward its 
role as a newly emerging strategy of bourgeois self-fashioning.  The kinship between the 
“extended self which collections represent,” and the mind which Locke already long 
before the day of Rafinesque had called the “storehouse of our ideas,” bears traces of a 
new metaphysics of knowledge, one in which classifying and knowing render the logic of 
nature in an orderly, accessible, and demonstrable fashion (Pearce Museums 63; Locke 
86).  Collecting localizes, or even personalizes this demonstration.  Whether it is the 
gallery of the wealthy connoisseur of fine artworks, the hipster’s record collection, or the 
undifferentiated masses that crowd the hoarder’s hovel, these collections seem to speak in 
the voice of the collector, and what is more, “on closer scrutiny he [the collector] proves 
to be speaking only about himself” (Benjamin Illuminations 59).  In modernity, the 
collection, “has been seen as at the heart of the private person, helping to create a unique 
persona and existing in a privileged position in relation to other activities …” (Pearce 
Practice 52).   
However, like with the broader process of acquiring knowledge, the collection—
as a metaphor for legitimate knowledge, and also as a metonymic signifier of the knower
—can be neither too private, nor too unique without lapsing into the perversely
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idiosyncratic or even the fetishistic.  This especially holds true, of course, for the 
systematic collection, which, like scientific knowledge in general, is validated in large 
part by securing the acceptance of the community.  In Rafinesque’s time, as the above 
quotations from Yoon and Pearce attest, the personal and systematic collections were not 
always so clearly distinct from one another.  And any such distinction that may 
historically be said to exist disappears when one considers that Rafinesque first and 
foremost considered himself a man of science, his personality predicated upon being its 
full time agent and representative.  Pearce asserts that, “systematic collecting … has in all 
its different manifestations in the various disciplines been accorded an intellectual 
primacy, which seems to derive from its apparent capacity to demonstrate understanding 
rather than feeling, and so to extend our control of the world” (Museums 84).  This 
“apparent capacity” casts an illusory sheen over the operation of systematic collecting, 
concealing the fact that understanding and feeling, the intellectual and the affective, are 
often intermixed.  And, perhaps ironically, in an intellectual age founded on the 
awakening hope for “control of the world” through classification, as well as for the 
powers of the individual-as-collector, the systematic collection can come to be a token of 
an intellectual world beyond any one individual’s control. 
Shapin has observed that, “Science, like finance, is a credit-economy: there are 
activities in which, if you subtract credibility, there is just no product left—neither a 
currency nor a body of scientific knowledge” (Never Pure 19).  On broad reflection, this
is true of knowledge and its valuation in general when it is applied to subjectivity (the 
locus of the credibility to which Shapin refers).  Knowledge demands endorsement for 
validation.  Rafinesque had faith—perhaps deep faith—in the intrinsic worth of his
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herbarium.  But the requirement of securing credibility—which is to say, the necessity for 
creating assent (or at least its appearance) within a recognized community—was not lost 
on Rafinesque.  Throughout their later correspondence, Rafinesque bombards Jefferson 
with documents, heralding his extensive qualifications, lists of honors he has received, 
societies to which he belongs, all sent in hopes that Jefferson might circulate them among 
the university trustees.  He details “Testimonials in favor of Prof C. S. Rafinesque,” and 
in a move that almost seems to anticipate the internet-age exhibitionism of social 
networking, the desperate scientist appends to his letters to Jefferson long litanies of 
notable to semi-notable figures whom “C. S. Rafinesque reckons in the Number of his 
friends and Correspondents” (Betts 374).  Among these are British naturalist William 
Swainson, Swiss Botanist Augustin DeCandolle, American botanist John Torrey, and, 
heading the list, Cuvier himself (John James Audubon, who was not only a sometime host 
to Rafinesque, but had even written on him in a now-famous journal entry entitled, “The 
Eccentric Naturalist,” had yet to make a name for himself, so perhaps for this reason he is 
omitted from the list).
To impress Jefferson and the University of Virginia trustees, Rafinesque also 
repeatedly emphasizes what the university stands to gain with his professorship:
Sketch of Prof. Rafinesque's Collections. His Library consists in about 1000 
Select Volumes. on Phisics, Chemistry, Natural history, Botany, Mineralogy
Philosophy, Travels & Miscellaneous Works, in  Latin, English, french, Italian &c 
… His Natural Collection consist in about 2000 Specimens of Shells, fossil 
remains, Minerals, Insects, Polyps & other zoological Subjects, mostly American. 
(Betts 375)
Rafinesque stresses the size of the collections but also their qualitative character, and in 
this they are reflective of the character and mind of their owner: the books are polyglot, 
demonstrating a breadth of focus, even cosmopolitan, while the material pieces reflect
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 intensive fieldwork conducted in the American frontier.  In this respect the collections 
could be regarded as two halves of a dichotomous whole, the books forming the 
conceptual side, the natural collection representing the concrete, or practical.  Midway 
between these there is the collection that most vividly represents Rafinesque’s specific 
professional and intellectual efforts: “His Herbarium Contains already about 12000 
Specimens, belonging to about 2000 American species & 1000 European or exotic 
Species, and is increasing every year” (Betts 375).  Like the collector, the herbarium is 
both a significant entity in its own right, a product of years of effort, and also a work in 
progress, under constant construction to accommodate the advances in the field.
In response Jefferson promises to, “take care to lay your letter before the board in 
due time,” but there is no evidence that Rafinesque was ever brought to the attention of 
the university’s trustees (Betts 372, and footnote).  Despite Jefferson’s further assurance 
that, “no doubt it [the letter] will command all the consideration which your well known 
qualifications entitle it to,” Rafinesque’s biographer, Warren, has speculated that quite to 
the contrary, “… most probably, confidential criticism—some serious, and some mean-
spirited and malicious—had reached Jefferson’s ears.”  Warren concludes that to 
Jefferson’s reckoning, “however learned and brilliant Rafinesque was, he was still too 
much of a risk, an unpredictable burden” (66).    
When Rafinesque reluctantly comes to the bitter conclusion that his “liberal offer 
was not accepted” (Betts 376) by either Jefferson or the trustees, he resorts to the tactic of 
implied ultimatum.  Nearing the last of their exchange, Rafinesque suggestively urges 
Jefferson by hinting, “I am rather anxious to hear something precise concerning the 
University of Virginia, and my prospects relating thereto, since I have some expectation
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to be offered the Presidency of the Cumberland College of Nashville and the Western 
College of Kentucky seated at Hopkinsville”22 (Betts 375).  Along with the collector, the 
herbarium and other collections are on the brink of slipping away from Jefferson and his 
trustees, and in his next letter Rafinesque warns that, “meantime I am on the point of 
endowing Transylvania University with all my past Collections amounting to about 
30000 specimens of plants, animals & minerals, as soon as the Trustees will be able to 
enter into some needful arrangements in the Subject, in which case I shall not be able to 
renew my offer to the Univy of Virg[inia] when it might be convenient to accept it” (Betts 
376-7).
To reiterate, one of the reasons that the collection is a better model than capital for 
describing personal knowledge is that the subject’s investment in it far exceeds that of the 
public, the latter acting largely in the role of arbiter and assessor.  Like the collection, 
knowledge is prey to fetishization, and in such cases it is the public that will pronounce 
judgment on both the value of the assemblage and its valuation by the collector.  Shortly 
before he died Rafinesque wrote in a letter to John Torrey that he planned to settle in 
Illinois where he and an associate had been planning to establishing a university; 
Rafinesque stakes his migration on what seems an unlikely swap, “I shall again botanize 
in the West & mean to settle there between 1845 & 1850 giving all my Collections and 
Books to [the new university], receiving Land for it” (Boewe Profiles 97).  Obsession 
over his collections, and particularly the botanical collection that was his herbarium, 
sometimes seems to amount to a fetishizing attachment; and much like Rafinesque’s 
22The viability of these scenarios seems highly unlikely, however it is possible that Rafinesque—in a 
moment of self-delusion—sincerely believed them possible.  The day before he penned this letter 
Rafinesque sent another to Charles Wilkin Short, a trustee of Western College, mentioning that a Mr. James 
Campbell had suggested Rafinesque should be appointed head of the school.  Apparently Dr. Short was 
unimpressed with this suggestion, for it went nowhere (Boewe 2003, 59, footnote).
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endless hunger for new knowledge, herbaria seemed to trigger a strange acquisitive desire 
in him.  In 1831, long after his attempts to win favor with Jefferson and just before the 
publication of Herbarium Rafinesquianum, Rafinesque’s generous patron, Zaccheus 
Collins, died.  Curiously, upon his passing, Rafinesque produced a (seemingly trumped 
up) bill demanding $340 in recompense for “Natural Objects” allegedly provided to 
Collins (Boewe 32-3).  In order to silence the pestering Rafinesque, the executors of 
Collins’ estate reluctantly offered Rafinesque the deceased’s herbarium, an object whose 
value was estimated at $150 based upon offers made by various parties, including well-
known botanist and pharmacist, Elias Durand, whose own herbarium was eventually 
estimated at around 10,000 specimens.  Rafinesque gleefully accepted the offer and 
absorbed Collins’ plant collection into his own.
Jefferson, on the other hand, could not be bought off so easily.  And in spite of his 
many attempts to persuade, his many promises of collected wonders, and his eventual 
threats to dispose of the collections elsewhere, Rafinesque never was offered a position at 
the University of Virginia.  The tone of the letters shows a wearied Jefferson retreating
steadily into silence.  Eventually, whatever discussion can be said to have existed 
between the two men comes to an abrupt end when Jefferson brusquely announces to 
Rafinesque that in his old age he has no more desire or ability to keep up correspondence.
The realm of modern collecting knows no shortage of idiosyncratic acquisitions, 
obsessive desires made manifest in the form of collections.  Pearce has commented of the 
fetishistic assemblage that, 
… these collections are detached from any context, they are removed from the 
sphere of actual social relationships with all the tensions, efforts of understanding 
and acts of persuasion which these imply.  This detachment is, indeed, a very 
substantial part of the attraction for their collectors, who use them to create a
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private universe, but its sterility gives to the material that peculiarly lifeless 
quality which all curators recognize with a sinking heart. (82)
Radical idiosyncrasy and detachment are anathema to the systematic collection, which in 
spite of its pretensions to intrinsic value or context-free worth (that is, scientific “truth,” 
generally), must also circulate in “a sphere of actual social relationships with all the 
tensions, efforts of understanding and acts of persuasion which these imply.”    
 After Rafinesque’s death, the prized herbarium—which the collector at one time 
had boasted contained over 50,000 specimens and was worth $1,800—was purchased by 
Elias Durand for a mere $45, and supposedly then only to get at the specimens previously 
belonging to Collins.  Given the metonymic equation between collector and collection, if 
there is some type of theory to be posited concerning the idiosyncratic autodidactic 
collection and its perceived worth, it is inaugurated by Durand in a letter explaining his 
acquisition of the herbarium, which by that time had fallen into disrepair, ill-cared-for,
decrepit, and rat-eaten:
Rafinesque’s own specimens were trash, incomplete, good for nothing; He was 
the worst collector I ever knew … There I saw the wonders he boasted of—the 
series of what he called his very rare specimens at 25 cents apiece, and a very 
small piece too; a disfigured flower and a few leaves, not spreading but more or 
less reflexed and rumpled … his new genera and species from the Apalach-
Mountains (a locality he loved above all) which were simply exotic plants well 
known, but disfigured and with addition of parts that did not belong to them … 
But enough about that poor insane—Requiescat in pace! (Boewe 180-1)
Given the well-known value Jefferson put upon education, as a force for 
producing viable subjects within a new democracy, and thus as an essentially public and 
political force, it is small wonder that Rafinesque was left to languish.  The quixotic 
autodidact and Renaissance man, was—like the herbarium and other collections and
75
specimens he had tried unsuccessfully to wield as currency in exchange for a position—a 
thing of unknown value.  In spite of Rafinesque’s passion for knowledge and learning, a 
passion which drove him to barter his most prized possessions, Jefferson was unwilling to 
gamble on these mysterious stakes.  Perhaps Rafinesque sensed this wariness born of 
uncertainty, for in a letter of 1821, amidst his desperate appeals for a position, he 
pleadingly tells Jefferson, “I hope you will excuse whatever may be too personal, and 
bold in this letter.  I write under some sharp feelings; and wish you could know me 
thoroughly” (Betts 373).
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ARTHROLOGY: TAXONOMY, CATEGORY, VALIDITY AND THE ARCHIVE
In his 1964 work, Elements of Semiology, Roland Barthes dramatically announces 
the necessity for a new “science”:
It follows that the future task of semiology is far less to establish lexicons of 
objects than to rediscover the articulations which men impose on reality; looking 
into the distant and perhaps ideal future, we might say that semiology and 
taxonomy, although they are not yet born, are perhaps meant to be merged into a 
new science, arthrology, namely the science of apportionment. (57)
The precise dimensions and prerogatives of this new field remain unexplained, and the 
brief mention serves primarily to give hints of the post-structuralist bent that haunts 
Barthes’ immediate future.  In spite of this text’s apparent pretentions to science (evident 
chiefly in its use of terminology), the line between what we would consider the scientific 
and the rhetorical/semiotic is blurred at significant moments throughout.  Here the excess 
of the signifier is already taking shape as Barthes elsewhere in the book muses over a 
series of metalanguages, each sequentially swallowing the next (including one to 
subsume the metalanguage which his own text is positing) in an imagined analytic 
gesture of potentially endless deferral (93).  
One can argue that the two notions—a semiological taxonomy and the limitless 
constructions of new metalanguages of analysis—are intimately connected in certain 
important respects, and the mention of the two within the same project is revealing.  
Language, whether “natural” or artificial, imposes a taxonomic order, and while this
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order is necessary and thus inherently binding and limiting—even to the degree of 
structuring thought—nonetheless, the idea of constructed categories (for instance, those 
that comprise the basis of an artificial language of analysis) implies a certain degree of 
fluidity, suggesting perhaps a point of intervention suited for aesthetic gesture—even 
experiment.          
During Rafinesque’s time there was a remarkable amount of change within 
scientific taxonomy, though whether this flux is better characterized as play or progress 
likely depends upon a combination of definition and perspective.23  Arguably, Barthes’ 
conjecture assumes a unity to the practice of early taxonomy that misleadingly marks it as 
monolithic in approach and philosophy to the extent that his “new science” is nothing but 
one more formalization, another reformulation and renaming of the forces and tensions 
already present during the nativity of modern systematics, and which haunt the field to 
this day.24  Rafinesque participated in this nativity, and contributed to its tensions.  But the 
nature and legacy of his involvement is complicated: too contentious to simply be 
regarded as a “founding father” of the science, his contribution continues to confound 
even within the rather limited perspective of the historical development of the discipline.  
Rafinesque is alienated enough from the mainstream of the science that a history of 
taxonomy may easily overlook him, and yet his name permeates the early record of 
systematics, not least of all in the technical appellations of New World species.  In this 
respect he could perhaps be theorized as the source of an essential parasitic noise as 
23For an entertaining and accessible account of this period of flux, see Ritvo, Harriet. The Platypus and the  
Mermaid: And Other Figments of the Classifying Imagination. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1998.  For a look 
into some of the philosophical complexities, see, Dupre, John. Humans and Other Animals. Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 2002.
24For an excellent overview of some of the contemporary debates that still surround taxonomic issues, see, 
Wilson, Robert A. ed. Species: New Interdisciplinary Papers. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. 
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explained by Michel Serres: a productive participant in a process that—on account of the 
integrity of its own self-definition—must deny his contribution.25  He thus becomes the 
inescapable interference that all would prefer to ignore.  As a case study, Rafinesque in 
his role as taxonomist illustrates not merely the ways that Jacotot’s “stultification” 
functions (that is to say, the process whereby knowledge becomes organized as an 
orthodoxy reflecting a power structure involving consensus and enforcement),26 but also 
the tacit concern that the archive itself is vulnerable to corruption from the renegade 
researcher.  Implicit in the story of the fall of Jacotot’s Universal Education, and in the 
cultural attitude to autodidaxy in general, is a worry not for but rather about the 
autodidact, a concern that this egregious subject of flawed learning may in turn corrupt 
the fund of knowledge with his/her unregulated meddling.  This fear betrays the 
unspoken assumption that knowledge is public to the extent of its own risk, and that 
rather than being a static or stable value, is in constant process of creation and revision, a 
trait dependent upon the influence and input of its agents.  But while the overt mythology 
of modern knowledge as it applies to the individual learner promises an open domain of 
free exercise and unrestrained engagement, Rafinesque’s forays into taxonomy reveal a 
far more guarded structure, an archive that is malleable but only according to increasingly 
complicated rules of engagement.  
Warren says that, "the era between the publication of Linnaeus' Systema Naturae 
[1735] and Darwin's Origin of Species [1859], two of the greatest landmarks in the 
history of biology, was one of identifying and classifying organisms, and the greatest of 
25“It was only a noise, but it was also a message, a bit of information producing panic: an interruption, a 
corruption, a rupture of information.  Was the noise really a message?  Wasn’t it, rather, static, a parasite?  
A parasite who has the last word, who produces disorder and who generates a different order.” (3).
26Ranciere 76-7.
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all identifiers of species at that time was Constantine Samuel Rafinesque” (156).  Perhaps 
to account for the lack of recognition both in his own time and in the present regarding 
this accomplishment, Warren then goes on to characteristically dismiss his subject on all-
too familiar grounds: "… usually, scientists had some background based upon formal 
education and training, but this Rafinesque lacked, as he did scholarly caution, and so he 
might be considered a talented, full-time amateur, learning as he went along.  
Extraordinarily well-read, he must have been aware of virtually everything that was 
going on at the time in science and natural history" (156).  Rafinesque’s awareness of the 
scientific trends of his day was indeed legendary (though by no means total, as we shall 
see), and one facet of this was his knowledge that, although perhaps “the greatest of all 
identifiers of species” as Warren asserts, he was not the era’s greatest naturalist-classifier.  
The strong contender for this honor was Georges Cuvier,27 the man who, among other 
accomplishments, augmented the Linnaean system with the necessary additional degree 
of “phylum.”  Rafinesque seems to have deferred to this elder scientist’s authority as a 
matter of course, though his secondary status in systematics did not prevent him from 
vigorously theorizing the field.  In fact, in terms of his taxonomic contributions, 
Rafinesque was especially concerned to maintain a positive working relationship with 
Cuvier; one could perhaps even venture from appearances that he wished to secure the 
French scientist’s professional blessing, and toward this end he expended much effort.  
Since the two men never met face to face, the professional bond between them was 
secured, like so many of the day, by long-distance correspondence.  Rafinesque eagerly 
27For a general sketch of Cuvier, see: Outram, Dorinda. Georges Cuvier: Vocation, Science and Authority 
in Post-Revolutionary France. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1984.  More relevant to this study is Foucault’s 
extensive discussion of Cuvier in his Order of Things, wherein we find this appraisal of the scientist’s 
episteme-forming importance: “from Cuvier onward, it is life in its non-perceptible, purely functional 
aspect that provides the basis for the exterior possibility of classification ... before, the living being was a 
locality of natural classification; now, the fact of being classifiable is a property of the living being” (268).
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courted communication with Cuvier, even sharing his specimens with the French 
luminary, shipping samples of various Sicilian fishes collected while the junior scientist 
was conducting his own researches in Italy (Warren 78).
The notion of correspondence is an apt one in this context.  When regarded 
broadly, taking into account its varied definitions, the term seems to be an index of many 
of the relevant historical and circumstantial conditions surrounding Rafinesque’s 
engagement with systematics.  On the one hand correspondence straightforwardly 
designates the written communication between Rafinesque and Cuvier, an exchange 
depicting a lopsided admiration and often uncomfortable professional affiliation.  But 
even at this literal level, there are multiple layers.  Peter Sloterdijk begins his essay, 
“Rules for the Human Zoo,” by paraphrasing Sartre’s comment that “books … are thick 
letters to friends” (12).  Sloterdijk concludes from this that, “humanism is in the 
narrowest and widest senses a consequence of literacy.”  Through this lens Rafinesque’s 
correspondence with Cuvier literalizes Sartre and Sloterdijk’s theoretical conceit but also 
preserves its chief article of conjecture: the creation and confirmation of an intellectual 
continuum secured through the written word, which is to say, a social/textual network for 
the transmission of ideas through space and time.  Under this rubric of “thick letters to 
friends,” the notion of correspondence has yet another meaning, for Rafinesque in his 
capacity as pioneering scientist could be said to correspond with his naturalist “peers”; in 
other words, he parallels those also laboring in the infant field of taxonomy and natural 
science domestically and abroad, thus participating—with varying degrees of intention 
and cognizance—in a productive post-Enlightenment zeitgeist devoted to the reordering 
of knowledge and its subjects.  This reordering process (and the zeitgeist that facilitates 
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it) is just the kind of socio-textual project Sloterdijk limns in his essay, though adherents 
and practitioners during its day would surely take issue with it being characterized as 
essentially literary in nature.
Within the specific horizon of knowledge and its workings, correspondence also 
hints at the notion of a so-called “correspondence theory of truth,” one of the 
fundamental precepts of traditional natural taxonomy as it strives to discover and 
articulate the supposed real-world analogies and affiliations that will give its categories 
their coherence and veracity.28  But conversely, the word itself cannot help but evoke a 
lasting post-Enlightenment counter-tradition of antirationalist (or perhaps more 
accurately para- or even suprarationalist) thinking, beginning with Swedenborg and 
continuing through Fourier, Baudelaire, Proust, Benjamin and Jack Spicer (to name but a 
few).29  Through this lens correspondence is a logic—and thus arguably a kind of 
taxonomy—of its own, a system of intuiting the synaesthetic filiations between entities 
oftentimes seemingly unrelated according to the more positivist literalism of 
domesticated reason.  This parallel tradition of discovering analogies—whether exercised 
as mysticism or modernism—not only acknowledges but even welcomes the otherwise 
problematic possibility of aesthetic and linguistic resemblances and resonances, types of 
likeness that either escape scientific rationality as irrelevant or even vex it as erroneous 
and misleading.  Finally, the term implies the unspoken assumption of mutual 
28See David Knight’s discussion of the stakes of natural versus artificial classification in, Ordering Nature, 
21-3.  For a more general discussion of the correspondence theory of truth, see, Kirkham, Richard L. 
Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Boston: MIT Press, 1995. 119-140.
29This strain of thought is significant as one expression of earlier taxonomic thinking—see Foucault’s 
chapter, “Representing,” Order of Things, 46-77—and one with a significant half-life in modern literature 
on account of its profound implications for language.  For an account of one strand of this legacy, see, 
Wilkinson, Lynn R. The Dream of an Absolute Language: Emanuel Swedenborg and French Literary 
Culture. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.    
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correspondence between the knower and the archive—that is, between the one who 
knows and that which is to be known.  Just as knowledge produces individuals (subjects), 
so too must knowledge itself be produced and organized, and this assumes a more or less 
stable degree of reflection and equivalence (what is commonly termed “accuracy”) 
between the content of the archive and the knowledge of the individual.  In this respect, 
archive and knower are codependent, and just as each is presumed a reflection of the 
other, each is also to some degree vulnerable to the other.
This full range of meanings—from the literal sense of written interpersonal 
communication to the more nebulous conceptual or relational equivalence between 
entities—applies when one asks what the term “to correspond” means with respect to 
Rafinesque.  In one of his letters to Jefferson, Rafinesque seems to tip his hand in terms 
of how he feels about one sense of the word (communication with his taxonomic mentor), 
for topping the list of his “friends and Correspondents” is none other than Cuvier himself 
(Betts 375).  The reality is that even as Cuvier was entertaining Rafinesque’s letters and 
accepting his specimens he was criticizing the naturalist for his discovery and 
classification of “purely imaginary” fish.  This accusation, which is quoted by 
Rafinesque’s (and Cuvier’s) contemporary William Swainson as excessive and 
misguided, and which is in turn cited in Ellsworth Call’s reverent 1895 biography of the 
autodidact-scientist, is telling by virtue of its endurance and chain of transmission as a 
point of contention: Rafinesque’s status among (that is, his correspondence to) early 19th 
century taxonomists is and was troubled, uncertain, and no amount of argumentative 
wrangling can change this fact any more than stamping an impersonal professional 
correspondent with the label of “friend” can make him so, regardless of how many thick 
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letters one has addressed to him (Call 76).30      
Rafinesque begins his 1824 work, Ancient History or Annals of Kentucky, with a 
dedication to “Alexander de Humboldt” (or in the more common Germanic form von 
Humboldt), naturalist, explorer, botanist, Romantic philosopher, and—along with his 
brother, Wilhelm—one of the chief architects of the modern university.  This work is an 
attempt by Rafinesque to situate Kentucky within the “universal history” of humanity, 
and as such it belongs to that loose but generally recognizable strain of early modern 
historical scholarship—one notable less for its rigor than for its broadness of vision (like 
many of its genre, Annals unreflectively tries to square its account with the biblical 
timeline).  It is certainly appropriate that Rafinesque would want to recognize Humboldt, 
pioneer of modern botany, a fellow scholar-traveler (a brother theoros, so to speak) and 
another European with a fascination for indigenous American cultures, a student of their 
ways and languages, as well as a keen observer of their natural environments of 
habitation.  It is also fitting that Rafinesque would be appreciative of Humboldt’s varied 
interests and achievements, recognizing in him a like-minded renaissance man with a 
similarly voracious appetite for knowledge and broadness of vision for how it might be 
applied.  
To the modern reader, however, the dedication can also perhaps be regarded 
somewhat ironically on account of the two men’s striking differences, differences which 
in many respects speak to Rafinesque’s alienation as a thinker and agent of the time’s 
scientific learning.  Alexander von Humboldt’s pivotal role in refashioning the modern 
30Cuvier’s criticism of Rafinesque’s fieldwork seems to contrast markedly with what he was telling the       
young taxonomist directly.  Edwin Betts reprints a letter from Rafinesque to Jefferson in which the former
quotes a note he received from Cuvier: “I have been much pleased to find in your works many new 
animals, and some which I thought new, although you had detected them before me.  I have also found that 
you have noticed before me many generic and subgeneric differences” (Betts 375).  This admission from 
Cuvier is significant, presuming that Rafinesque has reported it honestly and accurately.     
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university—an intellectual environment Rafinesque seemed singularly unable to work 
within, when not outright hostile to—is now all the more apparent given that the major 
European institution he helped imagine into existence has since been renamed in his and 
his brother Wilhelm’s honor.  Against Rafinesque’s standing as a man of science, and in 
particular as a botanist, the dedicatory gesture rings with a certain timbre of pathos.  
Rafinesque did not correspond to or with Humboldt, in either letter or kind, though 
Humboldt was to become the exemplar against which Rafinesque (or any other 
theorist/scientist of the time) would be judged.  Humboldt was in some respects the 
antithesis of Rafinesque, though he was arguably exactly what Rafinesque would have 
liked to have been, and often tried to pass himself off as: famous, well-respected, 
intimately connected to many of the philosophical, scientific, and artistic luminaries of 
his day.31 
The irony of the dedication seems all the more sharp when the apparent 
differences are regarded against the many spiritual affinities that could and perhaps 
ideally should have obtained between the two men (at least as recognizable public 
figures, given that the two were not personally acquainted).  Humboldt was part of a 
distinctive intellectual milieu—many of the day’s premier writers and exchangers of 
those “thick letters”—whose concerns seem directly relevant to Rafinesque’s vocation as 
a scientist and standing as a thinker; the absence of any association perhaps again speaks 
to Rafinesque’s isolation from certain significant intellectual communities of his time.  
Along with the emerging sciences and Naturphilosophie, one of Humboldt’s 
preoccupations was finding adequate channels for individual and institutional expression 
31His legacy is also in some respects an inversion of Rafinesque’s: whereas the latter remains mysterious 
and largely “unclaimed,” Humboldt’s celebrated status invites constant “appropriation.”  For a look at this, 
see, Rupke, Nicolaas A. Alexander von Humboldt: A Metabiography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008.
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of the new orientation toward knowledge, a goal he pursued in intimate company with 
other early 19th century visionaries and philosophers such as Schelling, Fichte, Steffens, 
Schleiermacher, Wolf, Coleridge, Davy, and others.  The range of these thinkers’ interests 
was quite literally encyclopedic and forms an interesting merger between the broad and 
nowadays often separated realms of the aesthetic, the scientific, and—with their emphasis 
on knowledge in the form of educational policy—even the political.  This intellectual 
climate was immensely productive, generating not only many significant theories of 
education, philosophies of knowledge, and visions for what the modern university should 
look like, but also at least one concrete institution of learning—though professor and 
theorist of literature and science, Elinor Shaffer, maintains that there was a direct 
influence from these thinkers on the 1820’s founders of the progressive London College 
(40).  Thus this number might deservedly be doubled.  
In many respects the accomplishments of the Humboldts and of their intellectual 
correspondents represent the culmination of Enlightenment hope in the power of 
knowledge as seen through the prism of Romantic idealism.  Shaffer comments of this 
intellectual continuum and its attempts at reforming education specifically, “most 
essential of all was Kant’s Streit der Fakultaten (Conflict of the Faculties)” and through 
this text, “the strong continuity between the Enlightenment and Romanticism can be seen 
in the contribution of Kant to the reform programme of (Wilhelm) Humboldt” (39).  
Outside of Germany, Kant’s thoughts on the topic were having a similarly inspiring 
effect.  Coleridge, who J.A.V. Chapple, in his survey of Romanticism and science, claims, 
“walked with physical scientists as an equal in understanding, if not in authority,” 
regarded the radically changing status of knowledge and its agents and pledged his
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commitment to a necessary secular cultural intelligentsia, christening them the “clerisy”
(11).32  Eventually, these Romantic (and—at least in derivation—Kantian) ideas on 
knowledge, education and the individual found eloquent expression domestically, in 
Emerson’s celebrated 1837 lecture on education, “The American Scholar,” and later in his 
lecture, “Education,” with its numerous variations.  For an overview of how this vision of 
education might look, one need only glance toward the nearest institution of higher 
learning, since the elaborated Kantian program of the university has essentially endured 
as the structure familiarly recognized as the contemporary university.  Bill Readings 
stresses this point in his positioning of the current conversation on university reform with 
respect to the “founding documents” of the Kantian/Humboldtian academy: “most 
projects for the University of the twenty-first century bear a striking resemblance to the 
University projects of the nineteenth century.  The reason it is necessary to reread 
Humboldt, Schiller, Schleiermacher, Fichte, and Kant is that the vast majority of 
contemporary ‘solutions’ to the crisis on the University are, in fact, no more than 
restatements of Humboldt or Newman” (62).  Not only were these thinkers instrumental 
in determining the shape of the modern academy, they were just as prescient in defining 
its endemic problems.             
The Kantian continuum did not just establish the terms of discussion for the 
structure of the new academy but also extended into the internal composition of the fields 
that would comprise it.  With respect to modernity’s intellectual correspondence (and 
correspondents), there are arguably no thicker letters to friends than Kant’s critiques.  For 
the burgeoning natural philosophy (what we would come to call science), Critique of 
32This term/concept was a coinage based upon Kant’s notion of the Klerisei, which Shaffer explains as, “a 
band of secular individuals who within the church of reason would be analogous to the clergy in established 
churches,” Cunningham, Andrew and Nicholas Jardine, eds. Romanticism and the Sciences. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1990. Page 40.
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Judgment cast an inescapable shadow over the validity of the entire project, since its 
questioning of the “purposiveness of nature” (the presence of some overarching scheme 
of organization that is discernible to human intellection) threatened the validity of the 
entire enterprise.  In the introduction Kant asserts as a basic condition that, “general laws 
of nature have their foundation in our intellect which prescribes them to nature” (5:180).  
As James L. Larson summarizes in his study, Interpreting Nature: The Science of Living 
Form from Linnaeus to Kant, according to Kant’s critique, “the idea of a system of nature 
did not follow from experience but constituted a presupposition that naturalists applied to 
experience and, in a sense, rediscovered there” (173).  Consequently, the doubt that such 
laws or system actually exist in nature becomes a burden for the scientific mind seeking 
to discover and articulate valid principles of organization, and this is acute in the science 
of systematics, given that the avowed mission of any taxonomy is the ordering of entities 
into meaningful and logical (and ideally natural) categories of interrelation.  
If Rafinesque-the-theoretical-taxonomist has a European Romantic parallel it is 
perhaps Lorenz Oken,33 philosopher, classifier, all-around Naturphilosophie Wunderkind, 
and friend to Goethe as well as the many other Jena intellectuals of the time (in 1807 he 
assumed a professorship there, though still only in his twenties).  Oken, was a mere four 
years older than Rafinesque, and in professional output and even drive—if not sensibility, 
the two share many parallels, though it seems that they were both strangers to each 
other’s work, and true to his seniority many of Oken’s projects predate those of 
Rafinesque, though barely.  Within five years of each other both had produced a unique 
theory of systematics, and, based on a common commitment to shared learning as well as 
33To date, there is no full-length study/biography of this curious intellectual.  For a general overview of 
Oken’s life and career—including brief mention of the Rafinesquian debacle wherein Hegel accused the 
scientist of “plagiarizing” one of his chief theoretical insights from Goethe—see his entry in, Murray, 
Christopher John. Encyclopedia of the Romantic Era, 1760-1850: L-Z. London: Routledge, 2003.  
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an expansive notion of knowledge, both were enthusiastic editors of journals, in Oken’s 
case, the celebrated long-lived Isis (1817), and for Rafinesque the neglected Western 
Minerva (1819) and later the equally ignored Atlantic Journal and Friend of Knowledge 
(1832).  The formal sensibility of Oken’s journal may perhaps be explained by his 
intellectual circle.  A few decades before, several of Oken’s colleagues to-be, still in the 
throes of fevered youth, penned a document that seems famously to distill the character 
and concerns of their historical/cultural moment; 1797’s “Earliest System Programme for 
German Idealism,” a brief essay believed to have been conceived by Schelling and 
Holderlin, but scripted in Hegel’s handwriting, demands a kind of fair play between the 
rational and the imaginative, the scientific and the aesthetic, what the authors of the text 
dub a “mythology of reason” (Behler 162, emphasis in original).  Following this 
Romantic principle urging the parity and even unity of knowledge in all its forms, Isis 
featured a mix of discourses: science, scholarship, politics, poetry.  A similar commitment 
(though not born of any apparent communal imperative or support) to the validity of the 
coexistence of scientific, scholarly, and aesthetic knowledge inspired Rafinesque to 
structure his own journals in like manner.
In the realm of systematics, Rafinesque distributed his scientific philosophy 
across two works spanning decades, 1815’s Analysis of Nature or Tableau of the 
Universe and of Organized Bodies, and again in one of his last works, Good Book or 
Amenities of Nature, published the year of his death, 1840.  These relatively obscure 
works (Good Book was self-published and never reissued whereas Analysis—a work 
originally written in French and also self published—was only first made available in 
English in the 1990’s) parallel Oken’s Elements of Physiophilosophy, a text that originally
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appeared in 1810 and then went through several subsequent editions.  If Rafinesque’s 
approach to systematics seemed singular to some of his critics, then it is less on account 
of any challenge to a canonical form than a confirmation that the genre in which he wrote 
was lacking in any such standard; for Oken’s scientific masterwork takes the shape of 
3652 aphorisms, spanning 600 plus pages, which depart from the apparent rift between 
human perception and the mechanical universe and climax with a posited “fourth 
science,” the “Art of War.”  Between these two poles was a grand scheme classing 
creatures by way of the occurrence of various sense-data organs, each being an imperfect 
stage in a hierarchic developmental chain crowned by the comprehensive human sensory 
apparatus, a perceptual instrument made for and adequate to the task of perceiving the 
natural—or in Kant’s terms “noumenal”—world.  Thus the creaturely class, “Glossozoa, 
or the Fishes, as being those animals in whom a true tongue makes the first time its 
appearance” is succeeded by, “Rhinozoa, or the Reptiles, wherein the nose opens for the 
first time into the mouth and inhales air; Otozoa, or the Birds in which the ear for the first 
time opens externally” and so on (Oken xi).  
Oken’s first maxim nods at Kant by bracketing any claims regarding the ultimate 
legibility of nature: “1. Philosophy, as the science which embraces the principles of the 
universe or world, is only a logical, which may perhaps conduct us to the real, 
conception” (1).  This announcement signals Oken’s awareness that, by Kant’s directive, 
all events here must remain squarely within the arena of perception, and so, “6. The 
philosophy of Spirit is the representation of the movements of ideas in consciousness.  7. 
The philosophy of Nature that of the phenomena or manifestations of ideas in 
consciousness” (1, emphasis added).  Oken continues to elaborate a scheme of relation
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between the material and the ideational, one that will allow him to respect Kant’s critique 
while still pursuing his organization of natural phenomena.  “8. The world consists of two 
parts: of one apparent, real, or material; and one non-apparent, ideal, spiritual, in which 
the material is not present, or which is naught in relation to the material ... 13. Now since 
in Man are manifested self-consciousness or spirit, Physio-philosophy has to show that 
the laws of spirit are not different from the laws of nature; but that both are transcripts or 
likenesses of each other” (2).  As with any document belonging to a broader intellectual 
trajectory, the spirits of multiple persons crowd this theory, along with Kant a mix of 
peers, forerunners and possible adherents.  Oken’s text is both an answer to a thick letter, 
and one in its own right, and there is no question to whom it is responding even as it 
addresses itself to the present as well as the unknown future of taxonomy, natural science, 
and philosophy.    
Given the almost wholly materialist direction in which science has since 
developed, Oken’s devout attention to metaphysical/epistemological concerns seems out 
of place in this type of tract.  And since this philosophical platform was essential to the 
underlying rationale of his homological taxonomy, it is perhaps no wonder that his theory 
now appears just an erroneous relic of a confused earlier age.  But during his time Oken’s 
theory was very much a part of an ongoing discourse that was shaping scientific inquiry.  
An 1847 English language version of the text produced for the Ray Society (named for 
John Ray, one of the luminaries of seventeenth century taxonomy) offers a glimpse at just 
how enmeshed this work was within its intellectual milieu as well as the enduring context 
of reception for such a theory.  Translator Alfred Tulk speaks of its Rosetta Stone-like 
properties within the realm of Naturphilosophie calling it, “the most practical application
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upon a systematic scale of the principles advanced by Schelling,” and extends its 
explanatory reach by adding that it will also function as a, “readily available introduction 
to the writings upon similar subjects of Carus, [Henrik] Steffens, Hegel and others …” 
(10/vi).  The influence of the text even touches French science and (at least textually) 
Rafinesque’s mentor-correspondent, for Tulk then goes on to say that he will refrain from 
outlining the philosophy of Oken since this has already been done best, “by M. Saint-Agy 
in the tome complementaire of Cuvier’s Hist. des Sciences Naturelles, 1845” (10/vi 
footnote).
Obviously Oken and his intellectual brethren were not merely applying Kant’s 
philosophy.  They were in the process of structuring a conversation that would reshape 
the archive and literally rebuild the university.  Oken’s theory—now considered far more 
of bygone curiosity than anything Rafinesque produced—was part of the productive 
discursive continuum of his day, and as such was participating in and enabling a 
particular type of international exchange and theoretical elaboration within the emergent 
natural sciences.  There was space in the conversation for Oken, just as his theory enabled 
further conversation.  
Meanwhile, Rafinesque was pursuing his taxonomic intuitions in relative 
isolation.  Apart from his dedication to Humboldt, Rafinesque seems to have had no 
engagement with, and little awareness of, Naturphilosophie or even Kant.  Nonetheless, 
taxonomic theory bookends his professional output, being the topic of his last published 
work as well as one of his earliest.  Analysis of Nature keeps the title’s promised focus 
(though in the most expansive sense possible) while assuming that each categorical facet 
of the natural world implies its own unique branch of scientific study; 1840’s Good Book
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continues this project, further subdividing the cosmos into fields of knowledge, some of 
these already established and plainly recognizable, others clearly visionary in status.  In 
spite of its promised materialist focus, Analysis begins with a brief rhapsodic statement 
whose metaphysical pretensions are not dissimilar to Oken’s first principles, though less 
rigorous and carefully structured around the time’s philosophical debate.  Rafinesque 
acknowledges the age old mind/matter dualist divide and pays brief lip service to a 
deistic, “Creator ... eternal Architect ... ineffable Author” (110).  To this cosmic parent we 
owe our nature as “a mixed being capable of the most precious advantages; for there 
exists in him [the all-inclusive “man”] an intimate union between the two different 
substances which the Universe contains! To a material and organic body, but the most 
perfect on this globe, he unites a spiritual and intelligent soul.  Man forms then as it were 
a link between the intellectual world and the material world: on one hand we crawl on the 
earth with the Animals; but on the other we touch the vaults of heaven by the sublimity of 
our thoughts.”
The vaults of heaven is exactly where Rafinesque begins his Analysis, departing 
his poetic preamble for the widest possible vista the natural world will allow: “Cosmony 
or Natural History: The Universe is the totality of all that exists, and Nature is the 
universality of the admirable laws which rule it” (111).  Proceeding from the general to 
the local Rafinesque begins at astronomy, geonomy (study of the motion of rotating 
heavenly bodies), uranology and astrography (science of the movements of the skies, a 
study presumably differing from the former in some unspecified way), then arrives in our 
own solar system with helionomy (the sun), planetonomy, selenomy (moons), tychonomy 
(“tychomes,” or what are commonly called comets) (111-12).  Once on earth, Rafinesque
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begins with the master-category geonomy—“all that has to do with this globe”—which is 
subdivided into the categories geognosy and somognosy.  These are then further divided 
into such subcategories as atmology (science of the atmosphere), dimnology (science of 
lakes), potamology (science of rivers), stromosics (physics of terrestrial beds), and so on.  
Poised to begin his classification of “terrestrial Bodies,” those many entities—
simple, composite, living and inanimate—that crowd the globe, Rafinesque pauses for 
some theoretical explanation.  Here he acknowledges the essential “gradations” of 
analysis: empire, kingdom, class, order (116).  It is also in this brief passage that 
Rafinesque posits a moniker for what he believes to be a hitherto unnamed branch of 
science, proposing the title “somiology” for the study of living forms (117).  But in this 
Rafinesque had been anticipated by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck by just over a decade.  The 
well-connected Lamarck enjoyed the ceremonial position at the Jardin du Roi fittingly 
titled correspondant, an honor that had been bestowed upon him by the illustrious 
Buffon, one of Rafinesque’s idols and—along with Linnaeus—the dedicatee of the book 
just prior to Analysis (Burkhardt 29).  Lamarck had risen in the world of international 
science by the time he published an 1802 taxonomic work establishing the term 
“biology” (Burkhardt 6).  His ideas on taxonomy, including an early theory of evolution, 
continued to gather in importance such that after his death none other than Cuvier penned 
the eulogy to be read to the French Academy of Science.  The rival scientist seized the 
occasion for simultaneously praising the man and publically lambasting his ideas with the 
dismissal that “a system established on such foundations may amuse the imagination of a 
poet; a metaphysician may derive from it an entirely new series of systems; but it cannot 
for a moment bear the examination of anyone who has dissected a hand, a viscus, or even
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a feather ” (Cuvier 15).
Though a curious form of “thick letter,” Cuvier’s elegy acknowledges Lamarck’s 
placement and connectedness within his orbit of thought and work, and testifies to his 
importance for the time’s discursive continuum of scientific inquiry.  The elegist had 
himself passed away before the text was publically presented to the Academy, and though 
his absentee-judgment was severe, the remembrance at least acknowledged Lamarck’s 
scientific significance and engaged his theories directly.  
Contrasting this is the notorious obituary to Rafinesque penned by pioneering 
American botanist Asa Gray decades after his death.  One of the few public recognitions 
of Rafinesque’s passing by the scientific community, this scathing document grants that 
once upon a time Rafinesque had been a “botanist of real genius,” whose early work 
contained merit.  But for the next three and a half pages Gray goes on to characterize 
Rafinesque’s mature writings not just as madness but even as a toxin to be scrupulously 
avoided lest the field be poisoned: “[they] are simply collections of absurdities which if 
recognized at all would so cumber our synonymy that it would tend to make of it a 
hopeless tangle” (“Botanists” 149).  The source of corruption is Rafinesque’s taxonomic 
“monomania,” particularly his enthusiasm for discovering and naming new entities.  
“Rafinesque should be held up before the young botanist of today as the type of a 
species-maker run mad.”  Gray goes on to ridicule “a paper which he sent to a well 
known scientific journal, in which he described in regular natural history style twelve 
new species of thunder and lightning” (149, emphasis in original).  In fact, the “well 
known scientific journal” was the modestly local and decidedly unscientific Lexington 
monthly Western Review and Miscellaneous Magazine.  And the article about doing field
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work in the Ohio Valley merely observed the unexpected paths of lightning seen by 
Rafinesque during the region’s spectacular thunderstorms and described their shapes 
variously as “spark,” “darting,” “ball,” “sheet” (Rafinesque Anthology 159-161)34.  
Gray’s obit makes crystal clear that, in terms of professional affiliation, 
Rafinesque was no Oken, no Lamarck.  Nor was the United States comparable to Europe 
in having an established domestic scientific culture, a fact which might have served 
Rafinesque; as Gray points out, “never was there a finer field open to the enterprising 
botanist than this country presented to Rafinesque when he landed here in 1802” 
(“Botanists” 151).35  But in spite of having little to no solid orthodoxy to contrast him 
with, Gray is intent on depicting Rafinesque as a chronic interloping outsider, even a 
pariah, to productive American science, labeling him a “dismal ... failure,” diagnosing 
him as insane, describing him as “eccentric,” an “egotist,” and in an earlier publication on 
Rafinesque’s writings, detailing how he was inevitably and justly neglected on account of 
his egregious “peculiarities” (“Notice” 221).  In the obit and earlier piece, Gray 
emphasizes his foreignness, both times incorrectly identifying him as Sicilian 
(“Botanists” 149, “Notice” 221).  He minimizes Rafinesque’s importance by reference to 
his ghettoized status, on the one hand complaining that his writings are hard fully to 
enumerate on account of being “so scattered throughout transient publications,” then 
gratuitously adding that among these far-flung works, “hundreds of pages must be read to 
find one which contains anything of value.”  When the obituary was published, Gray was 
34To Rafinesque’s credit—and perhaps Gray’s posthumous chagrin—many of his observations square quite 
neatly with modern meteorologists’ working classifications of lightning.
35Warren devotes a useful chapter of his biography to situating Rafinesque within the generally chaotic 
fragmented and heterodox environment of 19th century American science, pages 49-56, rife with renegades 
and untrained explorers.  Though strangely, this does little to attenuate his persistent characterization of 
Rafinesque as irremediable amateur and heretic. 
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in a unique position to pronounce Rafinesque’s status with respect to mainstream 
American botanical taxonomy (and to some degree the sciences in general), since he was 
one of its premier representatives.  In this respect, the text fulfills a performative function 
by not merely describing Rafinesque’s alienation from science, but even constituting a 
powerful injunction for this alienation.  This becomes starkly apparent when he asserts 
that poor Rafinesque, “who boasted of having established over three thousand new 
genera and species, has his name attached to but a paltry dozen of genera in Gray's 
Manual, which covers nearly all the ground of his personal explorations” (“Botanists” 
149).  Of course, Asa would be intimately aware of what was included and excluded from 
this still-authoritative botanical reference work, since the Gray referred to in the title is 
none other than himself.  
Gray’s equally mordant 1841 survey “Notice of the Botanical Writings of the Late 
C.S. Rafinesque,” concludes with a glancing review of Good Book, the autodidact’s final 
publication and thus the perhaps arbitrary culmination of his thoughts on taxonomy.  
Actually, Good Book was to be an ongoing journal, and its restless associative flow, 
bordering almost on the hypertextual, suggests a still active mind that fancied itself the 
instrument of a continuing project.  A general section on American botany (37-49) segues 
into a passage in which Ombelliferous plants receive their “proper” names (“the Linnaean 
Genera were the perfection of absurdity!”36), nearly all of the hundred-plus to now bear 
“Rafinesque” as part of their moniker—one of the benefits of the nomenclator (49-61).  
From there a review of other botanist’s work in classification (61-63) quickly gives way 
to a discussion on cephalopods newly-discovered by Rafinesque, and then their fossilized 
36Warren makes the perceptive comment, “Absurd was Rafinesque’s favorite word” (143).  This is 
certainly true when it came to assessing the work of others.
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ancestors (63-67), which in turn prompts a look at “new Quadrupeds of North America” 
(67), a brief list composed primarily of big cats including several species of “couguar” 
(sic) and “2 Mexican jaguars shot in Kentucky” (67), and climaxing with a fossilized deer 
(whose dentition deserves special mention), a similarly preserved shrew, and the 
mysterious, “fabulous fossil animal,” “rhinoceroides” (68).  This slippage from the 
modern to the ancient then prompts an excursus on the etymology of the “Origon” (sic) 
Mountain Range, a sierra that, “had absurdly been called Rocky Mts” (68).  Rafinesque’s 
assertion of the “Lenapi” (sic) origin of the name Origon then opens the gate for a 
discussion of the philological/ethnographic approach which Rafinesque is cultivating, a 
comparative/classificatory system of the world’s languages that, “will find but few 
readers, although it might be quite equal to the works of Cuvier and Champollion …” in 
their respective fields, and which informs the next chapter of this dissertation (68).  By 
the end of its scant eighty three pages the text has wandered from its initial focus on 
abstract epistemological/scientific categories to encompass botanical discoveries, new 
cephalopods, quadrupeds and fossilized creatures, striking New World geological 
formations, inscriptions from the lost city of Atlantis and other “ancient monuments,” 
early American and Chinese alphabetic systems, comparative linguistic analyses, and 
even a listing of various useful oils from India. 
Perhaps unexpectedly in light of its broad range and loose structure, it is not for 
any lack of system that Gray finds fault with Good Book’s approach to classification.  
Actually, his ridicule seems to hinge upon the unwarranted exercise of too much rigor, or 
at least, too many divisions.  Taking the opportunity to reiterate his favorite anecdote, this 
time not merely italicized but sealed with an exclamation (“twelve new species of
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thunder and lightning!”), his primary complaint is the multiplication of ethereal 
categories, many of these simply reiterations of those introduced in Analysis.  Gray 
harbors amused derision for “Astrosy, Heliosy, Tholosy, Selenosy, Toxosy ... Atmology, 
the science of atmosphere,” and so on.  But somehow, Rafinesque’s most original 
classifications seem to escape Gray’s comment, if not his attention: “Stiontosy [science] 
of stony beings”; “Ablepsoms or invisible—Atmisols or visible”; “Phrenomy the laws and 
knowledge of the human mind”—which Rafinesque distinguishes from psychology, “of 
the souls,” or pneumology, “of the spirits”; and perhaps the most useful categorically of 
them all, “Abariology,” the catch-all science of the “imponderable” (7).    
In his obituary Gray grants that Rafinesque’s “writings showed an appreciation of 
natural affinities and of the advantages of a natural classification, but the boundaries of a 
species or genus lay in an unknown region” (“Botanists” 150).  Though the autodidact’s 
work tends toward the science of the imponderable with its mysterious boundaries and 
unknown regions, Gray’s description invokes a common assumption that somewhere 
safely within nature’s own frontiers one may discover her essential affinities and 
categories.  The notion of “affinities” is one that hung in the air at the turn of the 
nineteenth century; but its utility for science was perhaps clouded from the beginning by 
its sense of poetic evocation.  Humphry Davy, British chemist, poet and sometime friend 
to Coleridge and Wordsworth was by some standards the epitome of the Romantic 
intellectual: a pioneering discoverer in the sciences (among his credits are various 
common elements as well as the use of laughing gas as anesthetic), inventor (for 
example, the eponymous Davy lamp which significantly reduced the dangers of coal 
mining), and a recognized writer of considerable talent.  In one of his last works, the
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Rafinesquely titled (and, according to Chapple, Coleridge-inspired) Consolations in 
Travel, or The Last Days of a Philosopher,37 Davy demonstrates the fluid connections he 
perceived to exist between science, metaphysical philosophy, poetry, and narrative art.  
This enthusiasm and interdisciplinary interest matches Rafinesque’s in sensibility, but 
Davy’s surer positioning within early nineteenth century science is confirmed by his 
legacy: a crater of the moon bears his name (another is named for Buffon—Humboldt 
warranted no less than a lunar sea), the Royal Society presents a medal in his memory, 
and he earned a plaque on the wall of London’s Royal Panopticon of Science and Arts, to 
mention but a few of his many honors.  Rafinesque mentions Davy in Life of Travels, 
alongside Humboldt, while discussing other scientists’ corroboration of his own work on 
volcanoes (35).  
Davy’s contribution to the continuum of post-Enlightenment thought exceeds utile 
technology and the strictly scientific realm of speculation.  Davy advanced a chemical 
theory concerning the behaviors of metals and other substances with a notion he 
evocatively dubbed “elective affinities.”  Like “event horizon,” “strange attractors,” or 
other terms from speculative science that seem possessed of a kind of unintentional 
poetry, this suggestive phrase was fated to exceed its native context, not only securing 
itself as scientific terminology but also inspiring a novel from Goethe and later a 
theoretically groundbreaking essay by Walter Benjamin on that novel.  In the section of 
Good Book explicitly concerned with expanding the discipline of systematics to cover all 
scientific knowledge, Rafinesque seems obliquely to echo Davy’s call.  Though much of 
Good Book’s section on taxonomy replicates the earlier Analysis, there is a key passage 
37For the record, this work by Davy was published—and titled—posthumously, though the title reflects the 
contents, and—presumably—the sensibility of the author and his intellectual milieu. 
100
concerning Rafinesque’s theory of the mandate of classification.  The science of 
“Eutaxy”—another coinage from Greek roots meaning “well ordered” (13)—will govern 
the universal categorization of all entities, and Rafinesque is emphatic about the 
importance of this “new science” (12).  It must be governed by definite principles of 
association, and Rafinesque posits one of these principles in his section on the “new 
science” of “the circle of natural objects”; categorical coherence is secured through, 
“analogies of corporeal forms,” or what he terms “collective affinities” (16).  Rafinesque 
does little to gloss this term as he conceives it, but it rings familiar, and so, between the 
two domains that it straddles the phrase may rightly be said to belong as much to the 
realm of poetry as science.  It is on this point that science, poetry and philosophy 
converge.
Exactly how categorical affinities correspond to nature (or even whether they do 
so at all) has been a persistent concern for modern systematics.  David Knight gives a 
sense of the scope of this conundrum in his history of taxonomies, Ordering Man, when 
he discusses the many attempts to ground category on strictly natural attributes:
Underlying this procedure is the unproveable metaphysical hope that nature really 
is ordered into unambiguous families.  This hope that there is an intelligible order 
in nature is like, and indeed is probably a version of, other general metaphysical 
propositions that make any kind of knowledge worth pursuing: that every event 
must have a cause, and that nature is uniform. (20)
Thus the ideal of natural categories of order assumes its role as one of the cornerstones of 
positivist scientism.  It is easy to see how Oken and the other proponents of 
Naturphilosophie are recognizing and responding to this essentially philosophical need
for an all-embracing explanation of the natural realm and thus their reach for 
explanations that could accommodate such conceptual heights; and though less fully
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 theorized and carefully articulated, this same awareness also explains Rafinesque’s 
insistent tendencies toward totalizing theory.  However, even once the philosophical 
dimensions are acknowledged, the problem remains for how each category is physically 
constituted, or how the essences of these natural “unambiguous families” are actually 
instantiated into legible real-world traits, and thus categories.  For Linnaeus, botany was 
explainable by his momentarily useful, but later much-maligned (even by devout follower 
Rafinesque) sexual system in which classification was arrived at primarily through the 
style and number of stamens exhibited by the plant—a system that ultimately had to be 
deemed fundamentally artificial by its own creator38 (though certain early acolytes 
confused it as otherwise).  In the faunal realm, efforts were made to found classification 
naturally on features of the brain, the genitals, or other arrangements of internal/external 
organs (Ritvo 35-8).    
Linnaeus, whose name has become the metonymic signifier of classification in 
early modernity, was Rafinesque’s inspiration (in fact, Rafinesque named his ill-fated 
only son Charles Linnaeus—the boy died in infancy).  David Knight has observed that it 
was Linnaeus who, “brought it about that natural history (seen as essentially a descriptive 
and classificatory science) became the leading science of the eighteenth century, as 
astronomy had been for the seventeenth” (Ordering 57).  This is because of 
classification’s fundamental role in all scientific activity.  Knight cautions, “it is wrong to 
think of the sciences as masses of authenticated facts; the ordering of facts is the 
important part (and without some ideas of the order of things one could not even collect 
them)” (Ordering 54).  Taxonomy is the collection of like things into groups, and it is 
38For a very brief but informative overview of Linnaeus and Buffon, see, Farber, Paul Lawrence. Finding 
Order in Nature: The Naturalist Tradition from Linnaeus to E.O. Wilson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 
2000.  For Farber’s incisive account of the Linnaean system, see especially pages 8-11.
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exactly the basis of these groupings that has been at the heart of ongoing debate during, 
before, and after Rafinesque, and even into the present day.39  In its time Linnaeus’ 
complex and often counter-intuitive system, a ranging collection of taxa and classes 
based on sometimes less-than-apparent criteria, and penned in musty Latin, faced bitter 
opposition.  One of his most vociferous critics was Comte de Buffon, whose 
compulsively readable Histoire naturelle presented an alternative to the abstract 
complexity of Linnaean categorization.  Buffon accused Linnaeus of promoting an arcane 
system of spurious relations between entities that was speculative and dogmatic.  In its 
place, Buffon offered a far-ranging approach based on heightened accessibility: 
Buffon proposed a convention alternative to Linnaeus’s use of hierarchical 
divisions.  Buffon wished to begin by studying natural forms that interest us 
because of their relation to us.  Necessary or useful forms come first, because we 
know best what is familiar.  Admittedly, the order of familiarity was subject to the 
objection against all artificial methods: it assembled heterogeneous objects.  But 
method existed for purposes of study and considered things in the order in which 
they were found ordinarily.  In this framework, the best way to advance science 
was to give a complete description and an exact history of each thing in particular. 
The study of nature would limit itself at first to these descriptions. (Larson 13)    
   
Utilizing this approach—one perhaps more akin to the bestiaries of old in terms of 
entertainment value, and which Larson claims was perceived by many of the day’s 
39For a general overview of some contemporary debates, the reader is again urged to see, Wilson, Robert 
A. ed. Species: New Interdisciplinary Papers. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.  
As a striking example of modern taxonomic controversy, consider one claim of the late 20th 
century “cladist” school of classification, in which types are reckoned according to strict relationships of 
evolutionary descent. By this measure the cladists announced the utter incoherence of the category “fish,” 
on account of extreme heterogeneity of derivation: whereas two aquatic, gilled creatures of apparent 
similarity would fail to qualify as related, some legitimate lines of filiation would have to join some 
varieties of fish with certain reptiles and even mammals.  Caroline Yoon deals with this debate at length in 
Naming Nature, summarizing the matter thusly, “as ridiculous as the idea might appear to be, the death of 
the fish turns out to be scientifically and logically unassailable” (8). 
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naturalists as decidedly antiscientific 40—Buffon’s sixth volume (out of ten), concerned 
with mammals, begins with these “technical” observations,
The cat is a faithless domestic … They are naturally inclined to theft, and the best 
education only converts them into servile and flattering robbers … The form and 
temperament of the cat’s body perfectly correspond with his disposition.  He is 
handsome, light, adroit, cleanly, and voluptuous; he loves ease, and searches out 
the softest places for rest and repose.  The cat is very amorous, and what is 
uncommon among animals, the female appears more ardent than the male; she 
seeks for and invites him, and by her loud cries announces the fury of her desires 
or rather the pressure of her wants. (1-3)
Buffon goes on to describe the visually pleasing “chiaro-obscuro” of the Persian breed, 
the fine coat of the Spanish feline, and those “cats with long hair and pendant ears, and of 
which the Chinese ladies are very fond” (12).
Rafinesque seems to have been unaware of the bitter disagreement between the 
two men and their clashing systems; or perhaps the by-then decades-old rivalry merely 
struck him as irrelevant, and any conceptual dissonance tolerable in comparison to the 
inspiration he drew from both, for he brings them together in the dedication to 1814’s 
Principles of Somiology: “To the memory of the great Linnaeus founder of the 
methodical study of organized bodies and to that of the illustrious Buffon their 
incomparable depictor …” (Classification 71).  By that time both systems were 
undeniably out of date.  Throughout his writings Rafinesque complains of the limitations 
of Linnaean taxonomy.  Warren asserts that, "by the time of Buffon's death in 1788, 
French natural historians [upon whom Rafinesque generally modeled himself] had had 
enough of his grand cosmogonies" (158), a sentiment which Larson confirms, pointing 
out that professional taxonomists of the late 18th century, as exemplified by German 
Zoologist Peter Pallas and his contemporaries, demonstrated a strong preference for, 
40Larson, page 12.
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“limited problems and accurate, well-coordinated information” (25-26).  It would be 
wrong, however, to assume that by Rafinesque’s day classification—either scientific or 
popular—had stabilized into a unified approach, much less settled its more pressing 
philosophical concerns.  Colonial expansion had introduced an entirely new set of 
problematic entities to stymie science.  And disagreement prevailed as various competing 
systems of organization clashed: an 1869 Punch cartoon parodies an oft-repeated 
anecdote in which zoologist and natural philosopher Frank Buckland was informed by a 
railway porter that he would have to pay extra for the monkey he was transporting 
because it was a “dog,” but since his tortoise was an “insect” it could ride for free (Knight 
25, Ritvo xi).        
Underlying this humorous episode is a very real problem.  For in spite of the 
many valiant (though sometimes far-fetched) efforts at unifying nature into coherent 
interlocking units, to this day no convincing large-scale fully natural system of ordering 
organic entities has ever been elaborated, leaving the hope for order into “unambiguous 
families” generally frustrated.  What then can possibly bind together these posited 
aggregations?  The suspicion is that they are perhaps held together by sheer force of will;
the specter looms that what we are actually seeing in the scientific category is little more 
than ourselves or our cultural values in disguise.  In this sense, the taxon, far from 
emanating from nature, is actually an imposition upon nature, an act of violence that 
radically forecloses multiplicity and slashes the complex organic picture until sized into 
an artificially imposed frame.  And yet, for the taxonomist committed to finding natural 
order, unnatural imposition may be a blackmail levied of scientific necessity, for without 
some underlying logic any ordering is, “but a confused, undisciplined crowd of subjects”
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 (through Ritvo 16).  To the systematic scientist, the stakes of abandoning defined orders 
are too high to risk, for as Rafinesque stresses when making his plea for so-called eutaxy, 
“if we deviate from them we fall into disorder and ambiguity” (Good Book 15).
In his unfinished turn-of-the-19th-century novelistic paean to science and learning, 
The Novices of Sais, which friend and fellow Romantic philosopher Friedrich Schlegel 
had published posthumously, Novalis muses, “it must have been a long time before men 
thought of giving a common name to the manifold objects of their senses, and of placing 
themselves in opposition to them” (19).  Here Novalis raises the thorny issue of the 
interrelation between language, category and experience.  The inherently categorizing 
function of language has been a concern to classifiers since the beginning: Plato’s dialogs 
are dominated by attempts to grapple with language’s power to form inclusions and 
exclusions,41 and Aristotle’s Categories is an intensive, systematic attempt to understand 
the equivocating power of names.  To the pioneering seventeenth century taxonomists 
John Wilkins and botanist John Ray—the latter of whose system some felt Linnaeus had 
merely pilfered and dressed up to make his own—language was the interference to 
perfect classification, white noise that prevented nature from articulating her own 
categories in full voice (Ritvo 25).  Assisted by Ray, Wilkins attempted to craft an 
artificial philosophic/scientific language, purified of semantic excess and attuned to the 
essential divisions of the universe.  An Essay towards a Real Character and a 
Philosophical Language is the subject of a well-known meditation by Borges on the 
impossibility of such a task as creating a perfect analytic language.  But Borges’ thoughts 
open into a kind of poststructuralist critique departing from language to encompass 
taxonomy, category, culture and more as he muses on an encounter with an antique (and 
41For example, Socrates’ famous attempt to give a precise definition of “virtue” in Meno, 74b. 
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likely apocryphal) Chinese encyclopedia wherein, “animals are divided into (a) those that 
belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) those that are trained, (d) suckling pigs, 
(e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are included in this 
classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those 
drawn with a very fine camel’s hair brush, (l) others, (m) those that have just broken a 
flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies from a distance” (103).  Foucault credits this 
essay with causing in him, “laughter that shattered ... all the familiar landmarks of my 
thought—our thought” (Order xv).  He goes on to clarify with a statement that seems 
almost the direct echo of Novalis: “the thought ... with which we are accustomed to tame 
the wild profusion of existing things,” and whereby we maintain, “our age-old distinction 
between the Same and Other.”  This experience becomes the genesis-point for his seminal 
Order of Things in which he dissects the emergence of the modern episteme through such 
figures as Cuvier.  In this work Foucault analyzes the seismic shift into post-
Enlightenment rationality as science and reason displace earlier networks of thought and 
representation constituted by perceived analogies and correspondences between entities, 
ultimately rendering these affinities nothing more than magic, superstition, poetry.
In his survey of Rafinesque’s botanical writings, Gray passed this judgment on 
Analysis (and Good Book as well), “as early as 1814, indeed, he sketched a general 
classification of organized beings, to which he continued to attach great importance; but 
there is nothing new in it except the names” (231).  Without a doubt, Rafinesque was not 
just a prolific “splitter” (as opposed to “lumper”—which is to say, one who tends to 
preserve intact the received species and genera rather than “create” new ones) but he was 
also a prolific namer.  Warren estimates that he is responsible for naming some 2,700 new
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genera, 320 new subgenera, 6,700 new species and nine hundred new varietals in botany 
alone (27-8).  This Adamic tendency irked contemporaries like Gray and Torrey, but can 
be seen as a facet of Rafinesque’s obsessive fascination with language and its power to 
organize thought.  
It is difficult to assert Rafinesque’s exact theory of the relationship between 
category and word, but hints are scattered throughout his writings.  1815’s Analysis 
contains a brief but suggestive passage that hints at a linguistic/semiotic facet of 
classification.  Positing the master category “somognosy” (a coinage whose Greek roots 
mean “knowledge of physical bodies,” or in other words, everything material) he 
partitions the study into two kinds of analysis, “description” and “history” (116).  The 
first type of analysis covers “external or Description proper … internal or Anatomy,” 
while the second type, history, more vaguely indicates “use or Cresic [?—perhaps a 
coinage based upon the Greek verb chraomai, “to use”]” (116).  Rafinesque does little to 
pursue this distinction or parse its terms, but one could speculate that the selfsame object
—even an entity of strictly natural origin—could conceivably submit to both types of 
analysis, the first based upon its organic constitution, the other based upon its continued
but ever-changing cultural significance, which is to say, its history (this latter suggests 
aspects of Buffon’s approach).  But Rafinesque also shows deep interest and sensitivity to 
the fluid status of words themselves and his philological writings seek to engage with 
immaterial—or as he might say, “non-somognosic”—semiotic history.  
One of his last and most striking efforts at historical linguistics, 1838’s Genius 
and Spirit of the Hebrew Bible, has baffled readers and Rafinesque scholars since its 
debut.  The book’s project is a complete reinterpretation—through painstaking linguistic
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analysis—of the language and text of the Pentateuch, a move to illuminate its inherent 
rationalist/scientific philosophical truth and rescue it from misuse by generations of 
rabbis and Christian commentators.  Warren wonders at Rafinesque’s mastery of the 
language but calls the book “rambling” and “obscure” (187); Call less charitably asserts 
that it is, “without the least possible value from any standpoint,” and is clearly the 
product “of a man who has lost the power of acute perception and correct ratiocination” 
(202); even Boewe suggests that its sole interest may merely be its novel transliteration of 
ancient Hebrew (Profiles 84).  But the text indirectly articulates a philosophy of 
language; specifically it indicates a profound faith in the power of words to convey subtle 
and precise intellectual distinctions.  Rafinesque maintains that the ancient Hebrew 
religion possessed a scientific knowledge of “Astronomy, Geology, Natural History, 
Physics ... Intellectual Philosophy” (53), as well as “Medicine, Music, Grammar” (47), 
and its language held a profound capacity for qualitative analysis.  He begins by positing 
the existence of a grand scheme of categories and distinctions, “peculiar to the Jews and 
Rabbis, THE SCIENCE OF GRADUATION AND CONTRASTS” in qualities or 
adjective things, objects and facts” (47).  Rafinesque enumerates a handful of the OBRI
(his improved rendering of the corrupt Hebrew) sciences and their native names: 
“OEXBE, Science—DOH Knowledge—OIUNIH Theory.  BINE, Wisdom or 
understanding ... DFUAE Medicine.  SMIXE, Graduation or Science of contrasts and 
degrees.  MBIOH Natural History.  MECAER, Metaphysics.  NIYUE, Dialectics.  GDR, 
MINSUG, Definition or Generalization, EGIUN, Logic. DKDUK, Grammar, MLIYE 
Rhetoric ...” and so on (47-8).  Following this is a lengthy and even more speculative list 
of OBRI verbal roots, glossing their denotative/connotative sense (most of which has
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been lost through generations of mishandling, misinterpretation and mistranslation).  
From this we learn that, “IEUA, miscalled Jehu by Jews, implies the unique self existing 
Being (61); AXI ... most sublime names of the diety (sic) ... AXI derives from AX 
compression or compressive faculty with I the sign of Power, meaning thus the powerful 
compression or gravitation!  The divine energy of consolidation ... his power to 
materialize, crush, consolidate and render unradiant (61).”  At times the connotations are 
bizarre on account of their peculiar specificity and obscurity of function: “AILH appears 
to mean the passing will or act of volition ... ECOER effort of modality or infusion (82); 
EUL, mistranslated Lucifer! ... One of the most sublime words of Obri Philosophy, 
derived from EU Potential Life, and LL circular motion, thus luminously expressing the 
powerful living action of rotation (83).”  Sometimes the words seem to strive for a 
metaphysical poetics, “ORBUH, from OR propensity, BUH active space, meaning the 
animated volition of space!; MXUN ... the collection of reality (87); BR, ray of light, also 
of a circle, realization, intellectual Son, powerful emanation or creation!  sublime Genus 
(perhaps genius?), from B paternity, R motion of radiance” (127-8).  
The effect of reading Genius and Spirit is not at all unlike that of reading Analysis
or Good Book, a vast mosaic exposition of interrelated degrees of quality.  And it is easy 
to see that the kind of linguistic precision Rafinesque claims to rediscover in OBRI is 
what he hopes to activate, via coinages and verbal differentiation, with the modern 
taxonomic project as he conceives of it.  In a footnote at the end of World; or Instability, 
we find one of the most telling passages—vis-a-vis classification—of Rafinesque’s entire 
oeuvre, in spite of the mention’s brevity: “a genus in organized beings is the collection of 
all the varieties or species that differ essentially from others.  A species is the collection 
110
of all the individuals acquiring distinct forms and colors, and all the deviations that can 
breed together.  They are abstract terms of our own; Nature only acknowledges 
individuals and vary (sic) them constantly” (228-9).42  If this is true, then the taxonomy 
(that is, the systematic ordering of species and genera) laboring under its implications 
will likely be complex and ever in process, for its job is to create and enable 
differentiations rather than merely discover them.
This nominalist impulse toward linguistic conceptual specificity, the coinage of 
new terms, differentiations and degrees up to and including visions of new disciplines, is 
perhaps more at home in the theoretical environment of late twentieth century literary 
interpretation than early nineteenth century science.  Perhaps this is “arthrology” as 
Barthes envisioned it.  In this respect Rafinesque was ahead of his time, but still out of 
step with his discipline.  Even in today’s metaphysically sober scientific environment 
there remains the hope that some standard of natural affinity might obtain.  As David 
Knight rather wistfully opines, our advances in scientific classification, “must give us the 
hope that we are in some sense finding the order rather than seeing ourselves or our 
society reflected there and nothing more.  A natural system without any misfits or 
classifications that cut across each other may be a dream, but it need not be a chimera” 
(35).  This is not to say that the scientific environment of Rafinesque’s day was not one of 
wild speculation and (by today’s standards) fantastic systems.  But what differentiated an 
Oken or a Lamarck from a solitary autodidact is in part that they were part of a culture 
and a continuum; they were intelligible voices in an ongoing conversation and as such 
they were working, to some extent, from inside the canon, whether or not their 
42This is not the only time Rafinesque voices a nominalist belief about the project of categorization, a 
position with profound implications for his avocation as a taxonomist; in Herbarium Rafinesquianum we 
find this casual—but philosophically crucial—mention: “individuals alone really exist among organized 
bodies” (13), i.e. unifying categories are no more than abstract human impositions upon nature.   
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contributions were to become a permanent part of it.  One of the most fascinating traits of 
Rafinesque’s legacy is that to this day he remains a permanent question mark on the 
archive, straddling margin and center, a lingering memento of stubbornly uncertain value. 
Whereas Oken and Lamarck are safely defined as definitive missteps toward the Truth of 
science, Rafinesque’s contribution persists as contentious, even rather mysterious.
To return to the question, what does the term “to correspond” mean with respect 
to Rafinesque?  Does it imply a parallel between theory and “truth”?  Does it suggest a 
meaningful equivalence between knowledge and the archive?  Does it invoke an 
approach to language and signs that acknowledges semantic excess, semiotic drift, even 
aesthetic tendencies in our quest to find meaning in, and relationships between, entities of 
experience?  Only in the most literal and impersonal way can we say that Rafinesque 
corresponded with his peers in scientific inquiry.  For though he wrote them thick letters, 
he belonged to no community of like minds and shared in no culture to speak of.  Not 
merely nominalist, Rafinesque was nominalism incarnate: without category, tragically 
singular, speaking in incoherent coinages and neologisms suggestive of Wittgenstein’s 
impossible private language.  Perhaps the most poignant emblem of this is the sole
remaining original copy of Analysis of Nature, Rafinesque’s first foray into taxonomic 
theory, which he eagerly sent to his idol and sometime correspondent for review and 
approval.  On the front it bears the stamp of its illustrious owner in bold: G. Cuvier.  But 
the pages were never cut and thus the book remained forever unopened by the one man 
licensed to give it validation. 
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INSTABILITIES: WALAM OLUM, KNOWLEDGE CREATION 
AND DISCURSIVE FORMS 
In the editor’s preface to The World; or Instability, there is a remarkable moment 
that—if it has even been noticed—seems completely uncommented upon by Rafinesque 
scholars.  As with most of Rafinesque’s publications, the appearance in this text of 
multiple author-contributors is illusory, and, as is universally agreed, the putative editor 
of this didactic poem must certainly be Rafinesque himself.  Amidst descriptive analysis 
of the author’s poetic style, this prefacer lavishes praise on both poem and poet, 
comparing him favorably to other didactic versifiers such as Erasmus Darwin and James 
Thomson, and, with respect to purely instructional value, even Newton (5).  He proclaims 
the poem, “altogether superior to Pope … in moral tendency, variety of subjects, and 
sublimity” (5), and in relation to Milton claims that on some counts it measures inferior, 
others equal, “but superior in some peculiar points” (6).  For although Paradise Lost, 
“justly ranks as the best English epic,” in addition to certain “defects of style,” it has also 
“been accused of some plagiarisms” (6).     
 The offhand, but jarring, accusation is noteworthy, not least of all because of the 
peculiarity of its presumptive basis.  In 1747, William Lauder, a sometime humanities 
professor at Edinburgh University, published the first of a series of attacks in which he 
claimed that Milton had extensively plagiarized a number of authors in writing Paradise 
Lost.  Shortly afterward scholarship exonerated Milton when it was discovered that
Lauder was basing his case upon forged texts, “evidence” which he himself had
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manufactured.  Revealed and shamed, Lauder published a confession-apology (strangely, 
with a reluctant preface by soon-to-be alienated onetime pal and advocate Samuel 
Johnson) and then retreated from the public world of British letters, absconding to 
Barbados and a new life. 43 
This literary-historical oddity—scarcely a footnote in terms of lasting impact—
seems the only possible basis for Rafinesque’s charge.  The fact that the matter was 
almost immediately resolved upon arising, and that the incident occurred nearly a century 
before the publication of Instability only renders its appearance in that work all the more 
curious: if Rafinesque was aware of the plagiarism charge (as he seems to have been), 
surely he also knew that it had been thoroughly debunked and that the accuser had 
recanted.  Obviously, zeal to glorify Instability drove this prefatory “editor” to 
extravagant claims about the poem’s literary merits, but why should he also risk questions 
of credibility or even justified censure by reviving antique accusations widely known to 
be baseless?
Whatever purpose the casual questioning of Milton’s authorship was to have, it 
apparently did not entirely invalidate the work in Rafinesque’s assessment.  Instability’s 
preface implies that in spite of this possible perceived stain, the poem’s other combined 
merits carry the day and it remains the exemplar and model for “the lofty aims, the vivid 
pictures, the sublime thoughts and the ranges of imagination” that Rafinesque’s own 
poem hopes to match (6).  Rafinesque here seeks to become part of a tradition, not just of 
Milton, but of others whose poetry strives, according to the mottoes of Philip Sidney and 
43For a very brief sketch of this peculiar individual, see his entry in Encyclopedia Britannica 11th Edition. 
New York: Encyclopedia Britannica Co, 1911. Page 279.
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Horace before him, to teach and delight.44  To the extent to which it has been perceived as 
a forerunner to Darwinian evolution, Instability partially achieved its desired success.  
But the fate of the didactic poem as discursive form was not a happy one, and as aesthetic 
and informational discourses were quarantined into separate, often opposing realms, 
Rafinesque’s epic account of natural philosophy has become a generally unknown 
remnant of a largely forgotten genre.  The same cannot be said for Rafinesque’s other 
poem of significant length, Walam Olum.  This “translation” of a pseudo-Native 
American epic which Rafinesque passed off as linguistic/ethnographic scholarship has 
remained one of the most enduring objects of controversy for an already contentious 
“legacy.”  While much of the debate surrounding this work has centered on the motives 
for the text and Rafinesque’s subsequent culpability, the Walam Olum is susceptible to the 
nearly endless uses and “misuses” of interpretation that attend any literary (or in this 
case, at least quasi-literary) entity so enduring and polarizing.  What follows is less an 
assessment of the text in terms of its authenticity or historical veracity.  Instead, I will 
regard this “myth” and its subsequent reception as a theoretical parable of the inescapably 
discursive nature of scientific knowledge and its uncertain regulation with regard to other 
“opposing” forms of knowing.  The Walam Olum is an entity in perpetual dispute, both as 
an object and a text, for it calls into question the ways we legislate various types of 
knowledge and the subsequent forms into which they are relegated and finally accepted.  
It is for reasons of its sheer undecidability that the text is so vividly illustrative.  Whereas 
Instability perhaps justly joins the ranks with works by teacher-poets Erasmus Darwin, 
Ibn al-Nafis, James Thomson, and others, Walam Olum transcends this antique genre by 
44Sidney, Philip, “An Apology for Poetry,” Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. Vincent Leitch, et 
al, eds. New York: Norton and Co, 2001, page 331. Horace Ars Poetica, line 333.
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becoming—unwittingly—its most contemporary example.  Like Instability, Walam Olum 
has much to teach, but it does so not in its verses but self-reflexively, by demonstration, 
by its conditions of existence and terms of endurance, and ultimately this is most 
appropriate to what it has to say.
In an 1819 letter to a fellow botanist, William Baldwin says of the recent rejection 
of two of Rafinesque’s articles by the Academy of Natural Sciences, “I am truly glad … 
that they have sufficient independence to reject the wild effusions of a literary madman” 
(Boewe, Profiles 159, emphasis in original).  This striking epithet has garnered some 
comment.  To the many scientists and historians of science who have been the most 
common readers and researchers of Rafinesque (Boewe, Stuckey, Warren for example), it 
constitutes a withering ad hominem attack meant to invalidate the taxonomist’s credibility 
by impugning that his objective purity has been corrupted by imaginative fancy (likely 
Baldwin’s intent).  To Jim Endersby it is a prompt to recast Rafinesque as one among 
several early observer-travelers who treated the banquet of New World flora and fauna as 
the raw material for inspired taxonomy-informed reveries of imagination (Endersby 174). 
What neither of these approaches takes into account is that Rafinesque was a literary 
figure—and not merely metaphorically or secondarily.  Apart from the many exercises in 
poetry that lace his several self-published journals, apart from his various forays into 
rhetoric and aesthetics, Rafinesque had literally epic pretensions as demonstrated in both 
Instability and the faux-Native American mytho-historical text, Walum Olum.  It is 
important to note that while both of these works’ recognized status as literature is 
problematic (each for very different reasons), their judgment as expressions of madness is 
on somewhat surer footing since each radically challenges convention in its own way 
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(though, tellingly, Baldwin had no way of knowing this since neither had yet been written 
at the time of his dismissive comment).
It is by now a more or less safe move to state that, by most current definitions of 
the term, Rafinesque “wrote” the Walam Olum, and the text’s bizarre nature seems to 
echo inside the casual charge Rafinesque levels at Milton.  Both Instability and the 
Walam Olum appeared in the same year (1836), and in light of the latter’s status it is an 
easy temptation to want to explain the accusation merely as some kind of subtle clue, or 
from a more punitively pathologizing perspective, a barely repressed will to confession 
on the part of Rafinesque (although in the latter explanation the exact logic of this 
psychological urge would likely be exceptionally complex, and even more likely to 
remain hopelessly hidden).  The Walam Olum initially appears as the fifth chapter, 
beginning page 121, of yet another ill-fated Rafinesque journal, The American Nations 
(only two volumes saw print).  It is presented as an epic “song” containing, “Original 
Annals and Historical Traditions of the Linapis”—in other words, Rafinesque claims to 
be merely presenting translations of discovered indigenous texts.  Although questions 
about its authenticity loomed from the beginning, over the next century and a half by 
degrees it became enshrined as a genuine document written in the language of the 
Delaware Indians, a mixture of myth, history and cultural symbolism.  As such it became 
the centerpiece of a considerable amount of linguistic, historical and ethnological 
scholarship.  But by the 1990’s questions of its origin again arose and evidence was 
marshaled to definitively denounce the Walam Olum’s purported origins, not least of all 
David Oestreicher’s intensive linguistic analysis which demonstrated that the text was 
originally composed in English and then only clumsily rendered into Delaware with the
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help of Native American glossaries compiled by pioneer-missionaries (Oestreicher 1994).
No one any longer regards Walam Olum as Native American literature; no scholar 
admits its status as valid history (in its current form), or even myth (though some 
remaining Delaware aver that authentic oral accounts were in fact used as a loose 
foundation in the construction of the narrative); as stated, it is now widely agreed to be 
the work of Rafinesque himself.45  And while the text’s meta-literary possibilities seem 
almost endless, the many deep and conflicting cultural and historical investments that are 
bound up in the work may make it simply too contentious to treat as a mere literary 
artifact.  Since its outing as inauthentic, the question that has naturally preoccupied 
scholars is, why?  How do we account for this egregious breach of scholarship by 
someone so obsessed with the apprehension of knowledge and its precision use, someone 
who made a regular practice of publicly decrying the inaccuracy, errors and missteps of 
others?  It is primarily within this frame and through these lines of inquiry that the text 
has been discussed in the last several decades, and though not the final destination, this 
will also serve as the necessary point of departure for this analysis.  
Probably the most compelling theory for the text’s genesis was posited by 
Oestreicher’s initial debunking, and has been again reiterated and expanded in Andrew 
Newman’s article on the Walam Olum in American Literary History.  Newman argues that 
Rafinesque’s motives were—according to the ethos of science and other systems of 
knowledge based on its precepts—(largely) pure and his methodology honest but naïve.  
Oestreicher had dubbed Rafinesque’s approach “pictographic palingenesy,” which 
45Rafinesque scholar Charles Boewe has publicly maintained a belief that Constantine was merely hoaxed 
and that he himself believed the text to be real, publishing it in good conscience: see his comments on the 
matter in the introduction to Profiles of Rafinesque, pages xxxiii-xxxv.  But in light of what Oestreicher has 
discovered about the epic’s construction, as well as what the “translator’s” notes seem to indicate, Boewe’s 
faith in Rafinesque seems little more than just that.
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Newman observes, “implies a process of restoration rather than invention” (37).  This 
notion is acknowledged by Rafinesque himself in 1838’s Ancient Monuments of North 
and South America wherein he nods toward the conceptual origin of his methods: “my 
process is similar to that of Cuvier and the modern Paleontologists who restore extinct 
animals by fragments of their bones” (28).  
The “process” to which Rafinesque here refers is one of Cuvier’s lasting 
contributions, the so-called “principle of the correlation of parts” (hereafter PCP), a 
theory that argues for the inferable ordering of the whole by way of the logic expressed in 
its mere fraction.  As Cuvier had announced in a lecture to the National Institute in 1798, 
“the number, direction, and shape of the bones that compose each animal’s body are 
always in a necessary relation to all the other parts, in such a way that—up to a point—
one can infer the whole from any one of them, and vice versa” (Rudwick 36).  In dealing 
with animals some of which have been extinct for countless millennia, Cuvier’s principle 
exceeds the Sherlock Holmesian ability to determine the brand of cigar via its residual 
ash, but the premise is exactly the same: when human intellection is rigorously trained up 
to modernity’s standards, knowledge promises the key to seemingly impenetrable 
mysteries.  
The appeal of such a promise to one like Rafinesque is obvious, as is the further 
application to which this principle could be applied by a resourceful polymath possessed 
of intellectual confidence and a bent for imaginative pondering.  In 1840’s Good Book 
(Rafinesque’s last publication, and one with a chapter entitled “The Graphic Systems of 
The Ancient American and Chinese Nations” that reflexively cites Walam Olum as 
evidence), he elaborates his vision of “Historical and Ethnographical Palingenesy.”  The
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roots of this term are the Greek genesis, “origin/birth,” and palin, “again,” and as 
Rafinesque defines it, “Palingenesy means restoration to life or existence or knowledge” 
(69).  The promise of this “new branch of science,” he tells us, may actually equal 
Champollion in importance but—undoubtedly based on hard experience gleaned from 
self-publishing—he posits it will remain largely unread and therefore underappreciated 
(68).  It will also pay tribute to the pioneering spirit of its inspiration and model, Cuvier
—“he has been greatly praised.  Shall I be?,” preserving his principle (the PCP) while 
applying it to the archeology of human culture (69).  Rafinesque explains, “I take 
scattered words of extinct Nations and Languages, and out of a few or any number, I 
restore them to our historical knowledge … I directed at first my attention to the old 
American Nations; but I have since been led to embrace the whole of mankind …” (69-
70, emphasis in original).  Here Rafinesque seems not only to avow the process that 
accounts for the Walam Olum according to Oestreicher and Newman’s arguments, but it 
is tempting to think that his vague reference to work on “old American Nations” may in 
fact be a nod to that very text.  
The PCP theory of the Walam Olum advanced by Oestreicher and Newman, and 
seemingly acknowledged by Rafinesque in the passage above, presumes that even if the 
work is inauthentic by modern standards of scholarship, within its composition—or at 
least somewhere in its back-story—there is a factual kernel.  This is in keeping with the 
logic of Cuvier’s principle which holds that even when scientific speculation is at its most 
sweeping and precarious, some authentic fragment—emblematized as a piece of bone in 
the original articulation—will act as anchor and point of departure.  Just what constitutes 
the factual remnant—the bone, so to speak—in the case of the Walam Olum?  The
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question is difficult given the mystery that surrounds the text and its acquisition.  
Rafinesque claims to have received the document from one “late Dr. Ward,” a man he 
encountered on one of his botanizing sojourns into Indiana (American Nations 122).  
Apparently, the doctor had accepted the text in return for medical services rendered to 
Indians residing along the White River, members of the Delaware Tribe (also known as 
the Lenni Lenape).  The text’s unusual form is reflected in its title.  Wallam-Olum (as it 
was first transliterated by Rafinesque) means “painted record,” or more evocatively, “red 
score,” the text itself being a collection of cedar sticks each with an ideographic glyph 
etched and painted red on its surface.  Every pictograph distills a discrete narrative 
element, visually communicating an episode requiring translation into a series of words 
roughly one sentence in length.  Supposedly these information-dense glyphs were for use 
as a mnemonic tool for the ritual chant of the tribal lore.  Based on Dr. Ward’s text, the 
reconstituted narrative begins with the creation of the world and ends with the first 
appearance in 1626 (according to the calculations of the Indiana Historical Society 
scholars) of Europeans—“Whites … friendly people with great possessions: who are 
they?”—on the east coast of what will come to be called North America (Rafinesque/IHS 
206-7).  Somewhere between this 1822 acquisition and its 1836 publication, Rafinesque 
laid hands on an addendum to the Walam Olum, a fragment delivered to him by an 
unknown source and already translated by a man the equal to Dr. Ward in mystery, one 
John Burns.46  This latter passage, while brief, begins where the other leaves off and 
updates the narrative, chronicling the disastrous outcome of Indian relations with the 
newcomers, and concluding shortly into the 19th century.  In spite of the dubious 
provenance of the two passages that make up the whole of the Walam Olum, and in spite 
46Attempts to identify both Ward and Burns have proven futile.
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of the mysterious loss of the inscribed sticks originally acquired from Ward, the text has 
endured and the “original” ideographs have even persisted as an object of study thanks to 
Rafinesque’s extensive notes, which to the fortune of posterity included detailed pictures 
and analysis of each character.  This effort has allowed the Walam Olum to be repeatedly 
“retranslated” and thus re-imagined.  Perhaps ironically, perhaps fittingly, though 
Rafinesque’s reputation as a source of scholarship had suffered greatly even in his own 
lifetime, in the end he became the sole custodian and conduit for this complicated text to 
reach the modern world and find its varied readership. 
Oestreicher’s label for Rafinesque’s project, “pictographic palingenesy,” not only 
posits a theory for the Walam Olum, but also suggests what might be reckoned as its 
Cuvierian bone—that factual remnant upon which the whole has been developed.  
According to this view, Rafinesque based his excursion on some actual ideographic 
representation associated with the Delaware, building up his work from the level of 
script.  A number of points bear observation with respect to this idea.  For example, it was 
for this very reason that Henry R. Schoolcraft, one of the Walam Olum’s earliest skeptics, 
cried hoax (Warren 150).  As an interesting side-note, Schoolcraft’s own scholarship has 
been made to function as the authentic relict core for other fantastical epic 
“reconstructions”: his work on the Ojibwe Tribe became the loose source material for 
Longfellow’s romantic poem, “Song of Hiawatha.”  Schoolcraft was suspicious of the 
Walam Olum’s pictographs because of their occasional obvious similarity to Chinese 
characters, a feature that has been consistently pointed out by skeptics since—in addition 
to the apparent influence of Egyptian hieroglyphics on the script.  However, this 
resemblance could be explained as perfectly reasonable to a certain mindset of the day
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(which Rafinesque shared in), since texts like the Walam Olum were thought to belong to 
an ever-emerging narrative of universal human history, one in which all peoples had 
deviated from a single origin and language group and suffered the same primordial 
catastrophic disasters, such as a great flood.47  
While this urge toward seeking a common human arche was gradually disavowed 
in history and science (particularly when found to be bearing traces of biblical influence, 
which it often did), it could be argued that the unifying impulse simply migrated and 
disguised itself, surreptitiously reemerging later in certain forms of 
linguistic/ethnographic comparative analysis.  A fascinating example of this is the 1954 
Indiana Historical Society’s version of the Walam Olum.48  This remarkable text was the 
pet project of Eli Lilly, pharmaceutical magnate and Native American enthusiast.  Likely 
it is this work that bears the lion’s share of responsibility for whatever continued aura of 
authenticity the Walam Olum enjoyed throughout the mid to late 20th century.  Beginning 
in the Great Depression and continuing for twenty years, Lilly—one of the poem’s true 
believers—funded a team of roughly a dozen scholars to produce the definitive edition of 
the epic.  The result of this impressive labor was an oversized, gilt-paged volume, replete 
with color maps and graphics, an artifact custom-designed for the bibliophile.  In addition 
to a pictograph concordance and critical apparatus featuring scholarly essays on the text, 
its history, and its significance, every page of text devoted to the poem itself features a 
reprint of Rafinesque’s original notes containing his version of each ideograph and a 
47The Walam Olum contains a flood episode similar to the story of Noah in the Hebrew Bible and the 
Greek/Roman story of Deucalion. It would not be until 1872 that George Smith would rediscover the very 
similar Atrahasis episode in the epic Gilgamesh, a find that would only make the narrative motif seem all 
the more universal to later theorists.
48Cited throughout this chapter as “Rafinesque/IHS” in order to differentiate it from Rafinesque’s earlier 
published version. 
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rough literal translation.  Below this is the updated (and sometimes “corrected”) 
translation by Edward Sapir-trained linguist/anthropologist C. F. Voegelin, followed by a 
visual analysis of that page’s pictogram (by Lilly himself) and “ethnological 
observations,” that is, commentary by celebrated anthropologist and Voegelin’s then-
wife, Erminie, comparing that narrative element with other Native American 
mythological accounts.  
Anthropologist/ethnologist and Rafinesque critic Stephen Williams has attempted 
to exonerate the involved scholars who labored under Lilly’s beneficence by observing 
that their testimony in favor of the text comes across as exactly “what one feels the donor 
would want to hear” (Fantastic Archeology 113).  In spite of this generous assessment by 
Williams (who in 1991 doubted the verses of the Walam Olum but believed the migration 
tale at the heart of the poem to be authentic indigenous lore), the scholarship of the 1954 
edition validates the text and situates it within an approach to ethnological 
research/analysis based upon cultural analogy and resemblance.  Erminie Voegelin’s 
commentary focuses on finding correspondences between the poem’s narrative elements 
and mythic/religious and historical themes of Shawnee, Ojibwa, and modern Delaware, 
among others.  During the text’s early account of creation, Manitou and mermaids and 
other motifs abound with archetypal resonance, whereas for the poem’s later “historical” 
verses, discussion on trans-tribal rules of succession and political customs predominate.  
Though her explanatory approach could be read (as Williams apparently does) as a way 
of discussing the text while sidestepping overt judgment concerning the authenticity (or 
even substance) of its content, it also forcefully naturalizes the document with its insistent 
catalog of parallels and cultural contexts for situating the story within the reader’s
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understanding.  
Lilly’s analysis broadens the range of correspondence by universalizing its 
imagery.  In fact, Lilly’s commentary often appeals directly to a universal language of 
image, such as when he notes the use of wavy parallel lines to designate “river” for the 
Egyptians, Chinese, Babylonian and Sinai—as well as the familiar zodiac sign of 
Aquarius (233), or the more unlikely entry on page 228 for the concept “clear”: “uplifted 
arms spread sidewise, as in sign language” (presumably ASL).  When not clumsily literal 
(on page 58, below a stick figure holding an arrow Lilly glosses “an arrow indicates the 
hunter”), the sometimes vague pictographs can come to represent self-evident (but 
nonetheless esoteric) motifs: “the curve is, of course, the celestial arch” (16).  The deeper 
conceptual well the imagery draws from is often strikingly familiar as the cultural values 
of observer and observed seem to collide and commingle in obvious ways (to the modern 
reader, anyway).  For example, inimical figures throughout the text are inevitably 
associated with the snake, laden as the creature is with Judeo-Christian moral 
implications; toward this end the symbol signifying the concept “evil” is “a double 
fanglike mark” (220).  Under the pictograph concordance entry for the word “sinister,” 
there is the explanation, “a figure crossed by a series of transverse lines like stripes on 
prison garb.”  This intrusion of images and words with culturally specific value into a 
supposedly objective analysis becomes present at the level of language when Lilly goes 
on to explain, “the Eskimo also used a zigzag-marked figure to express sinners” (234).  In 
his defense, many of Lilly’s projections merely extend the logic of thematic tendencies 
already at work in the poem or the pictograms; still he pursues its lead with enthusiasm 
and studious attention.
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A strict assessment may dismiss the above as symptom of an unreflective 
culturally-embedded myopia typical of an earlier generation’s version of “academic” 
analysis, while a more generous account would perhaps cite merely unfashionable 
pretensions to some archetypal bond between cultures.  Either way, the projected 
universal resonance of the Walam Olum, whether manifested in the text itself or the 
analysis thereof (potentially a contentious distinction anyway), lends the issue a lasting 
complexity.  As previously mentioned, some Delaware still consider the basis of the 
poem to be genuine indigenous myth, a point which Newman’s 2010 article confirms (34, 
and see page 51, footnote 12, in which he relates the ambiguous email reply he received 
about the matter from Tamara Francis of the Cultural Preservation Office).  Even more 
significant is the poem’s appeal to many younger Delaware Christians who see the text as 
confirmation of their place within a Judeo-Christian/Native American continuum.  To this 
view the poem, with its suspiciously biblical themes, is a kind of proto-scripture that—
although by no means gospel—is at the very least prophetic (Newman 34).  The effect of 
this cuts both ways, creating a sense of belonging for Christian Delaware (and given its 
pan-Indian pretensions, Christian Native Americans generally), as well as a ready-made 
place of acceptance and recognition for them to be received by believers of the ethnic 
majority.  Users’ reviews from the Amazon.com webpage for David McCutcheon’s 1993 
new age “translation” of the text bear witness to this: “this book is awesome … the 
Wallum Olum (sic) begins with the mythical creation of the world, the entry of evil and 
strife, and a great flood.  Sound familiar?”49; or even more forcefully, “The story of the 
Lenape sounds like the whole story of mankind, complete with Creation, floods and evil 
serpents like the account in Genesis and records of their leaders just as Kings and 
49http://www.amazon.com/review/R2I48FIINA65B0/ref=cm_cr_pr_viewpnt#R2I48FIINA65B0  
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Chronicles contain in the Holy Bible. I felt a sort of kinship with these people, even 
though I have never met any Lenape personally and though I am a Christian, I sensed the 
presence of God in their tale as well.”50
A certain potential Christian significance of the Walam Olum was certainly within 
Rafinesque’s awareness and may have even factored into the correlation of its parts—at 
least negatively.  Here one must again enter the muddy waters that confuse the “why?” 
with the “what?” of the Walam Olum.  Oestreicher is nearly unique among those who 
speculate about the motives of the incident in his emphasis that Rafinesque’s likely main 
purpose was to secure the prestigious and (sometimes) lucrative French Prix Volney 
award which in 1835—one year prior to The American Nations was published—was 
pledged to go to new linguistic scholarship in “Lenni Lenappe, Mohegan et Chippaway.”  
Curiously, Rafinesque first submitted a broad-ranging essay on general linguistic issues, 
then hastily supplemented the submission with the appended Walam Olum, claiming 
“new philological and graphic materials” (Boewe, Profiles 239).  Although one of only 
two entrants, Rafinesque still failed to secure the prize.  This certainly looks coincidental, 
if not outright suspicious; though even as explanation for motive its use is limited.  The 
coveted Prix Volney may have formed some part (conscious or otherwise) of the 
inspiration for the Walam Olum (though given a personality as complex as Rafinesque it 
would also be a remarkably simple and transparent causal agent—elaborate self-delusions 
notwithstanding), but at best it perhaps explains some facet of the text’s genesis or a clue 
to the timing of the matter; that is, it speaks to the poem’s circumstance while saying little 





motive one could posit another, one involving only slightly less questionable impulses, 
but which at the same time preserves intact the glimmer of embedded fact, or “truth,” 
which the PCP necessitates, and which Rafinesque so avidly pursued and obsessively 
cherished.  This could provisionally be dubbed the theory of the “apotropaic hoax,” or 
hoaxing against hoax in order to advance what is perceived to be the ultimate truth.  
Shortly before Rafinesque’s publication of the Walam Olum, Mormon founder 
Joseph Smith had claimed literally to unearth a text with a similarly questionable origin, 
similarly bizarre form, and similar historical/etiological pretensions, in the form of a 
long-buried cache of gold plates inscribed with details of the Native Americans’ 
genealogical descent from the lost tribes of Israel.  This “evidence” (which swiftly and 
mysteriously disappeared) was unique to Smith, but not the theory they supposedly 
confirmed: as already mentioned, even the developing sciences of Rafinesque’s time were 
struggling to reconcile New World entities with the still-prevailing authority of scripture, 
and to the non-scientific observer the human inhabitants were especially a conundrum.  
Rafinesque pulled no punches in publically calling out Smith and fundamentalist bible-
thumping armchair scholars such as Josiah Priest and Ethan Smith in articles like 1832’s, 
“The American Nations and Tribes Are not Jews,” from his Atlantic Journal (98-9).51  
Though Rafinesque harshly criticizes Joseph Smith as a fraud in this piece (as he did 
consistently elsewhere), not long after, Smith-appointed church elder Orson Pratt cited 
Rafinesque’s authority on linguistics and even the chart of Native American glyphs that 
begin this very volume of Atlantic Journal to mount a case for the authenticity of the 
religion’s suspicious founding documents in his, “Divine Authenticity of the Book of 
51This article had undoubtedly reached a much broader audience when it previously appeared in Saturday 
Evening Post, vol. 8, Sept 12, 1929, page 1.
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Mormon” (Pratt 88).  It was perhaps this glaring irony that led ichthyologist, pioneering 
university president, and committed rehabilitator of Rafinesque’s scientific reputation, 
David Starr Jordan, to make the baffling attribution in his bio entry for 1899’s Science 
Sketches that Rafinesque was one of the originators of Mormonism (163).  Surely this 
bizarre assertion by Jordan is another case of Rafinesque functioning as a lightning rod 
and repository for exaggerated romanticized projections about the perverse capability and 
eccentric accomplishments of the self-fashioned intellectual. 
The truth is that against the notion of Native American Hebraic origins 
Rafinesque was championing the theory of early Asian migrants crossing the Bering 
Strait.  While much of the “history” depicted in the Walam Olum was at the time 
uncontroversial (except perhaps in its sharp characterization of white settlers’ avarice and 
dishonesty in dealing with their Indian counterparts), the poem seemed to corroborate 
Rafinesque’s favored account of the then still-disputed origins of native peoples in 
America.  This euhemerist “interpretation” of the Walam Olum and its explanation for the 
indigenous populations turns out to be essentially true, but the poem’s timeline, still 
basically bound by the influence of Hebrew scripture, does not.  According to this reading 
the skeletal factual remnant of the story is an account of historical migration and 
settlement dressed up in the mythic garb of a quest tale.
One way of generalizing the contrast between ancient and modern 
epistemological orders might be to say that the scientific approach to a thing’s origin, 
with its positivist emphasis on causality and reason, reveals mythic explanation as 
primitive, childish, fantastic and flawed; an opposite reading of the same issue might say 
that myth openly shows itself as the true guiding impulse in every search for origins.
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There is something rather mythic in the premise of the principle of the correlation of
parts, with its attempt to give structural—even narrative—sense to the unknown by 
connecting it meaningfully to the known, and the Walam Olum literalizes this with its 
offer of Native American lore.  But the structure of the poem (including its many 
contentious elements) also offers insight into the principle’s own self-mythologizing 
tendencies.  Consider the imagery of the principle.  The remnant, or core, that founds the 
excursion of thought is its beginning, giving the appearance of a base, of an origin, and a 
reliable token of truth.  The image itself, bone, or in the Latin word that provides the 
scientific root for terms dealing with bone, ossa (plural), suggests not only the notion of 
an organic core, but also firmness and stability.  However in the functional position of 
ossa, Rafinesque places glossa: language, speech, verbal representation (though as a 
curious side-note on the poetry of happenstance, in that other source-language of 
scientific learning, Greek, the term ossa can designate “voice, an ominous or warning 
voice, prophesy, rumor”52).  With glossa the expectation of pure hard truth gives way to 
that of signification, rhetorical gesture, and inevitably to that of uncertainty.  Cuvier’s 
ossa is not merely an anatomical fragment, but like every origin (arche) it is the 
guarantor and anchor, the firm foundation upon which equally solid knowledge should be 
built.  But story begets only more story, and glossa announces itself as discursive, 
speculative, even literary.  Part of Rafinesque’s move, vis-à-vis Cuvier’s principle of the 
correlation of parts, is to show the fundamental instability of the principle’s operation; the 
PCP is inescapably discursive, and Rafinesque’s Walam Olum highlights this.   
52Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon: Abridged from Liddel and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 1994, page 502.
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The many webs of possibility that persist for explaining the Walam Olum attest to 
a text that remains largely undecided.  Even decades after its “outing,” nothing seems 
fully settled about this work, neither its motives for being, nor its principles of 
construction, not even the truth-value of its content.  But rather than an aberration, this 
uncertainty is precisely the modus operandi of informed modern speculation.  Returning 
to the issue of shifting epistemological orders, Baudrillard succinctly limns the shift from 
a premodern order of fixed meaning (characterized by unreflective certainty) to the 
modern one of inquiry and signification (characterized by automatic skepticism) when he 
explains that “counterfeit is born with the Renaissance,” (simulations 83).  The 
arbitrariness of the sign, the fluidity of meaning under the conditions of representation 
freed from identity and analogy that accompanies the shift into modernity, one which 
Foucault tracked extensively in his archeology of the modern era, The Order of Things, is 
a well-worn axiom of semiotic analysis.  Umberto Eco offers a trenchant statement of this 
phenomenon in his Theory of Semiotics: “every time there is possibility of lying, there is a  
sign-function … the possibility of lying is the proprium of semiosis …” (58, 59, emphasis 
in original).  
Vivid though it is, Eco’s statement offers a nonetheless limited view of the 
relationship between knowledge and signification in that it presumes the arguably 
spurious distinction between content and representation.  It is in this respect that the shift 
toward the modern episteme becomes especially complicated, particularly in terms of the 
so-called sciences and their varied cultural functions.  The privilege modernity affords to 
any knowledge regime fortunate enough to operate under the moniker of “science” is 
well documented, and its corollary is science’s exercise of tremendous cultural authority,
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authority of oftentimes mysterious purview and obscure limits (even to its own avowed 
practitioners).  As to its operative methods, one of the basic precepts of the scientific 
model of knowledge is that it is ever-contested, subject to constant change, perpetual 
revision, a principle that is often conceptualized as refinement based on an ever-
improving grasp of content (though many theorists of the pursuit, such as Thomas Kuhn 
or Paul Feyerabend, have strongly disagreed with this teleological model53).  This 
commitment to “correction” is reflected in the sciences’ consistent use of the term 
“theory” to describe even widely agreed upon de facto axiomatic principles, and gets 
theorized in the principle of scientific “falsifiability” as espoused by Karl Popper and 
others.54  To put this in stark terms, there is implicit acknowledgment in the sciences that 
much of what passes for knowledge today will have to be changed—i.e. is fundamentally  
untrue.  Inasmuch as science embodies modernity’s ideal form of knowledge and the 
methods of its apprehension, it also passes judgment on knowledge as unstable and 
insecure, a value with pretensions to essential claims of being, but whose actual status 
threatens a constant becoming.  
In spite of content in flux, the products of knowledge must allow for functional 
interface; they must effectively join into network with other established and normalizing 
structures of meaning.  In other words, all knowledge demands a discursive connection to 
the existing knowledge that precedes its appearance.  According to Cuvier’s principle, a 
solitary fossilized bone is no isolated curiosity, no stand-alone fact or knowledge-end in 
itself, but rather it is a terminal ready-wired to reactivate (and thus metaphorically 
53See Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago UP, 1962; and 
Feyerabend’s Farwell to Reason. London: Verso, 1987.
54For more on this theory, see, Keuth, Herbert. The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2005.
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reanimate) a once-living organism and integrate it into the horizons of understanding 
appropriate to the newly emerging natural sciences.  The principle of correlation, with its 
obvious reliance upon speculation and narrative structure, raises questions about the self-
sufficiency of all scientific data (arguably anything that is to be communicated submits to 
narrative—or at the very least rhetorical—principles), especially in a cultural 
environment in which “scientific” knowing occupies such a foundational status and is so 
often summoned as authority for even non-scientific endeavors.  
Mindfulness of the discursive component of scientific knowledge or even 
awareness of the interdependence and complicity between scientific and non-scientific 
knowledge-discourses informed theory and practice in Rafinesque’s time.  The 
Hegel/Schelling/Holderlin collaboration, “Oldest System Programme of German 
Idealism,” bears traces of this when it calls for the elaboration of a “mythology of 
Reason,” suggesting the need for a meaningful narrative structure.  Rafinesque’s own use 
of epic poetry as the vehicle for communicating his philosophy of nature shows a keen 
concern for the relationship between form and content (an example all the more striking 
given the importance Rafinesque placed on the articulation of this theory, as seen in his 
letter beseeching John Torrey to see it through in the event of his death).  In his analysis 
of early media (another famously complex domain with respect to the differentiation 
between content/representation), Siegfried Zielinski discusses Rafinesque-contemporary, 
Johann Wilhelm Ritter, pioneer in the study of electricity and member of the German 
Romantic/scientific scene of Goethe and the Jena crowd.  In a lecture entitled “Physics 
and Art,” Ritter posited a knowledge-function to each aesthetic medium.  The epistemic 
contribution of painting is the creation of what Ritter called, “half-space,” which
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 Zielinski explains, “… partially gives back to humans the necessity of an active role, for 
the observer is compelled to complete the image space …” (177-8).  This interplay 
between the partial known and the imagined whole, between data and speculation, sounds 
remarkably familiar.  And though overtly concerned with aesthetic effects rather than
knowledge acquisition (again, a debatable dichotomy—especially to Naturphilosophen), 
Ritter’s “half-space” recalls the principle of correlation in acknowledging the role of 
imaginative projection (one could even say creation) inherent in the process of 
apprehension.  Between Ritter’s projected spaces and Cuvier’s imagined correlations we 
see the rough outline of a largely unspoken poetics of science that issues from its own 
speculative thought and the combined impulses of curiosity and creativity that power that 
thought.  In keeping with this experimental and exploratory ethos, we could merge the 
ideas of these two scientific contemporaries (and contemporaries of Rafinesque) and say 
that Ritter acknowledges the kinship between science and aesthetics, while Cuvier’s 
principle of correlation at once validates and illustrates Ritter’s theory by absorbing and 
systematizing it into its operation.  Toward fulfilling the promise of this merger between 
scientific speculation and aesthetic practice there stands Rafinesque’s Walam Olum as 
perhaps its most Baroque and beguiling example. 
It is here that Baldwin’s label of “literary madman” might be revisited and 
reconsidered as generally accurate but imprecise, not so much because of its 
inapplicability to Rafinesque, but on account of its facile assumption of the purity of the 
sciences and her methods.  But assuming that Rafinesque’s text at once exemplifies the 
principle of correlation, while also pushing its logic to the extreme limit, it is probably no 
surprise that the Walam Olum’s closest parallels come from the realm of literature.  The
134
basic content of the poem is the appropriate and familiar stuff of cultural epic, a genre 
that already encompasses the discrete but overlapping realms of history, myth, religion, 
and ethnic identity.  It begins with an account of creation; as a beneficent deity creates the 
earth and begins to populate it with life, a parallel malignant demiurge produces
“powerful men and those water monsters … he created the flies and he created the 
mosquitoes” (Rafinesque/IHS 22-3).  In spite of this rather Manichaean parentage, the 
entities of the world live for a time in peace until a serpent-god unleashes a great flood, 
driving the people first to the cold north and then toward the east (apparently across the 
Bering land bridge into what is now North America).  The text then traces how this Ur-
tribe gradually spreads and splinters through struggle and schism, forming the many 
groups that finally people the continent.  As previously mentioned, the pictographs 
conclude with the arrival of the first Europeans, where John Burns’ addendum picks up to 
advance the narrative into Rafinesque’s own day.
In the introduction to the Indiana Historical Society version, Lilly likens the 
literary contribution of Lekhibit (the presumptive name of the Walam Olum’s author 
based upon a single mention in the Burns fragment) to that of Homer (Rafinesque/IHS 
xiv).  In more than one way the comparison is apt.  Homer is certainly the prototype for 
much Western literature, perhaps least fortunately that of cultural self-definition.  The 
epics attributed to this apocryphal author gave the politically (and to a great extent 
culturally) fragmented communities of the Ancient Aegean and their many far-flung 
subsidiary colonies at least linguistic commonality through their narratives.  Not long 
before Rafinesque’s birth this socio-unitary literary model and its mandate had been 
further refined by James Macpherson to serve the emerging needs of identity as
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structured by nationalist/ethnic affiliation.  The aftershocks of the fantastically popular 
(and ferociously controversial) Ossian Scottish epic were still reverberating during 
Rafinesque’s adulthood having enchanted people as diverse as Thomas Jefferson and 
Napoleon Bonaparte, inspiring operas and paintings among other artistic tributes and
providing impetus and model to the nascent Romantic sensibility.  The climactic scene of 
Goethe’s career-making novel Sorrows of Young Werther even centers upon the dramatic 
reading of the poems between its central pair of star-crossed lovers.  Nonetheless, even at 
the time of publication the poems’ authenticity was doubted by such notable figures as 
Samuel Johnson, and this intuition proved correct since eventual scholarship revealed 
them to be Macpherson’s fabrication.                      
The 1762 release of this newly “discovered” epic story of a mythic king,55 the 
supposed work of an ancient Celtic court bard, Ossian (pronounced “o-shane”), provided 
a solid and intoxicating literary framework for galvanizing Scottish nationalist 
sympathies and general interest in the recovery of lost cultural roots, both of which were 
brewing at the time (Trevor-Roper 2009).  It is worth noting the complex aesthetic 
mechanics at work in the text, a strikingly vivid example of the interplay of presence and 
absence that animates representation.  The reader of the poems imagines (one could even 
say longs for) an idealized lost culture linguistically crystallized in the form of its lost 
verses. Macpherson promises to resurrect this forgotten but precious remainder, a task he 
can only accomplish in the already provisional mode of “translation,” a literary form 
whose combined sense of intimacy and distance always tantalizes as much as it satisfies.  
Applying Ritter’s notion toward literature, it could be said that translation produces a 
55Fingal, mangled avatar of the “real” mythic Fionn mac Cumhaill, AKA Finn McCool, who reappears in 
Joyce’s Finnegans Wake and O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds among other places. 
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notably rich “half-space” by offering an especially porous artifact for the projection of 
extra-textual inferences and expectations.  In the case of Ossian, with its combined 
aesthetic, ethnographic, archeological and anthropological pretensions, the already 
heightened sense of wish-fulfillment that attends reading a work only available in 
translation is multiplied as an imagined poem and its people flicker like an evanescing 
ghost for the reader just beneath Macpherson’s words.
The promise of recapturing a lost people and their ways is precisely what 
animates Rafinesque’s approach to linguistic archeology (actually, any literary payoff is 
relegated to mere byproduct).  It is even tempting to think one hears a trace of Ossianic 
pathos as he describes his application of the principle of correlation to ancient tongues in 
Good Book: 
Give me but a single genuine word of an ancient or extinct Language, and I can 
find out its analogies with all others. Give me 2 or 3 or a few, and I can trace its 
alliances.  Give me several, and all its origins, parentage, filiation, claims, 
affinities, peculiarities &c can be traced. The larger the Vocabulary collected out 
of any source the better can we proceed in the investigation—and the whole leads 
to know the migrations, contests, habits, manners, civilization, religion &c of the 
extinct Nation and cluster of human beings of Yore … (70-1)
At the surface there are but a few surviving words, below this the essence of a people.  
And though epic poetry is not directly invoked, what the paragraph’s final sentence 
promises might as well be a laundry list of the information we expect from one of these 
literary instruction manuals of a culture: migration (just as the Trojan survivors flee to 
people distant Italy under the guidance of Aeneas, or the Delaware cross the Bering 
Strait); contests (as when Odysseus plays games against his Phaeacian hosts, or Pollux 
boxes Amycus, Arjuna strings his bow, or any of the many more deadly competitions that
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crowd epic literature); and of course the intimate snapshots of basic cultural/religious
 practice that permeates every people’s poetry.  However, lest we mistake this enterprise 
as merely the “scientization” of Ossian, Rafinesque goes on to add an important element: 
“[this] knowledge may be confirmed or increased by the study of their Antiquities, 
Monuments, traditions and annals of extinct Nations.”  What Ossian would prefer to 
conceal—the “factual” back story behind its verses, the “true” history to which the poem 
belongs, its unalloyed semiotic dependencies and imported contexts of meaning —
Rafinesque wishes to foreground.  By his account, the “reconstructed” glossa is overtly 
intertextual, openly reaching out for connection to the various knowledge structures—no 
matter how imperfect or partial—upon which it is dependent, and to which it hopes to 
join up.
Newman begins his account of the Walam Olum by invoking what, theoretically 
speaking, is perhaps its more appropriate literary analog: the Yasusada journals that 
variously vexed and delighted the English language poetry community of the mid 1990’s. 
These notebooks full of poems, letters, English assignments, shopping lists and other 
jottings were reputed to be the work of a Hibakusha, a witness to the Hiroshima 
bombing.  Uniquely attuned to the sensibilities of the Western avant-garde and almost 
wholly unpublished himself, after his death Yasusada’s private writings were discovered 
by his son whereupon they were turned over to a trio of translators, rendered into English, 
and gradually began appearing in Western poetry journals.  The revelation of Yasusada’s 
nonexistence (along with that of his son, the translators, and nearly everyone involved in 
the story), as well as the realization that the poems had been written in English, prompted 
outrage from many of those taken in, with Arthur Vogelsang calling the project,
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“essentially a criminal act” (quoted in Nussbaum 82-84).  
However, the theoretical response was a bit more nuanced.  Marjorie Perloff 
argued that the poems be understood as an aesthetic meditation on the impossibility of 
accurately depicting the “other,” a prompt to reexamine texts, authentic or otherwise, that 
purport to represent impassible cultural differences that by nature defy representation 
(Yasusada148-166).  Perloff cites a wealth of clues strewn throughout the text—Barthes’ 
Empire of Signs, Yasusada’s fascination with Jack Spicer, among others—which signal 
that the collection is not meant to be read as an authentic diary but rather as an elaborate 
intertextual work from within a realm of critical self-reflexive writing.  Mikhail Epstein’s 
response to the “hoax” was a call for a new domain of “transpersonal” authorship: “this 
writing in the mode of otherness is not just a matter of pseudonym, but rather of 
hypernym … hyper-authorship is dispersed among several virtual personalities which 
cannot be reduced to a single ‘real’ personality” (Yasusada 134).
What many of the theoretical responses to Yasusada recognized in the poems is 
the operation of something that could be provisionally described as a “meta-positing.”  
All texts, no matter how seemingly self-contained, naturally rely upon outside structures 
of meaning to give them sense (one facet of the Derridean absent supplement).  But the 
Yasusada poems overtly gesture beyond their own scripted borders toward an outside 
ideational realm upon which they are dependent, a textual unconscious that both enables 
and limits their signification.  The journals force the reader to marshal an array of outside 
“data”—commonly shared knowledge and impressions about history, war, Japanese 
culture, the effects of the atom bomb, technology and its impact on tradition, the interplay 
between language and identity—and activate these into the reading process.  These pieces
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of data are sometimes incomplete, uncertain, imprecise, even flawed (Perloff points out,
oftentimes obviously so), but they are nonetheless actionable—that is, they combine to 
produce an exceptionally vivid overall picture, so much so that the reader is tempted to 
suspend her/his awareness of the provisional information upon which this picture 
depends.  Undoubtedly it was this effectiveness that led to the charge of hoax, and which 
gave it its sting for those “taken in.”    
Nearly every defense of the Yasusada author56 (or Rafinesque) depends in some 
way upon extricating the project from the staining label of “hoax.”  Brian Mchale has 
even elaborated a taxonomy of hoaxing in order to properly situate the journals. He 
argues for differentiation between “true hoaxes,” which are designed to endure in their 
deception (Ossian qualifies, as does James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces), “trap-hoaxes” 
which are meant to humiliate or shame upon revelation (Sokal or Ern Malley, for 
instance), and so-called “mock-hoaxes,” such as Fernando Pessoa’s many constructed 
literary identities or the Yasusada journals.  One of the ironies of this move is that if there 
is an obvious theoretical explanation for Yasusada it is in its vivid questioning of 
authorial intention as guarantor of a text, and in order to exonerate the journals one must 
argue that the authorial intent was not to deceive (which is the basic defining feature of a 
hoax).  But what may in literature amount to a question of intent, can elsewhere be 
understood as an issue of operational necessity.  In the Boston Review, Harvard professor 
of Asian Studies Stephen Owen wrote of Yasusada, “it is an obvious fact that when 
reading poetry from another culture, if we are seeking only that which confirms our own 
prior interests and anticipations, then a hoax will always satisfy us far more perfectly than 
56The presumption is that the author is Yasusada enthusiast and editor, community college professor Kent 
Johnson, but Johnson continues to deny this.
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the real thing” (Summer 1997).  That which to Owen makes Yasusada unsavory as poetry
—the associations and “meta-positing” that the poems encourage, the appeals they make 
to our always-imperfect base of knowledge, the agreement they attempt to secure with 
“our prior interests and anticipations”—these also could be used to characterize the 
operations of pictographic palingenesy, the principle of correlation, or countless other 
“theories” that give rhetorical shape to evolving forms of thought.  As has been argued 
here and elsewhere, between its own explanatory ambitions and the demands placed upon 
it by cultural expectation, science often assumes an oracular mode that involves the 
construction of narratives, narratives which connect new knowledge with old, which 
make sense of once disparate and disconnected “facts,” and which open the possibility for 
new actionable information.  Perhaps the best of such narrative explanations is the one 
that can most convincingly join up existing strands of knowledge into a compelling 
picture, thus creating the most viable and functional half-space.  But there is no guarantee 
that such an account will remain convincing, nor that one moment’s iron-clad explanation 
will not constitute tomorrow’s intellectual embarrassment.  For the appetite that seeks 
total veracity in all knowledge, it is perhaps most judicious to reckon culturally 
embedded scientific explanation (and arguably that is most if not all of it) as an expansive 
unstable continuum upon which truth and falsity are to be found telescopically connected 
to one another in some shifting degree.  The Walam Olum is just this kind of explanation.
In trying to seek out the historical nature of the Walam Olum, it would be wrong 
simply to dismiss the notion of hoaxing as a cultural force during Rafinesque’s time.  The 
manufacture of phony authenticity for a variety of purposes was rampant during the early 
19th century, as attested by such striking examples as the notorious Kinderhook Plates,
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showman-pioneer Gilbert Imlay’s Louisville-set melodrama/land advertisement of still-
debated parentage, The Emigrants, or the rise of roving hucksters like P.T. Barnum.  
Rafinesque was himself famously hoaxed by host John Audubon while a guest at the 
latter’s home in Western Kentucky.  Apparently as retribution for the destruction of a 
beloved Cremona violin, an instrument Rafinesque had smashed trying to bring down an 
especially juicy specimen of bat that flitted through the room one night, Audubon, while 
leading the naturalist on exploratory excursions through the wilds of the region, would 
spin vivid descriptions of the exotic fauna that usually crowded the area but which at that 
moment lay hopelessly out of sight.57  Enthralled and convinced, Rafinesque even 
published a few articles based solely on Audubon’s testimony, which surely did little to 
help his overall reputation.  But in addition to cases involving the defrauding of others for 
personal gain, or for the satisfaction of malicious or vengeful impulses, there are also 
more mysterious examples of the interweaving between truth and its opposite (however 
that may be reckoned), and Rafinesque was involved in one notable example.  The 
practice of scientifically describing, and even classifying, based on second hand accounts 
was not only acceptable (though not preferable) in Rafinesque’s time, but even oftentimes 
necessary given the problem of uniting experts with sometimes hard-to-get specimens.  
Long before Lewis and Clark made their famous journey into the unknown, trapper 
Charles LeRaye was kidnapped and dragged throughout the west during a four-year 
(1801-05) captivity by the Sioux.  In 1812 his narrative of the ordeal and of his travels in 
the as-yet-unseen (by white men, that is) wilderness was published, and it gave sufficient 
detail for Rafinesque to be able to classify and assign scientific name to heimionus, the 
57This included the infamous Devil-Jack Diamond fish, a monstrous Ohio River denizen, several feet long 
and with scales hard enough to be bullet-proof upon which hunters could strike a spark for a campfire.  
Seen sunning itself on the water’s surface by Rafinesque from a great distance, this turned out to be nothing 
more than a dead branch. 
142
American mule-deer, by way of LeRaye’s description.  The name and classification stuck 
and holds to this day; LeRaye turned out to be an invention and his account merely a 
fantastic fiction.58  
Whatever the Walam Olum’s “actual status,” perhaps some kernel of fact, some 
bony relic, remains buried within, either within its pages or within its back-story or 
merely off to the side, part of its status as a meta-narrative about the uncertain nature of 
knowledge.  The phantasmal Homer had first Chapman as translator and then Heinrich 
Schliemann to unearth the remains of the historical Troy buried under centuries of rubble. 
Lekhibit may simply prove to be the bard of a truth that is by nature far more unstable.   
 
58Dollar, Clyde D. “The Journal of Charles LeRaye: Authentic or Not?” MA thesis, Univeristy of South 
Dakota, 1974. 
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THE BONES OF RAFINESQUE: 
VIRTUALITY AND KNOWLEDDGE'S DEFERRED PROMISE 
According to legend, at the time of Rafinesque’s 1825 firing from Lexington’s 
Transylvania University (familiarly known as “Transy”) the terminated professor 
unleashed magical forces to vex the institution in revenge.  This lore is loosely based on 
his own version of events from Life of Travels: “… thus leaving the college with curses 
upon it and Holley (then president); who were both reached by them soon after, since he 
died next year at sea of the yellow fever, caught at New Orleans, having been driven from 
Lexington by public opinion: and the college has been burnt in 1828 with all its contents” 
(78).  Apparently Transylvania administrators had forgiven this supernatural slight by 
1924 (though it continues to this day to be invoked as both explanation and excuse by 
students and staff) for that year the university sponsored a project to have Rafinesque’s 
remains exhumed from their resting place in a potter’s field in Philadelphia and reinterred 
in a dark chamber on the lower floor of Old Morrison, the school’s imposing neoclassical 
administrative building.
Charles Boewe recalls talking to the last surviving witness to the exhumation, 
Robert K. Spencer, who just happened to be Boewe’s textbook representative when he 
was still a fledgling professor.  Spencer had skipped school that day to watch his father, 
James, supervise the dig and he recalled to Boewe that among the various bones 
unearthed by the search there was a, “massive skull,” an outsized relic whose distinctive 
shape, “suggested a man with a bulging forehead” (Boewe, Profiles 374).  Boewe relates
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how, at the time, he and Spencer agreed that this feature was consistent with the one 
surviving image of Rafinesque known to be authentic, the engraving featured on the 
frontispiece of his 1815 publication, Analyse de la Nature.59  They also agreed about this 
trait’s meaning, a conclusion consonant with Audubon’s description of Rafinesque upon 
his first encounter with the “eccentric naturalist”: “his forehead was so broad and 
prominent that any tyro in phrenology would instantly have pronounced it the residence 
of a mind of strong powers” (Profiles 368).   
Rafinesque likened phrenology to astrology, calling it “a vain pursuit,” and a 
“mere hypothetical horoscope of the brain and its propensities” (Celestial Wonders 25).  
Pseudoscience though it may be, Rafinesque’s description acknowledges the 
metaphorical power of this branch of “study” for giving form to the otherwise intractably 
disembodied feature that we call mind or intelligence.  Like the autodidactic protagonist 
of Edith Thomas’ L’Homme Criminel,60 who “diagnoses” himself as genetically felonious 
by his casual reading of a library book on physiognomy-based positivist criminology, 
Audubon, Spencer and (at the time) Boewe could not help but recognize the intellectual 
significance of this striking physical characteristic.  The shape of Rafinesque’s head 
becomes the legible trace of an otherwise invisible intelligence.  
In this way the skull of Rafinesque joins up with a host of metaphorical tokens 
that have guided modernity’s attempt to give concrete form to this highly prized, but 
largely indefinable and stubbornly amorphous trait.  The measurement of IQ, the folds of 
the brain, the enduring legend that humans only harness ten percent of their gray matter 
59The mystery surrounding Rafinesque portraiture and the debates concerning the authenticity and 




for everyday living (the exact quantity varies according to the telling), or the Iron 
Curtain-like divide that separates our logic from creativity in the left and right 
hemispheres, all of these fables speak to modernity’s obsession with the powers of 
intelligence, our faith in its capabilities, but also the way that this capacity eludes direct 
conceptualization, even—or perhaps especially—in the language of scientific thinking, 
rooted as it often is in material causes.  Within each of these images there is emphasis on 
the potential of intelligence, its possibility and promise—un(der)tapped though it may be, 
as if mental capacity were best cognized as the coil of a spring.  Whether in the guise of 
the (nearly) uninhabited uppermost regions of the intelligence scale, or some as-yet unlit 
treasure vault of the brain, the imagery suggests a kind of unrealized mental capacity and 
latent super-knowledge that up to now has been reserved for those future races and alien 
invaders of cinema.
Intelligence, then, is not unlike its ostensible object, knowledge.  For knowledge 
too oftentimes operates largely by way of its sense of unrealized—and even sometimes 
unrealizable—promise.  As a site of ideological investment, one of the premises of 
modern knowledge is that it works to unite the actual with the potential, to make the 
wonders of the imagination real and available.  But as such, knowledge itself often 
becomes just this kind of ideational wonder, always deferred, never instantiated, a hope 
rather than a reality.  This is not to say that the pursuit of knowledge in modernity has not 
been extremely fruitful or generated its share of wonders.  But the drive for knowledge 
acquisition often exhibits a kind of paradox in its quest for fulfillment.  Like the Lacanian 
conception of jouissance,61 knowledge acts as the erotic goal for much intellectual 
61See, Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. Ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller. New York: Norton and Co., 1992.  Pages 167-218. 
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striving, but also as the essentially unattainable promise that governs the eternally 
unrequited character of that pursuit.  No matter what we now know, it is but a partial and 
pallid reflection of what may one day be known.  No matter who we are now, we can 
learn to be something different, perhaps something more.  Knowledge as a post-
Enlightenment cultural value is always to some extent conceived as, and motivated by, 
what it not yet is, and Rafinesque, who embodies the modern ideology of learning, in 
more ways than one illustrates this fictive promissory aspect of knowing.    
Actually, true to form, Rafinesque’s skull is a fundamentally unstable emblem of 
intelligence and knowledge—that is, of the mind’s potential as understood according to 
the ideological valuation of modernity—and therefore for the purpose of this analysis it 
becomes a vivid theoretical image.  The bones of Rafinesque turn out to be “inauthentic,” 
or perhaps more appropriate to the argument, merely virtual.  Boewe, ever the sleuth, 
determined for his article “Who’s Buried in Rafinesque’s Tomb?”, that according to the 
measurements of the dig and the description of the contents thereof, the exhumation was 
far too shallow to reach the scientist’s resting place in his pauper’s grave.  The bones 
spirited to Kentucky and now resting in that Transylvanian crypt must belong to one 
Mary Passimore (382).62  So in terms of Boewe’s line of inquiry about the remains now 
resting at Old Morrison, the only just response to the question posed by his title is, not 
Rafinesque.  But arguably, the contents of that crypt could not be more appropriate as a 
symbol of knowledge, and thus as a symbol of Rafinesque—especially on account of 
their problematic status, especially by virtue of their uncertainty.  For what is buried in 
Rafinesque’s tomb is exactly the same thing that Spencer saw emerge that day from the 
62According to Boewe, Transylvania officials refuse to allow analysis of the bones now interred in Old 
Morrison, in spite of numerous requests by scientists and their promises to treat the remains with the utmost 
respect and keep their findings within professional circles. 
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Philadelphia potter’s grave, and what Audubon recognized in the features of his “odd 
fish” guest: mental capacity as matter.  Like the shape of Rafinesque’s head, his remains 
are another case wherein the vapors of the incomprehensibly ideational must assume 
determinate concrete form, word must be made flesh; and in such an instance factual 
accuracy is less important than the power of metaphoric illustration.    
Forensic phrenology notwithstanding, Rafinesque was a keen purveyor of the 
promise of knowledge precisely as promise.  One of the ways this took shape was in his 
visions for how knowledge could be harnessed to determine the future shape of society.  
Harboring longtime socialist leanings, Rafinesque often deployed his intellectual talents 
toward a kind of speculative politics of welfare.  Though aware of many of his utopian-
minded contemporaries such as Charles Fourier, or domestically, Robert Owen, founder 
of Indiana’s Owenite community at New Harmony (a collective he at one time considered 
joining), Rafinesque’s musings often took him away from the strictly political and instead 
toward theorizing those embedded institutions that ensure the stability of communities or 
that shape their character.  In addition to his lifelong concern for education, Rafinesque 
was interested in overhauling the economic structure of society in order to eliminate 
competition and guarantee parity for deserving citizens.  In The Pleasures and Duties of 
Wealth, perhaps the closest thing to a manifesto ever to issue from his pen, Rafinesque 
makes the diagnosis, “the besetting national sin of America is cupidity” (27).  The 
principle of “mutualism” that Rafinesque puts forward as remedy is in part dependent 
upon eliminating the use of wealth for speculations—for this merely facilitates greed—
and instead basing the monetary system directly on labor performed (10).  
This tract, one of the last works published by Rafinesque, is a philosophical
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counterpart to an economic system which the scientist-inventor had devised many years 
prior.  Like the ideal equivalence between labor and its recompense, the so-called Divitial 
Invention was designed to ensure a more direct correlation between various types of 
ownership and wealth through a system of exchangeable coupons to stand in for personal 
assets.  The adoption of these divisible chits of value (essentially a type of alternate 
currency) would allow greater flexibility of resources for those of more modest means 
and those whose worth was of a type otherwise unable to circulate.  Rafinesque coined 
the term “Divitial” from the Latin word dives, “rich, wealthy,” on account of the 
expectation that after the deposits were converted into currency they would earn interest 
and a dividend would be regularly paid to the holder.  Thus the system would create 
wealth.  Rafinesque patented the Divitial system, and a Philadelphia firm even instituted 
it successfully for a few years, though by the time of his death in 1840 the inventor seems 
to have long since been effectively cut off from the enterprise and his economic system to 
have come to the end of its brief life as anything more than theory (Warren 180).  
 The intellectual as a recognizable figure and cultural trope, even as it describes 
Rafinesque, naturally predates him, and arguably has some surprisingly ancient 
antecedents, as does the conception of that identity’s exaggerated abilities and foibles.  
Thales of Miletus, hailed by tradition as the first philosopher (and therefore an exemplar 
of intellect’s essential character), illustrates a prototypical version of the comically absent 
minded professor.  In Theaetatus Plato has Socrates recount how the Ionian thinker was 
so lost in contemplating the constellations overhead that he failed to watch his step and 
fell into a well (174 A).  But the fantastic potential of intellect is also part of the legend of 
philosophy’s original practitioner.  Aristotle relates that upon being chided over the
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pointlessness of philosophical speculation, Thales used keen observation and analysis 
about the growing season and its relation to supply and demand to make a killing in the 
olive oil market, an anecdote that confirms a mental correlation between genius and the 
ability to outmaneuver others strategically, even in economic contexts (Politics 1259a).63  
In spite of the Divitial Invention’s unrealized potential as a widespread engine of wealth, 
Rafinesque was apparently a genuinely canny businessman, though the precise relation of 
his business sense to his broader intellectual pursuits remains uncertain.  Hailing from a 
merchant family, he amassed a fortune while in Europe only to lose it over time between 
various ventures and the expenses of a wife and daughter he left behind in Italy.64  Once 
in the United States, his intellect and entrepreneurial spirit collaborated toward a number 
of projects with assumed commercial potential, but few amounted to much more than a 
supplementary income.65  
It would surely be an insult to the ambitions of critical intellect if its founding 
mythology amounted to mere get rich quick-schemes, bald aggrandizement of the 
individual’s material self-interest.  So appropriately the legend of Thales does not merely 
inaugurate the intellectual as the potential master of markets, but also as Philosopher 
King—or to give it more modern spin and terminology, as realpolitik nation-builder.  
According to Herodotus, the war between the Medes and Lydians had no end in sight 
until Thales predicted a full solar eclipse would occur during heated battle.  When this 
came to pass, fear prompted the laying down of arms and immediate peace negotiations 
(Histories 1.74).  In the legend of Thales, the trained-up intellect seems to have unique 
63This anecdote is reiterated in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, Book I, 1.1.27.
64For an overview of some of Rafinesque’s wildly successful early business ventures, see Warren, page 37.
65Rafinesque’s botanical cure for tuberculosis, Pulmel, seems to have been one of his most successful 
domestic ventures, though it did not yield anything remotely close to wealth or riches (Warren 121).
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access to both riches and brute power; as if in anticipation of the Hobbesian demigod 
Leviathan, the idealized genius of lore is equipped to cultivate and mete out fearful 
punishments as well as just rewards, necessary ingredients to good government.66  Once 
Rafinesque’s Divitial Invention failed to transform the arena of American capitalist 
economics, he turned toward other possibilities for the exercise of his idealist political 
vision.  In an unsolicited 1825 letter to Joel Poinsett, fellow botanist/scientist-traveler and 
then-minister to Mexico (as well as the namesake of the Christmas flower), Rafinesque 
requests that the representative send him vocabularies of indigenous Mexican languages: 
“the importance of these fragments to history are beyond belief … [they] will enable me 
to trace the origins of all the Mexican Nations” (Boewe Profiles 24).  Though the concern 
here initially seems to be for the reconstruction of ancient “nations” (perhaps not 
dissimilar to the project of the Walam Olum), the letter’s second half introduces a vision 
for the construction of the new-born state still taking shape just to the south.  Hoping to 
use Poinsett as a go-between, Rafinesque offers his Divitial Invention as the basis for the 
creation of a Mexican bank.  But should his egalitarian economic system fail to entice on 
its own terms, Rafinesque offers to sweeten the deal with an irresistible asset to national 
security, a mysterious doomsday device:
As a further inducement for the Mexican Government you may acquaint them that 
I have made a dreadful Discovery in the Art of Defensive War. Or invented a New 
Kind of Artillery, a single discharge of which will destroy One thousand Men in 
Arms, one mile off, or sink a large Ship of War.  This awful Invention will be 
communicated Secretly to all such governments who will grant me a patent or 
Privilege for my Divitial Invention.  I hereby authorize you to offer the knowledge 
and use of it to the Mexican government if they grant me the privileges asked 
above. (Boewe 24)
66A combination of principles nine and eleven of Hobbes’ “Rights of Sovereigns by Institution,” 
Leviathan: or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1904. 125-6.  
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In 1840’s Pleasures and Duties of Wealth, Rafinesque optimistically quotes David 
Brewster—scientist, astronomer, university administrator, inventor of the kaleidoscope, 
and in an odd coincidence, son-in-law of Ossian’s James Macpherson—that “the labors 
of science have no counterpart of evil” (Pleasures 21).  Within a hundred years this 
sentiment would be utterly unthinkable even for Enlightenment Reason’s most Pollyanna 
adherent.  And whatever the reality of Rafinesque’s promises to Poinsett (no other 
evidence of his proto A-bomb exists outside of this letter), they uncannily anticipate the 
character of the twentieth century’s particular vision of progress, poised as it was 
somewhere between dreams of a salvific economics and the threat of manmade mass 
annihilation.  
In Rafinesque’s letter to Poinsett we see hints of the genetic connection between 
the broad and sometimes amoral scope of the so-called myth of progress and the more 
manifestly metaphysical utopian visions of modernity.  Knowledge in the abstract 
becomes a kind of repository for the projection of hope (and sometimes fear) concerning 
humanity’s someday self-realization.  Pleasure and Duties of Wealth describes an 
envisioned ideal community within the ever-present (and arguably conceptually 
inescapable) horizon of individuals as laborers and owners.  That this becomes a primary 
schema for the discussion of all matters political is likely the natural byproduct of a 
nearly universal cultural conception of the individual based on ownership and production. 
As C.B. Macpherson succinctly summarizes in his landmark study, The Political Theory
of Possessive Individualism, “society becomes a lot of free and equal individuals related 
to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and of what they have acquired by 
their exercise” (3).  Naturally then, every convincing political theory positing a
152
community wrought by design will ultimately have to address the issues of work and 
wealth and their precise relation to one another.  Rafinesque’s version necessitates the 
elimination of competition and the “inducements” of “cheaper food and expenses by 
clubbing for cooking and everything else” (16).  As to the issue of labor he offers a 
“proposal quite peculiar,” in which the necessary work will be transformed—essentially 
aestheticized—into an experience approximating leisure by making it “as easy and 
pleasant as a festival.”  Toward this end “ploughing, reaping, manual labor &c. are to be 
performed with songs, music and dances, just as if going to a wedding” (16).  The 
glimmers of a Schilleresque “eutopia” based in the play-drive67 begins inadvertently to 
suggest Benjamin’s “aestheticization of politics” (fascism—and likely, the more generous 
moods of Stalinist communism would also qualify)68 when Rafinesque explains, “this is 
certainly something new (unless martial music for soldiers is a pattern).”           
The community of Pleasures and Duties is a kind of cooperative in which labor is 
more evenly distributed, and thereby generally reduced, but some type of system of 
ownership and exchange is preserved.  Rafinesque envisions four hours of work each day 
per person, leaving the rest of the time for “study, reading, recreation, extra labor, 
exercise, meals, &c. besides 8 for sleep” (16).  The order of this list of leisure activities is 
telling in its glimpse of the values that will ideally guide this community of knowledge.  
For in spite of its future-leaning orientation, the text draws its authority from what 
Rafinesque sees as universal principles regarding the intellect.  When Sir Thomas More 
coined the term “utopia” he stitched its fictitious nature into the word itself: Greek ou, 
67Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Trans. Reginald Snell. Mineola: Dover, 2004.  
The actual term used by Schiller, and rendered by Snell (among others) is “ideal state,” Page 28. 
68Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New 
York: Schocken Books, 1968. Page 242.
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“no,”+topos, “place”=“no [real] place.”  Rafinesque perhaps unwittingly pays homage to 
More’s self-conscious acknowledgment of playful make-believe when he proposes names 
for his fantasied community, among them Eden, Elysium, Arcadia and, in an echo of both 
Schiller and More, Eutopia (homophonic to More’s imagined land, but this time using the 
Greek prefix eu, “good”) (15).   But apart from the as of yet contrary-to-fact existential 
status of the community, Rafinesque bases its values on what he understands to be real-
world ethical imperatives.  In the passage limning those duties of wealth alluded to in the 
pamphlet’s title, he explains that “to foster and protect Genius is one of the highest 
prerogatives of wealth” (21, emphasis in original).  He goes on to give further definition 
of his terms:
Genius however is not confined to Painters or Machinists, it applies and belongs 
to all Inventors, whoever seeks, finds and makes known useful or valuable facts 
or things, to Original Authors, Poets, Dramatists, Philosophers, Historians, 
Naturalists, Botanists, Astronomers … as well as Manual Laborers, from the 
inventor of Sandals or Shoes, to that of Steam Engines and Telescopes.  To all 
these the friendly help or patronage of Wealth is needful at present; in a better 
state of Society, it would be the duty of the public to reward them (21)    
Knowledge—even just as raw potential—is to be enshrined as a kind of communal telos, 
the primary point of focus toward which the community as a whole should be oriented; it 
is the expected goal for times of rest, and the purpose of production’s surplus, the anchor 
of both work and leisure.       
Rafinesque explicitly explains the centrality of knowledge as a general cultural 
value, assigning its functional position in the scheme of human relations, in passages 
laying the philosophical foundation for Pleasures and Duties.  Appropriately for a 
taxonomist, the section of the pamphlet critiquing society as it is currently structured 
reads as a kind of classification (though admittedly not a very rigorous one), defining the
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relevant terms, the actors, and their relationships.  Some people fall either into the 
wealthy or destitute poor, and to further discriminate into subgroups, these may be 
divided into “Worthy … and the Vicious or Unworthy.”  Fortunately there is a “third and 
medial class, which balances these two, and often happily preponderates: it is that 
nameless middle Class of Individuals neither rich nor poor, with a competence of 
property or emoluments of labor, that possess neither the superfluity of Wealth, nor dread 
the evils of poverty” (5).  This middle is the ideal, “the Nucleus and main strength of 
society, and to which if all could belong, there would no longer be to fear the evils of 
exuberant Wealth or destitute Indigence.”  The key to erasing all poisonous difference in 
privilege and bringing everyone into the noble fold of one vast, peaceful middle class is 
the proper recognition, use and management of the three basic human powers.  
Rafinesque identifies these as wealth, industry and knowledge (6).  Toward the necessary 
changes that will inaugurate a better society, wealth “should furnish the means,” and 
“industry effect them.”  Standing centrally between the resources (wealth) and the results 
(industry) there is knowledge, pure possibility, the what can and what may be.  In a 
Rafinesque Eutopia, wealth serves knowledge, industry realizes its conceptions.
Knowledge in Pleasures and Duties is discussed as a force so discrete and
recognizable, so concrete and instrumental, one can nearly forget that its appearance in a 
utopian tract renders its status subjunctive.  The rhetorical force of this gesture is 
appropriate to its context.  Elsewhere knowledge appears more nebulous, discussed in 
terms befitting an abstraction, though admittedly one with a profound and extensive—if 
not even quasi-theological—investment.  Atlantic Journal’s first piece (following a short 
introduction) is a brief paean to “Latent Knowledge” (1), that combined mass of learning
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some of which is “nearly forgotten and lost,” some merely “sleeping.”  Rafinesque 
includes within this notion the combined knowledges of all world peoples throughout 
history, as well as that not yet discovered: “…fortunately the latent or dormant may yet 
be restored and rendered yet available, by care, patient researches and exertions.”  The 
project he envisions is part recovery, part discovery,69 and presumably its ultimate 
destination is a state of total awareness that bridges historical difference and transcends 
the limits of time and place through its object, knowledge.  Of course, like in its function 
as the engine of a Eutopia to be, what chiefly characterizes this latent knowledge is its 
state of constant irremediable deferral.  Perhaps what Rafinesque imagines could be 
understood as a kind of naïve Hegelian “end of history” culminating in pure self-
awareness under the radiating glow of “absolute knowing,” but for now, the very pathos 
and yearning that accompanies musings on this state of pure wisdom mark it as 
unrealizable as utopia’s “nowhere.”
The kind of knowledge envisioned by Rafinesque, and the imagined state wrought 
by the total apprehension and comprehension of that knowledge, both echoes Hegel (at 
least in certain elements) and anticipates the fantasies of Progress that have preoccupied 
much science and fiction during the last century in particular, and not merely in their 
moments of overtly utopian reverie.  The notion of knowledge as a kind of quantifiable 
value, always in a state of increase or decrease, and capable of bringing salvation or 
doom in the wake of its discovery or loss is a familiar enough idea to qualify as an article 
of culturally shared common sense.  The potency of this idea permeates a well-worn 
imagery of enlightenment versus dark ages, times in which whole cultures rise and fall 
69The last entry of Atlantic Journal is a blurb for The Book of Knowledge (no other evidence of the text 
exists), promising, “Discoveries and useful Facts, latent knowledge restored, lost knowledge 
reestablished ... facts and truths neglected or forgotten” (212). 
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according to the threat of invading Vandal barbarians or conversely the accomplishments 
of liberator-luminaries.  Regarding the powerful grip this picture holds on modernity’s 
imagination, Walter Benjamin, in the Arcades Project section “On the Theory of 
Knowledge” writes that, “overcoming the concept of ‘progress’ and overcoming the 
concept of ‘period of decline’ are two sides of one and the same thing” (Benjamin 
Arcades 460).  In this capacity knowledge becomes reified as a discrete and identifiable 
though elusive and exceptional entity that has the power to elevate humankind from the 
base state to which nature impels us.  But at the same time knowledge appears as an 
article of faith, a self-justifying teleological goal, akin to the metaphysical gnosis of 
ancient thought.  Hans Jonas, in his attempt to illustrate certain parallels and differences 
between Gnostic and modern thought70 has observed,
‘Knowledge’ is by itself a purely formal term and does not specify what is to be 
known; neither does it specify the psychological manner and subjective 
significance of possessing knowledge or the ways in which it is acquired.  As for 
what the knowledge is about, the associations of the term most familiar to the 
classically trained reader point to rational objects, and accordingly to natural 
reason as the organ for acquiring and possessing knowledge.  (34, emphasis in 
original)     
          
This idealized understanding of knowledge—supposedly drained of any metaphysical 
pretensions—is perhaps the real mystification; it is certainly the more rarified and alien to 
modern experience in being purely formal, empty, abstract.  The notion of knowledge as 
separate from any content, detached from any knower and centered squarely upon 
“rational objects” is as convincing as the notion of “natural reason,” which is to say, only 
at the level of abstraction.  Knowledge in action, especially according to modern contexts 
of usage, is quite the opposite in being nearly always bound up in its subjective 
70In particular, existentialism; see Jonas’ “Gnosticism, Nihilism and Existentialism,” in the Gnostic 
Religion, pages 320-40.  
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significance to knowers, the modes of its acquisition, and issues of its content; and while 
this content is not categorically irrational, it often is speculative or even fantastic.  Jonas 
continues his analysis of different understandings of knowledge, specifically, knowledge 
as a metaphysical value: “in the Gnostic context, however, ‘knowledge’ has an 
emphatically religious or supranatural meaning and refers to objects which we nowadays 
should call those of faith rather than of reason.”  Ultimately, this is not merely knowledge 
of the arcane, but also knowledge itself as arcana, as a cosmic end in itself, knowledge as 
it both circumscribes and escapes the boundaries of the material here and now and 
continues its rule into the realm of the hereafter, great or otherwise.  According to this 
metaphysical scheme, the human soul and its qualities are to be measured in degrees of 
knowledge, thereby establishing a fundamental correlation that assumes ever subtler 
forms at later historical moments especially as the materialist imagery and cause-and-
effect logic of scientific reasoning is eventually brought into play.  The alchemical faith 
in a correspondence between matter’s behavior and divine awareness assumes this
primary identity between mind and spirit, a perceived equivalence that will reach even 
profounder maturity in Hegel’s untranslatable concept of Geist.71  
The cultural sacralization of knowledge—what we will call “gnosis” whether its 
use is literally liturgical or merely secular-metaphysical—does not necessarily render it a 
wholly positive value.  The longstanding suspicion concerning the effects of knowledge, 
the pain of its acquisition and its indeterminacy of worth once acquired, is expressed as 
gnomic lament in Ecclesiastes 1:18, “he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.”  
One could say that in its capacity as a metaphysical value, knowledge retains that aspect 
71For a quick but incisive overview of Hegel’s treatment of Geist, here rendered as “Spirit,” see Stern, 
Robert. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit. New York: 
Routledge, 2002. Pages 34, 74, 135-82.
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of the mysterium tremendum (“mystery to be shuddered at/terrified of”) that Rudolf Otto 
thought essential to all things numinous and that Derrida resurrected as central to his 
critique of Christianity and its relationship to Western rationalism (Otto 12, Derrida Gift 
of Death 7).  Inasmuch as knowledge embodies metaphysical value, its relationship to us 
cannot function as anything but irremediably “Other,” such that the quality of this 
relation falls somewhere between perceived indifference and abject terror.  Here the 
ambiguity of the concept of “comprehension” comes into play, as we intuitively grapple 
with the complex and unsettling relationships of inclusion and exclusion, power and 
subjugation, in our roles as both subjects and objects of knowledge.  We realize ourselves 
as entities thrown into a “truth” (knowledge) after which we will always seek, but which 
will always exceed our full grasp.  Imperfect knowers who are in turn wholly known, we 
are like isolates standing in a circle of light encased by an endless ocean of darkness.  
Benjamin expresses this conundrum of gnosis in his meditation, “On Language as Such,” 
when he avers, “that which mourns feels itself thoroughly known by the unknowable” 
(Reflections 330).  
The autodidactic Benjamin was poised by reasons of history and personal 
sensibility to be a bridge between neo-Gnostic pessimism72 and a deflationary modern 
metaphysical epistemology.  Drawing influence from Jewish esotericism, Benjamin 
spoke in the tones of the Hegelian dialectic as inflected through twentieth century 
Marxian terminology.  He died just before the European debate about the Hegelian 
dialectic could reach its apex in Alexander Kojeve’s influential lectures on 
Phenomenology of Spirit, a debate that perhaps made knowledge seem a more ambiguous 
72This is the contention of Kristen J. Grimstad in her work, The Modern Revival of Gnosticism and 
Thomas Mann’s Doktor Faustus. Rochester: Camden House, 2002. Grimstad credits this notion to several 
articles by Norbert Bolz, 37-8.   
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value than ever before.73  Are we currently living the so-called “end of History,” enjoying 
the era of “absolute knowledge”—i.e. the age of realized gnosis?  Kojeve, in clarifying 
what the terms “end of History” and its corollary “end of Man” both mean, gives a 
picture of this metaphysical telos that—at least in its reckoning of aesthetics and play—
harmonizes with Rafinesque’s knowledge-governed utopia:
… Knowledge (Revelation) is indifferently related both to natural Being and to 
human Being … the natural World remains what it has been from all eternity … 
Man remains alive as animal in harmony with Nature or given Being … 
Practically, this means; the disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions.  And 
also the disappearance of Philosophy: for since Man himself no longer changes 
essentially, there is no longer any reason to change the (true) principles which are 
at the basis of his understanding of the World and of himself.  But all the rest can 
be preserved indefinitely; art, love, play, etc. etc.; in short, everything that makes 
man happy. (158-9, footnote)    
            
True change disappears and knowledge becomes purified to the point of no longer 
needing philosophy, let alone human struggle.  But in the end, Kojeve’s state of absolute 
knowledge may bear less in common with the paradise of Pleasures and Duties than with 
Rafinesque’s letter to Poinsett in which the bliss of a Divitial utopia is offset by the need 
for ingenious devices of mass destruction.  The skeptic may be prompted to ask: if this 
moment we’re living is truly the era of absolute Knowledge (as Kojeve argues, and Hegel 
implies) where is that pacific aesthetically-powered paradise?  In response to this, 
Kojeve’s interpreters and acolytes have observed that the all-inclusive post-Hegelian 
notion of knowledge (gnosis) recognizes and even subsumes “the unreasonable origins 
of reason” (Descombes 14, emphasis in original), including its violence and terror.  In 
fact, in an effort to differentiate this metaphysical “knowledge” from the word’s more 
73This famous Hegel seminar, a series of Paris lectures given between 1933-1939 and attended by the likes 
of Georges Bataille, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Lacan, Andre Breton, and others, 
forms the basis of Kojeve’s Introduction to the Reading of Hegel.   
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common, humble and strictly functional sense, Kojeve employs the term “Wisdom” (75) 
to signify knowing writ large—that is, knowledge in full awareness of the workings of 
apparent “unreason.”  As Kojeve proselyte Georges Bataille puts it, “we can ignore or 
forget the fact that the ground we live on is little other than a field of multiple 
destructions” (23), the implication being that mere forgetting does not make them go 
away.  Returning to the above quotation from Kojeve, the operative term with respect to 
Knowledge and human being is “indifferently related.”  Negativity (that is, those acts of 
violence and upset formerly dismissed collectively as “the irrational”) still exists and 
wreaks havoc but is now liberated from the burden of purpose; and the task of true
knowing is simply to recognize and accept this fact.  Knowledge/Wisdom/Gnosis by this 
definition is characterized by its tacit admission of the limitations of its own 
understanding.        
By leaving knowledge somewhere between fully comprehended and totally 
incomprehensible, post-Hegelian dialectic thought strips gnosis of its utopian positivity 
while preserving its thaumaturgic function as a mysterious breeding ground for hope and 
fear—or put more neutrally, as the source for future possibility.  Kojeve observed that the 
received disciplines—including that so-called “love of wisdom” bequeathed by the 
ancient Greeks—are not adequate to capture knowledge in its full array: “‘Wisdom’ (is) 
opposed to Philo-sophy (and to Theology as well as vulgar Science)” (75).  Rafinesque 
demonstrated similar suspicions about the efficacy of any one disciplinary regime, though 
it is important to remember that in his day branches of knowledge and their agents had 
yet to assume the same categorical closure that they would in another century.  In fact, 
during Rafinesque’s time the term “science” was still new, but the term “scientist” had
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only just been coined and was not yet fully accepted as the signifier of that vocation74 
(Chapple 1); likely he was totally unaware of the title.  For all of his obsession over 
classification and category, Rafinesque showed a remarkable openness to the many varied 
forms by which knowledge might appear, including those that we would regard as 
decidedly aesthetic.  His “Fragment of a Philosophical Poem on Knowledge” in Atlantic 
Journal gives formal testament to this (as does World: or Instability), and describes a 
process of searching characterized in terms of darkness versus light with overtly 
metaphysical presumptions: “yes, God and truth are one, and both, what is,/Has been, 
will be” (36).  When read alongside “Latent Knowledge,” the jaundiced eye of 
contemporary criticism might take this poetic statement to be more melancholy than 
hopeful: God is Truth, which is knowledge; but the slender knowing of an imperfect 
present is always bookended by that wisdom lost to a vast dark past and whatever good or 
ill may yet visit us from the limitless abyss of the future.  Here a glimpse of Lacan 
(another disciple of Kojeve) and his psychology of lack begins to show through, as 
knowledge becomes the mark of perceived deficit and the ceaseless striving to overcome 
that deficit—i.e. the site of Jouissance, a profound emptiness whose impossible remedy 
becomes the ultimate raison de etre: “this place is called Jouissance, and it is Jouissance 
whose absence would render the universe vain” (Ecrits 694).  Given the little that 
actually is known and the unreliability of its channels of apprehension—that is, those 
limiting disciplines of study such as Philo-sophy, Theology and/or vulgar Science—the 
status of knowledge begins to look remarkably nebulous and uncertain.
74Actually, prior to the 1840’s the term “philosopher” was often used to designate what we would call a 
natural scientist.
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This fluid nature, situated somewhere across or between fields of study, always 
simultaneously present and absent, suggests something more than a simple lack, and 
perhaps the status of gnosis-knowledge could best be understood in terms of the virtual.75  
Indeed, the concept of the virtual (in its contemporary usage) is itself somewhat protean.  
Precisely what does this word mean, not necessarily in any specialized capacity, 
but rather as a common and functional item of cultural discourse?  Though in many 
quests for knowledge (not to say gnosis), a Google search yields as much confusion as 
awareness, in matters related to cultural disposition it can prove to be a remarkable 
resource, and in response to queries about “the virtual” it reveals a ranging and often-
used term that has people grappling for precise definition.  Many definitions appeal to the 
realm of computer technology and electronic representation as the primary (if not sole) 
authority on the word’s usage, but amidst these accounts there are others that try to 
capture the more fundamental existential quality of this flexible morpheme as it is 
pressed into service in contexts other than those created by cyberspace.  
Answers.Ask.com features a user post that begins, “virtual is an adjective that describes 
something which is not tangible or an actual thing,” and Webopedia begins its answer to 
the question, “what is virtual?” all the more simply and forcefully as, “not real.”76  From 
here the site goes on to explain the term’s value for computer technologies, but returns to 
its fundamentally ontological underpinnings: “it distinguishes something that is merely 
conceptual from something that has physical reality,” and to illustrate it offers up a 
heuristic dichotomy: the brain (real) versus mind (virtual).  
75This is not to imply that Lacan’s concept of lack is in any way simple; but it is possible that his notion 
could also be framed according to the notion of the virtual as well.
76http://answers.ask.com/Reference/Dictionaries/what_does_virtual_mean   ; 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/V/virtual.html
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Assuming the validity of these ontological definitions it is safe to say that the 
notion of the virtual long anticipates the rise of computer representation, though this 
technology perhaps becomes the term’s most vivid and illuminating (and thus largely 
inescapable) illustration.  The birth of the concept may in fact extend all the way to the 
origin of speech (since what is language if not the first order of a virtual reality?), 
however the term itself seems initially to appear in Antonin Artaud’s seminal work, The 
Theater and its Double, in that text’s essay, “The Alchemical Theater.”  Here Artaud 
argues that, “there is a mysterious identity of essence between the principle of the theater 
and that of alchemy” (Artaud 48).  Specifically, both create parallel and—importantly—
intersecting worlds of symbols and concepts with respect to the domain of perception and 
matter, i.e. that which has been canonized and enshrined as “the real.”  “Where alchemy, 
through its symbols, is the spiritual Double of an operation which functions only on the 
level of real matter, the theater must also be considered as the Double, not of this direct, 
everyday reality of which it is gradually being reduced to a mere inert replica—as empty 
as it is sugar-coated—but of another archetypal and dangerous reality…” (48).  Alchemy 
alludes to “what might be called philosophical states of matter,” but theater to something 
even more universal, and it is at the point of this revelation of the 
philosophical/conceptual that “the virtual reality of the theater” and alchemy may be said 
to be akin to one another (49, emphasis in original).  
What is crucial to recognize in Artaud’s formulation is the extent to which it 
complicates any simple definition of what is real versus what is not.  It is important to 
remember that one of the preoccupying themes of Artaud’s text is that theater—in spite of 
its “imaginary” status—constantly threatens the realm of the real.  This notion becomes
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especially acute in the text’s celebrated manifesto, “Theater of Cruelty,” where we are 
urgently reminded that what defines theatrical spectacle is that at any time it may break 
out from being merely virtual (i.e. merely spectacle) and degenerate into embodied acts 
of violence, mayhem or sheer force.  Following Artaud’s lead and dispensing with the 
obviously regulatory (and ill-defined) linguistic notion of a real versus unreal, it is 
perhaps more accurate to say that the virtual is less unreal than simply materially 
unrealized or even just under-realized, though this does not mute its potency, nor does it 
negate the many unexpected and unpredictable ways that the virtual intercepts and 
unsettles the “real,” i.e. that which seems given on account of being embodied, 
instantiated and integrated into the commonplace, ready-to-hand order.  One possible
definition of the monstrous would be that it is a state exemplifying the imbalance 
between the conceptual and the material.  A monster is an entity that assumes very 
definite shape, while remaining murky and uncertain in concept.  Conversely, the virtual 
could perhaps be understood as over-realized in concept but under-realized in material 
form.  Whether this qualifies as necessarily monstrous, per se (Artaud would perhaps 
argue so), it certainly renders the virtual (and with it the notion of gnosis that we have 
been pursuing) mysteriously phantasmal.  
The fantastic virtuality of gnosis that gets so grandly projected as utopian dreams 
and post-Hegelian apocalyptic nightmares also distills itself at the atomic level of the 
individual.  This is perhaps where the epic myths of progress and decline take on their 
most acute sense by being personally internalized as fictive images reflecting fears of 
mental perversity and hopes of exaggerated prowess.  About his own future learning, 
Rafinesque muses, “I hardly know myself what I may not become as yet” (Life 148). 
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Nearly everyone engaged in the educational process has some similar vested hope in the 
transformational power of learning (or at least in the system of qualifications that gives 
lip-service to that power), and the modern cultural imagination has given us no shortage 
of fables concerning the fantastically empowering and monstrously corrupting effect of 
knowledge on individuals.  Movies and novels are strewn with the trope of the 
superheroic genius mind—Sherlock Holmes or Indiana Jones—but also with the image of 
the fragile intellect pushing learning to dangerous extremes: Doctor Frankenstein, The 
Invisible Man, Mister (or Colonel) Kurtz, to name but a few.  Interestingly, Rafinesque 
joins these in being the fictionalized subject of James Whaler’s 1931 epic, Green River: 
A Poem for Rafinesque.  In spite of failing to become an enduring masterpiece, Hart
Crane praised the work in a 1932 review in the journal Poetry on account of Whaler’s 
portrayal of the “intimate aspirations of his subject” (44).  Presumably Crane bases this 
comment on Whaler’s own postscript, a biographical sketch shot through with the same 
speculative romantic pathos as the poem itself: “he became obsessed with dreams of 
scientific discovery, dreams which … became a refuge from the hurt of his personal 
sorrows and the abuse of his contemporaries” (Whaler 150).  In Whaler’s poesy 
Rafinesque becomes a once pistol-wielding swashbuckler-scientist who retreats into the 
world of thought after being betrayed by his Italian wife.  Falling into a wondrous cave 
housing the remains of a once enlightened but isolationist civilization, he is 
metaphorically reborn, emerging from underground back into the light, and in the process 
pledging to abandon his misanthropic obsession for knowledge.  Throughout Whaler’s 
poem a stark binary is affected by the text’s moral conscience pitting desire for learning 
in opposition to erotic desire: “You spend your thoughts on fishes, worms, and
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weeds/Rather than study what a woman needs” (25/44).  But through this apparent 
contrast the equivalence between the two is cemented, and hunger for learning comes to 
seem not so much the opposite of carnal yearning, or even its surrogate, but rather a 
perverse species thereof: “stung by a maggot wild as poetry/Or love,—my inexterminable 
lust/To know the essences and laws august … Josephine … May love defend you from 
my inward battle … the daemon that becharms my mind” (40-1).
Fictive fantasies of the autodidact, a relatively small but distinct subset of the 
trope of the intellectual, seem particularly prone to themes of erotic irregularity.  Though 
Whaler merely alludes to Rafinesque’s autodidactic status by suggesting an inborn 
(perverse) proclivity to need to know—“therefore something distorted me at birth/to be a
seeker up and down the earth”77—elsewhere this trait becomes a marker of transgressive 
desire, generally.  Hardy’s Jude the Obscure aspires to become a scholar and attempts to 
teach himself.  His plan is hampered when in a fit of “erotolepsy” he is fooled into 
marrying the churlish Arabella Donn (Hardy 112).  At last resuming his self-study he is 
persistently haunted by obsessive desire for his cousin, Sue Bridehead, and their eventual 
marriage and incestuous union turns disastrously tragic through their children in a 
spectacular episode of murder/suicide.  Far less sympathetic, though no less tragic, is 
Sartre’s Self-Taught Man, whose autodidactic studies in the public library double as 
occasions to seduce young boys.  The text climaxes with the symbolic destruction of this 
ambivalent figure as his desire and intellect are simultaneously thwarted upon being 
beaten and permanently driven from the library (Sartre 163-9).  A recent vivid, and 
remarkably similar, version of the same theme is Max Cady from Martin Scorsese’s 1991 
remake, Cape Fear.  Though already a brutish thug, Cady uses his prison sentence to 
77Whaler, page 40.
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embark on an extensive autodidactic education that will facilitate a long-desired act of 
revenge: the premeditated rape of his former lawyer’s adolescent daughter.  Long before 
Lacan theorized desire as lack, Plato articulated the same intuition, as well as pondered 
the various metaphoric/metonymic sublimations, substitutions and associations that issue 
from those fantasies about what we want but do not (and by definition, cannot) possess.78  
In fictional accounts of the autodidact, the general equivalence between the desire to 
know and erotic desire is further inflected such that yearnings both intellectual and sexual 
seem not merely unregulated but even irregular and transgressive.  Even for the 
autodidact of fiction a certain consensual normativity pronounces judgment, but this only 
confirms the existing association between knowledge, desire and fear.  
As is so often the case, Rafinesque seems not merely to illustrate but also to 
epitomize some facet of the workings of knowledge—even down to his skeletal remains.  
And this is certainly true in the case of metaphysical knowledge, gnosis in its virtual 
capacity as a dream-deferred, an ideational promise ever-postponed but always in some 
sense driving the here and now.  At the end of his life, more or less shunned by the 
scientific community and failed within the academic establishment, Rafinesque turned his 
utopian hopes for learning toward the creation of his own university.  “The Eleutherium 
of Knowledge” was a visionary consortium, really a think-tank of two, though Charles 
Wetherill seems to have been the benefactor leaving Rafinesque as the primary (if not 
sole) idea man.  The Eleutherium’s plan was to purchase a vast tract of land in unsettled 
Illinois for the establishment of several towns, Industry, Honesty, Benevolence and 
Tolerance, which together would comprise the city of Agathopolis.  Within this imaginary 
city an imaginary university was to flourish, home to colleges of agriculture and labor, 
78See especially the celebrated Diotima episode from Plato’s Symposium, 201d.
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arts and sciences, teachers and languages, medicine, and a school for adult education.  
Obviously such an institution was never realized, but during its brief tenure the 
Eleutherium had already become the academic press for the “Central University of 
Illinois,” publishing several works including a few of Rafinesque’s most imaginative 
forays.  Thus, in a way, Rafinesque, ever the idealist and an indefatigable searcher after 
gnosis, did succeed within the university, even succeeded at founding one—at least, a 
university of the mind.
It is possible that given modernity’s quasi-religious expectations for knowledge
and its capability, what it actually is and does comes as something of a surprise (this is 
certainly true for many readers of Kojeve).  And after the twentieth century’s 
demonstration of the tremendously amoral and even destructive power of knowledge, it is 
perhaps also possible that we are taken aback by what knowledge was and what it has 
done.  For anyone invested in the acquisition and creation of knowledge (perhaps 
especially at the professional level) this uncertainty between what is imagined—even 
promised, and what actually materializes might raise ethical questions.   Here I am 
reminded of Bill Readings’ argument concerning the state of the modern university.  “We 
have to recognize that the University is a ruined institution, while thinking what it means 
to dwell in those ruins without recourse to romantic nostalgia” (169).  Like the university 
in ruins, the disparity between actual and ideal knowledge is with us, and apparent upon 
reflection.  But perhaps Rafinesque (and the autodidact in general) provides a useful case 
study somewhere between his Eleutherium and his “remains” at Transylvania.  
Knowledge is never fully instantiated in the here and now, nor is it irretrievably 
consigned to the realm of the ideal; it exists virtually, somewhere in between, and the
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goal is to invest fully and knowingly in this in-between.  Perhaps Rafinesque had some 
inkling of this, and perhaps that is why he so enthusiastically invested his last days in a 
virtual university.  In a strange move to potentially cast doubts on his culpability in the 
Walam Olum incident, Boewe claims that Rafinesque had no sense of humor, and in fact 
claims to know of only one joke in his entire corpus.  This simply is not true.  Though 
perhaps not riotous, several passages of Western Minerva feature attempts at humor, 
including a faux-proposal for a future academic journal called, The Monkeys (68).  And if 
humor, as they say, always contains a grain of truth, one of these articles, jokingly
proposed by Rafinesque, seems especially resonant: “an inquiry into the meaning of the 
words Old and New, the former implying what we never knew and the latter what we 
never will know.  By Dr. Last.”    
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(Cultural Studies/Film)
Southeast Indiana Humanities Conference, Indiana University Southeast, 2008
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“Phantom in the Text: Some Literary Implications Revealed by the Yasusada Notebooks”
(Critical Theory/Literature)
Humanities Graduate Colloquium, University of Louisville, 2004
“Hittite, Indo-European, and the Ancient Near East”
(Historical Linguistics)
Eta Sigma Phi Annual Honors Society Conference, Monmouth College, 2000
Teaching
Cultures of America, Humanities 152. 1/2009-4/2009; 5/2009-7/2009; 1/2012-5/2012; 
1/2013-
present.
University of Louisville introductory undergraduate course focusing on 
interdisciplinary humanities approaches to identity and expression of culture 
within the arts and college composition.
Greek Mythology, Humanities 338. 1/2011-5/2011; 6/2011-7/2011; 1/2012-5/2012; 
1/2012-
present.
University of Louisville intermediate undergraduate course focusing on the 
mythological legacy of ancient Greece and its persistence in the contemporary 
arts.
Introduction to the Modern Humanities, Huma U102. 1/2011-5/2011; 1/2012-5/2012; 
1/2013-
present.
Indiana University Southeast introductory undergraduate course surveying 
interdisciplinary approaches to the Western humanities in the modern era.
Introduction to the Ancient Humanities, Huma U101. 8/2010-12/2010; 8/2011-12/2011.
Indiana University Southeast introductory undergraduate course surveying 
interdisciplinary approaches to the Western humanities in the ancient era.
Creativity and the Arts, Humanities 151 (Honors Section). 8/2009-12/2009; 8/2010-
12/2010; 8/2011-12/2011.
University of Louisville introductory undergraduate course focusing on 
interdisciplinary study and appreciation of the arts and college composition.
World Literature to 1700, Humanities 101 (Honors Section). 8/2011-12/2011.
University of Louisville introductory undergraduate course surveying the literary 
legacies of the ancient, medieval, and renaissance worlds and college 
composition. 
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Modern Fiction: the Twentieth Century, Humanities 322. 7/2009-8/2009; 1/2010-5/2010; 
6/2010-8/2010; 8/2010-12/2010; 1/2011-5/2011; 6/2011-7/2011.
University of Louisville intermediate undergraduate course focusing on fiction 
and theories of fiction of the past century.   
Masterpieces of Ancient Greece: Writing Course, Humanities 354. 8/2008-12/2008; 
8/2009-
12/2009.
University of Louisville intermediate undergraduate course focusing on the 
literary legacy of ancient Greece from the Homeric to the classical era, with an 
intensive focus on composition.
World Literature to 1700, Humanities 101. 8/2008-12/2008; 1/2009-4/2009.
University of Louisville introductory undergraduate course surveying the literary 
legacies of the ancient, medieval, and renaissance worlds.
World Literature: 1700 to the Present, Humanities 102. 8/2005-12/2005; 1/2006-4/2006.
University of Louisville introductory undergraduate course surveying the literary 
legacy of the modern period.
Intermediate Greek, Greek 102. 1/2004-4/2004; 1/2012-4/2012
University of Louisville undergraduate course on ancient Greek.
Intermediate Latin, Latin 202. 1/2004-4/2004; 1/2012-4/2012. 
University of Louisville undergraduate course on Latin.
Intermediate Latin, Latin 102. 1/2012-4/2012. 
University of Louisville undergraduate course on Latin.
Additional Invited Class Lectures
“The Ethics of Anarchy,” Ethics, Philosophy 321. University of Louisville, 2004.
Teaching Assistant
Greek Mythology, Humanities 338, University of Louisville, 8/2003-12/2003.
Service/Academic Affiliations 
Vice President, Association for Humanities Academics.  12/2009-1/2011. 
Conference panel co-organizer, “Collecting, Travelling, and Administering Modernity.” 
Kentucky Philological Association, Kentucky State University, 2011.
Co-coordinator, “Anti: Revisions, Reconstructions, Refutations,” University of Louisville 
Graduate Conference in Humanities.  1/2010-3/2010.
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In cooperation with Commonwealth Center for Humanities and Society, Chief 
Coordinator for the “Humanities, Culture(s), Controversies” series, a public forum 
hosting guest lectures by liberal arts scholars from around the world.  8/2008-4/2009.
Research Assistant to John Hale for his book, Lords of the Sea: The Epic Story of the 
Athenian Navy and the Birth of Democracy. 6/2003-9/2003.
Language Competencies
Basic reading competency in French and German.
Advanced reading competency in Attic Greek and Classical Latin.
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